

INDIA IN REVOLT

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INDIA IN REVOLT

BY

MAJOR-GENERAL

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C.B., C.B.E., D.S.O.



MCMXXXI

LONDON

EYRE AND SPOTTISWOODE

*I am she beside whose forest-hidden fountains
Slept freedom armed,
By the magic born to music in my mountains,
Hearts-chained and charmed.
By those days the very dream whereof delivers
My soul from wrong;
By the sounds that make of all my ringing rivers
None knows what song;
By the many tribes and names of my division
One from another;
By the single eye of sun-compelling vision,
Hear us, O mother!*

SWINBURNE.

TO THE GODDESS KALI

1. *Chaos and night surround us, fools laugh and wise men tremble; the gods swoon into obscurity, and in the gloom of a dying age new myths are born.*

2. *As the sun sinks in the West, so in the East is the moon losing her brightness, and everywhere are the stars blotted out by the shadows of things unseen.*

3. *The earth quakes and thunder roams around the world hungering after dreams and hugging things dreamt of; the props of the heavens are bent, for their foundations are rooted in greed.*

4. *Some are still counting their gold, the many are wiving and talking; yet in the womb of the Abyss moans the Wonder that is to be.*

5. *No man can say, "This is my brother"; stability is gone for the struggle of the nations is like unto rattling bones, and their truces are as the venom of snakes.*

6. *Corruption centres this age and the thoughts of dead men gird it, the lowly have been exalted and the kings have passed to their doom.*

7. *All shall dissolve, and all shall emerge from out of dissolution. Birth, Conflict, Death, in unending rhythm, such is the road of mankind until Siva shall open his Eye.*

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As the reader will soon find that now and again I make use of quotations to enforce my arguments, here, in this Preface, I will ask him not only to read but to meditate upon the following one—the longest in the book; for, though I do not accept every word of it as incontrovertible, I consider it to be a good filter, through which his ideas on India may profitably be passed, before he accepts or rejects those set forth in the text.

Few men, so I think, were better acquainted with the East than Meredith Townsend. In his book "Asia and Europe" he writes of the British Empire in India in the following terms:

"Above this inconceivable mass of humanity, governing all, protecting all, taxing all, rises what we call here 'the Empire,' a corporation of less than fifteen hundred men . . . who are set to govern, and who protect themselves in governing by finding pay for a minute white garrison of 65,000 men. . . That corporation and that garrison constitute the 'Indian Empire' . . . Banish those fifteen hundred men in black, defeat that slender garrison in red, and the Empire has ended, the structure disappears, the brown India emerges unchanged and unchangeable. To support the official world and its garrison. . . there is, except Indian opinion, absolutely nothing. Not only is there no white race in India, not only is there no white colony, but there is no white man who purposes to remain. . . No ruler stays there to help, or criticise, or moderate his successor. No successful white soldier founds a family. No white man who makes a fortune builds a house or buys

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an estate for his descendants. The very planter; the very engine-driver, the very foreman of works, departs before he is sixty, leaving no child, or house, or trace of himself behind. No white man takes root in India, and the number even of sojourners is among those masses imperceptible. The whites in our own three capitals could hardly garrison them, and outside those capitals there are, except in Government employ, only a few planters, traders, and professional men, far fewer than the black men in London. In a city like Benares, a stone city whose buildings rival those of Venice, a city of temples and palaces, beautiful and original enough to be a world's wonder, yet in which no white man's brain or hand has designed or executed anything, a traveller might live a year talking only with the learned or the rich, and, unless he had official business to do might never see a white face . . . it is so everywhere. There are no white servants, not even grooms, no white policemen, no white postmen, no white anything. If the brown men struck for a week, the 'Empire' would collapse like a house of cards, and every ruling man would be a starving prisoner in his own house. . . This absence of white men is said to be due to climate, but even in 'the Hills' no one settles. Englishmen live on the sultry plains of New South Wales; Americans who are only Englishmen a little desiccated, are filling up the steamy plains of Florida; Spaniards have settled as a governing caste throughout the tropical sections of the two Americas . . . but the English, whatever the temptation, will not stay in India . . . An uncontrollable disgust, an overpowering sense of being aliens inexorably divided from the people of the land, comes upon them, and they glide silently away. It follows that even in the minute official world and the minute garrison nothing is permanent. The Viceroy rules for five years and departs. The Councillor advises for five years, and departs. The General commands for five years, and departs. The official serves thirty years, probably in ten separate counties, and departs. There is not in India one ruling man whom two generations of Indians have known as a ruling man. Of all that in Europe comes of continuousness, heredity, accumulated personal experience, or the wisdom of old age, there is in India not one trace, nor can there ever be. Imagine if in Europe no Sovereign or Premier or

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Commander-in-Chief ever lived six years! Yet these men, thus shifting, thus changing, do the whole work of legislating, governing, and administering, all that is done in the whole of Europe by all the Sovereigns, all the statesmen, all the Parliaments, all the judges, revenue boards, prefects, magistrates, tax-gatherers, and police officers. These are 'the Empire' and there is no other."

This was written some thirty years ago, when British rule in India reached its zenith. It is an amazing picture, both awe-inspiring and terrifying, this stupendous land of 300 million souls perched atlas-like upon the shoulders of some 1,500 Englishmen. It is a picture never before seen in history, and possibly such a picture will never be seen again.

I will turn now from the reader, with this picture in his mind, to the book itself.

It is not so much a history of the Indian revolution, as an enquiry into its underlying causes. The first chapter is frankly philosophical, and the last is a sequel to it. Of the remaining nine, the first five form more or less a background to the succeeding four, which deal with separate subjects. By employing this method a certain repetition and overlapping is unavoidable, especially in Chapters VI and VII. This, I trust, will not annoy the reader. Another point I will mention here, which may meet with criticism, is: that some statements and conclusions are seemingly contradictory, that the book is somewhat discursive and diffuse; but is not the Indian problem diffusive and discursive, does not it flow out, extend, ramble and change its form—look at it to-day and look at it less

than five years ago. Further, is not India a land of contradictions, and has not Mr. Gandhi rightly said of it, "India is a country of nonsense." To write a purely logical account of the revolt in India, might satisfy those prim minds who love "sensible" nonsense, but it would be a false picture, as false as a logical account of a mad man's life, indeed actions might be more clearly defined, but much of the madness would be missing. It is because we are so constantly applying logic to this question that in recent years our rule has become so confounded. Thus, in Chapter x, when I examine democracy, I do so mainly with a Western eye; in Chapter xi—with an Eastern, which happens also to be my own point of view. In the one it is considered more or less a blessing, in the other a disease. I have adopted this system purposely, for if, after reading this small book, the reader's mind is left in somewhat of a chaotic state, perhaps he will all the better realize that the Indian problem is chaotic—it is like moving through a jungle towards some uncertain point and not towards a known one by a high road.

The population figures of India are based on the 1921 census. Since writing this book the figures of the 1931 census have been published, and they show an alarming increase, the total having risen from under 319,000,000 to slightly under 351,000,000. To quote *The Times* of March 16, 1931, "The general increase in British India being $9\frac{1}{2}$ per cent., in the Indian States about 12 per cent., and for all India 10.2 per cent. The increase in the States was especially helped by a

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rise of 41 per cent. in Bikaner, due mainly to the opening of great irrigation works there in 1927, and by a rise of 27 per cent. in Travancore."

In the end I offer no radical solution, that is something tangible—so loved by Westerners, because in Asia it is the intangible which grips a man's thoughts and controls his actions. In place I offer ideas, some logical, some perhaps illogical, some cold and matter of fact, others fantastic, for fantasy plays a far greater part in the East than is generally acknowledged; hence the East has always been the power-house of religious movements. Unless we look at India through Eastern as well as Western eyes, we shall look at her askant. This it seems to me we have been doing for the last fifty years. We have been trying to see what is round the corner by looking straight ahead; and, be it remembered, Asia, and particularly India, is all corners; the mind of an Asiatic when compared to a European's may without exaggeration be defined as angular if not circular, for it generally comes back to the same point—Illusion.

If, after perusing thus far, the reader is likely to be disappointed, because I do not intend to kick a goal, and the English in particular are always kicking something (themselves included), he should put this book down, and mentally refresh himself elsewhere. If not, then it may provide him with a few ideas, and I think that to-day new ideas (for since the World War we have been living in a new age) are quite as important as stereotyped solutions, or catchwords

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such as—"Dominion Status," which no man can define.

Lastly, I have not attempted to hide the faults of British rule, because I believe it to have been the best that India has ever known, and that, consequently, it can well support criticism.

The benefit of the doubt I have given to the weaker side, which shows that I am at heart an Englishman. Consequently, should this book fall into Asiatic hands, I may expect the normal abuse meted out to acts of generosity. It is because the East, so long crushed under the heels of its own despots, possesses in no great abundance this signal virtue and its mate "gratitude," that the complex problem of India's future is so hard to solve. It is like thinking out an intricate piece of mathematics to the cacophony of a jazz band, the very rhythm of which induces a night in Africa. Nevertheless, the mere fact that we are attempting to solve this problem, surely the greatest social experiment in history, shows that, with all our faults and in spite of our many failures, we are still possessed of the spirit of Agincourt, that high courage which has guided us through so many difficulties, which has made us what we are, and which, for the good not only of ourselves but of the world, may yet guide us through this one.

*Written at St. • Beatenberg, where the
mountains tower above and
the lake sinks into
an abyss below*

June 15, 1931.

J. F. C. F.

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INTRODUCTION

INDIA AND THE GODS

INDIA is a land of illusions, mirages and will-o'-the-wisps. Time itself is an illusion, a mirage of deity, a corpse light fluttering through space which is as unreal as time itself. And out of this unreality emerges Brahmā the Great God, the He¹ of Eternity, who, gazing on the void, creates the It, the whirling force of the spheres—innumerable worlds and universes. And from this sexless emanation—Brahmā, the countenance on the void—in turn scintillate Vishnu the Preserver and Siva the Destroyer. Then from these two in the rhythmic dance of Life and Death are shaken forth through the atoms and the worlds the million lesser gods; the hosts, the legions and the myriads of village gods, forest gods, gods of the fields, the valleys, mountains and rivers; gods of the hearth and of the house with their jinns, their demons and their imps. The Great God is in Himself unknown and unknowable. His creative force is a mystery, concerning which every definition is a lie. He is beyond thought, therefore let us transcend thought, for all things thinkable are unreal. "Cogito ergo sum" is no

¹ Brahmā, the Supreme, is masculine, his creative emanation Brahmā, is in gender neuter.

argument in contemplative India, no proof that "I am," but a sure proof that the "I" in me "is not." And not until Siva opens his mystic eye (and there is a Siva in each one of us), will he and his gentle brother Vishnu be annihilated in the creative fire of Brahmā which itself will vanish in the mystery of Brahmā. Then will the "I" in me become one with the "I" in Him.

Such is the philosophy of this strange land, ancient as the Ancient of Days, modern as Sir James Jeans with his negative and positive electrical waves which vanish in an ungraspable nothingness, which, if a "something," is nevertheless a "nothing" to human thought. It is an enchanted world created by the imagination of men who, in the coolth of the mountain caverns and the shade of the forests, sought refuge from the burning sun, and in these dark places in ecstasy gave birth to the hypostasis of Hinduism.

Look at this land, then beyond Brahmā, and Vishnu, and Siva, shall we see around and about us, within and without us, the Powers which created these gods in the astrolabe of man's mind and in the alembic of his heart. For behind the sprouting shoots and falling leaves of Hope and Fear, and hope is but fear reversed, stand the silent gods coeval with this world—the might of Time and Space, of Sun, Earth, Rain and Air. It is truly these gods and many others like them—the forces of the universe—which shaping our wills and moulding our minds have caused us to worship and tremble as they dance backwards and forwards in the stark reality of this changing world. They are our

masters, and we call upon them with strange names, supplicating them, yet they remain for ever the creators, preservers and destroyers of mankind.

Look at this land of blank illusions and burning heat, of Sun which fructifies or withers up; of Rain which drowns or vivifies; of vast roadless spaces which physically separate and spiritually unite; for each village is as the next one, its dwellers doing the same things, living the same lives and dying the same deaths. Look at the rigid seasons, the wetness, the dryness, the six months of toil and the six months of meditation; and then look at the people fashioned by this unchanging order, a jumble of many races, working, idling, praying and slowly being transformed by Sun, Rain and Earth into human bricks similarly compounded, from which perchance may some day be fashioned a living nation; or is this also an illusion?

Let us probe into this question, this jumble of earth and ore. Black was the original Dravidian stock, as black as night in Africa. Then came the white and the light coloured peoples bringing strange gods with them. Through the mountain passes, down the plains trickled and surged in streams and torrents Aryans, Scythians, Greeks, Arabs, Persians, Afghans and Mongols, and lastly came ourselves, we English, the final wave of the Aryan tide. All without exception, less ourselves for the time being, were lost in the Indian flatlands like water in hot sand. India swallowed them up, one and all, and the black goddess Kali danced over their mouldering bones.

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When the first Aryans, chanting their Vedas, crept through the mountains and swept down onto the Indus from where to-day lies Kandahar, what kind of a land and a people did they subdue? We know little of these times, but we can hazard in answer that the land at least was not so vastly different in essentials from what it is now. To-day India is predominantly agricultural, there are to be counted in it 500,000 villages; a few acres and a couple of bullocks are the wealth of most men, and roads being few and generally bad increased labour brings no reward, so it comes about that prosperity knows no other motive beyond supplying the mouths of the family. Along the rivers, which in past days were the only sure thoroughfares, great cities are to be found, yet how few. Even to-day there are but thirty-three of over 100,000 inhabitants, and the population of these could be crowded into modern London or New York. Nine-tenths of the people are purely tillers of the soil, that is to say one-sixth of the entire human race is to be found in the villages of India, most of them so small that any form of municipal progress is beyond the powers of man to evolve.

Thus also must have been the India of three, four or five thousand years ago, when the first white men came down the Kabul river and eastwards through the Bolan pass, a mere handful of whiteness to be smelted like a speck of radium into a lump of lead. To radiate through it, to tinge it little by little with streaks of silver; to disintegrate it and to be disinte-

grated by it; and then a long pause of two thousand years of sleeping gods and yawning goddesses, of dire propitiations to re-awaken life and reality; widow burnings, flickering lights before snake holes, mantras echoing through the night, and sadhus with contorted arms and shrivelled legs—but all in vain. Will the last wave of the white outpouring accomplish more? Shall we in its onward-flowing tide turn the lead into silver and the silver into gold? Did our ancestors, thousands of years ago, move towards the setting sun to learn some great secret which those white brothers of theirs who followed the dawn were unable to fathom or to guess? Is all to be everlasting death in this land of Kali and her black worshippers, or is it our destiny to bring forth an awakenment which will prove that all action is not an illusion and all thought a lie?

Look at the problem, and all but the bravest must stand aghast; for the battle is not with men but with gods—the ideas in the heads of men. To create we must not only preserve but also destroy. The problem is to establish a new incarnation of Brahmā, to detonate a new creative force, and not merely to preserve the peace, to feed the people, to see that justice is done; in short, to sustain and regulate life. Creation demands destruction as well as preservation, just as an electrical current is built up of positive and negative waves. We did not conquer India in the days of Clive and Warren Hastings, it was the Indians who conquered the land for us. To-day we cannot conquer the gods of India, it is these gods which must conquer themselves. To give

to a people material things is easy for the children of the West, but to give to a people spiritual things, that is to change their gods, their ideas, is a task of infinite difficulty to them. Such a change cannot be accomplished by gold, by law, by truncheons or by bayonets, but solely by the incarnation of a more powerful god—a more virile idea. This is our and India's task in its ultimate form, and just as the engendering of a child demands a mother and a father, so does the birth of a nation, or of a culture, demand the clash of two different civilizations. It matters not one whit whether we are the father and India is the mother, or we the mother and India the father, for all that matters is that the god be born—otherwise sterility, slumber and death.

To look now at this problem from a less metaphysical point of view, let us examine the land and the influence of the old gods upon its peoples. India is a sub-continent, twenty times the size of Great Britain, as large as Europe without Russia, 1,805,000 square miles in extent, or without Burma—1,575,000. It is divided into British India and the Indian States which are not British at all; but, in place, independent princdoms under British suzerainty. These States number some 600 in all, and cover over one-third of the entire land, for their area is 701,000 square miles.¹ In this immense country swarm 320,000,000 living souls (of whom some 13,000,000 live in Burma); two and a half times the population of the United States, or one-fifth of the entire human race. Seventy-two millions of

¹ Or nearly a half if Burma is excluded.

these people are ruled by the Indian princes. The population of the United Provinces, of Madras and of Bengal are each as great as that of the British Isles, Bihar and Orissa have as many inhabitants as France, Bombay as Italy, and the Punjab as Spain and Portugal combined. These teeming millions speak 222 distinct languages and dialects, and of these, amazing to say, English is the one language which all educated Indians understand, it is the language of the leading Indian newspapers and of the Indian National Congress, the members of which pour forth their hate upon our heads in our mother tongue.

These people, taken in the aggregate, are as illiterate as they are poor. Only 13.9 per cent. of the men and 2.1 per cent. of the women can read and write, whilst the average yearly income per head is less than £8, probably much less, for at the opening of the present century, Lord Curzon, then Viceroy, estimated it at no more than a quarter of this figure. In 1918, in the United Provinces, out of a population of 48 millions, there were only 126,000 people who possessed incomes of more than £20 a year. Obviously such poverty renders government and changes in administration perplexing; for instance, whilst in Great Britain £2 10s. per head is yearly spent on the defence forces, and £2 15s. per head on education, in India these figures dwindle to 2s. 7d., and 9d. respectively.

A still more powerful factor than language, education, or gold, is religion, and in India religions are legion, for in the everyday life of her people may be

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found many more tones and shades of belief, crude, subtle and exalted, than have existed in Europe during the last sixteen hundred years. Of the followers of Hinduism there are some 216 millions, but Hinduism is not so much a religion as a way of life, the cardinal principle of which is caste, not a Vedic conception but one of later date, established to maintain the purity of the original white stock. The Aryan invaders dealt with the indigenous people in the way the white race has generally done. They did not only keep the dark people apart from social intercourse with themselves, but they also shut them out from all participation in their higher aims, and more especially so in their religious convictions and ceremonies. They did not attempt to raise them spiritually and intellectually, but in place set up barriers to protect their ideals from contamination. Hence the four great castes of priests, warriors, traders and labourers; outside of which stand outcast 40 millions of "untouchables." Besides these there are 70 million Moslems and over 30 million Sikhs, Jains, Buddhists, Parsis, Christians and other religious and irreligious persuasions, many of whose tenets and customs clash. For instance; the Mahomedan when he prays turns to the West, the Hindu to the East. The Hindu venerates the cow, the Mahomedan sacrifices this animal ceremonially. As the Mahomedan calendar is fixed by reference to the lunar year, and as the Hindu calendar is not, dates of religious importance frequently coincide, and a Moslem day of mourning may synchronise with a Hindu day of

rejoicing, then the irate gods unsheath their swords in anger and demand their toll.

At one end of the scale of human thought we get Hindu polytheistic toleration, and at the other end Mahomedan iconoclastic fanaticism; or from another angle, as Lord Dufferin wrote some forty years ago: "the naked savage hill man, with his stone weapons . . . and his childish superstitions . . . and . . . the Europeanized native gentleman, with his English costume . . . and his literary culture."

Yet the Powers behind the gods are more subtle still, for it is in the crucible of the Sun and under the dew of the Moon that the strange nature of the Indian has been compounded. The Sun has made the inhabitants of this land, and all who come to it, a little mad; mad from our European way of looking at things. For instance, not long ago, during the viceroyalty of Lord Curzon, a certain well-known Maharajah spent three lakhs of rupees (£20,000) on the marriage of two pet pigeons. Yet this same potentate, on another occasion, turned to a British official and asked him: "What is your opinion of the Rockingham Ministry?" A ministry which lasted for a few months in 1782! Still nearer to us in time, another Maharajah to punish a polo pony had it soaked in kerosene oil and burnt; whilst yet another assembled his leading financiers to consider the problem of increased taxation with reference to the rise in the price of rice which was seriously affecting the yearly allotment provided to feed the ants of his State.

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The Sun has made of the Indian a fatalist, for a temperature of 120 degrees in the shade for months on end will make a man, and still more so a race of men, marvellously resigned to discomfort. "Do nothing and we cannot be blamed," and then torrential rain for a month or so, which steaming up from the scorching earth weaves around life a network of lethargy. Placid fatalistic resignation is not the soil of progress, but the hotbed of intrigue. Behind the veil the women whisper and scheme, weaving their jealousies into poignards, and their doubts into poisoned coffee; whilst the men in palaces or go-downs dream strangely of pice or power, and of crooked and seemingly easy ways of gaining both.

Not steel but gold is the sure weapon of the East. It is easier and much safer to hire an assassin than to become one, especially in a land where a witness can be bought for a handful of rupees. Gold is a great god in the East, a far greater god than among ourselves, and this in spite of all our materialism. In the West this god gives us the Machine and the Machine labours for us as a good god should; in the East, it buys the souls of men, and these souls work for their masters. Everything in the East is tainted by bribery, and in India a bribe officially is considered no more than an "illegal gratification." To bribe freely you must possess gold, besides India is a land of unhappy chances, consequently from days beyond a date she has hoarded wealth and so has been the sink of precious metals. Though, poverty-stricken, 30 per cent.

of the world's annual output of gold is sunk in India. Since the opening of the present century, the imports of gold have amounted to £400,000,000, and of silver to £350,000,000, and this in a land where the average yearly income per head of the population is a low fortnight's wage in England. And where does all this bullion go? The bulk of it is hoarded and fashioned into bracelets, and nose rings, and trinkets. It is stored away like sunlight in coal until some invader digs it up, and with it lightens and warms a re-born epoch.

Cast education into this lethargic, intriguing and suspicious mass, and at once intrigue is transformed into litigation and suspicion into hair-splitting arguments. Babus breed like mice, one finding a job for another, and so on until hordes scribble to hordes, backwards and forwards, and all reality is lost in the mountains of files which clog every government office. Litigation is much the same; for instance, in Bengal the largest source of revenue after land is the sale of judicial stamps.

Cringing though the normal Oriental is, he venerates a strong king and worships a strong government. Strength to him is something he does not possess, and in his rulers it generally means to him that his weakness will remain inviolate. A coward by nature he has no use for a coward as a king; to him a brave man is a hero and a strong man a god. •And it was because we English in the past were both brave and strong that the country was given to us through the intrigues and weaknesses of contending rajahs.

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We came like the first white wave, but over the seas in place of over the mountains, bringing with us strange gods and celebrating, seemingly, unholy rituals. Jehovah, the Hindu could understand, Christ was however foreign to his nature. Besides these we brought the idea of the gentleman, honesty, justice, efficiency, courage and determination, all strange and spiritual forces which were destined to set up a fermentation in the land, for most if not all were, and still are, entirely alien to its instincts. We eat cows and so out-caste ourselves, we established clubs in which none but ourselves and an Indian menial or so were allowed to enter. We, like the old Aryans, became a caste, a social order exclusive and close shut against the customs and ideals, the culture and civilization of the millions which surrounded us—a soulless vehicle of our activities. We prospered and prospered greatly. We took over Akbar's land revenue system, which strangely enough was based on the assessment laid down by Julius Cæsar. We opened the coffers of the Moguls and released the hoarded wealth of ages. With Indian gold we financed the Industrial Revolution which changed the face of the world.

Few things are so mysterious as this power of gold. The brains of Europe and the gold of India gave birth to the Machine—the ruling god of Western civilization. And when this god was born he strode forth to conquer and subdue, and before the breath of his nostrils systems and frontiers, religions and the ways of life shrivelled up and vanished in wisps of smoke. He

came to Asia, and Asia awoke. He strode across India and the land became seamed and furrowed with tens of thousands of miles of railways, roads and canals.¹ Twenty-eight million acres are now under irrigation, ten million more are to be added, and the Sarda Canal System alone possesses 4,000 miles of main channels and distributaries. Plagues have been restricted, wars abolished, crimes vastly reduced, famines allayed, and law and order established, and all more or less mechanically so, by never more at any one time than 156,000 white people of whom 45,000 are women and 60,000 soldiers. This transformation, which has taken less than a hundred years to accomplish is one of the miracles of history. Out of a million and a half of civil servants, 12,000 only are of European stock including a large number of engine drivers. In the police service there are but 1,400 Europeans out of a total strength of 187,000, and in the judiciary there are 230 Europeans among 2,500 judges.

Yet the Machine has not conquered the Indians and their gods. Rather has it awakened those who have come into contact with our mechanical science and legislation. If a handful of Englishmen can control this land why not then a handful of educated Hindus? Ferment and agitation, the backwash of the engines, surge against us, and to disencumber ourselves, for the lethargy of India has now gripped us, we prattle of Dominion status as glibly as a child will talk of a new

¹ Under British rule, 40,000 miles of railways, 59,000 of surfaced roads, and 67,000 of canals have been built.

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doll, forgetting that such a status includes the right of secession. We offer with one hand and take away with the other, we argue and we scribble like the Babu; we shirk responsibility and punish those who accept it. We know that democracy is a meaningless word in a land where millions of rural voters cannot count beyond five. We listen to low caste pleaders vilifying the Indian Princes—"puppets" and "products of a vicious system" which must go. We tremble before the "holy" men who proclaim our rule "Satanic," and through fear of making martyrs turn revolutionaries into demi-gods. We know that were we to leave India, and yearly the country is becoming more and more distasteful to young Englishmen, civil war would rage through the land, the Himalayan forests would be burnt down to provide grazing ground, and the rivers and canals in consequence would dry up. Whole communities would perish, railways would be torn up, and should the monsoon fail myriads must die of hunger. It is no exaggeration to predict that 100,000,000 people would perish from famine, plague and sword, as happened in Europe when Rome went down before the Barbarians.

Is it destined then that the black goddess Kali, to whom rises in ever-increasing volume the chant of "Bande Mataram" (Hail Motherland!), should once again dance over the land with her rattling skulls? She was there crouching low on the banks of the Ganges when the first Aryans came, when the Mongols came, and she is crouching there now ready to spring into

her dance should the Sirkar vanish. Or are we destined to overcome her?

In the answer to these questions lies coiled the fate of India; and no man who has lived in that land, or has studied its problems, would hazard an answer with any certainty. The answer must be an Oriental as much as an European one. We understand, or we think we do, democracy; but the average Indian has no conception of the meaning of this word. In Europe the democratic myth is drifting towards stalemate or an end. We have passed through the ecstasy of nationalism, and are veering towards internationalism. Asia has been awakened by the Machine, and, politically, intellectual India stands where we stood over a hundred years ago. She is thinking in terms of nationalism, not of internationalism, she is thinking of herself apart from others, she is a gathering wound in the side of a unifying world.

Mr. Gandhi's hatred of the Machine is but a passing phase of medievalism, which we also in our day passed through. The poet Tagore, a truly wonderful man, sees things far more clearly. He sees that the Machine is a god, a spiritual force as well as a material force; a god who if endowed with a soul, to him—the ancient beauty and mystery of Hinduism, can fashion love and contentment, happiness and unity; and, without a soul, can be but a monster grinding fear and greed into wars and revolutions. We, in the West, have not been entranced by such a vision. In our arrogance we proclaimed the last World War to be

INTRODUCTION

“A War to save Civilization.” To save what? A world which begot this cataclism! Had it been a war to preserve what was good, to destroy what was bad, and to create what was better, we might to-day understand the mystery of the Trimurti—Vishnu, Siva and Brahmā as an inseparable unity. Then we should have progressed a long way towards solving the Indian problem.

We have destroyed much in India, we have created much, but we have preserved and fostered little of her ancient culture and civilization, because our arrogance of caste has walled us out from her people. The Machine is unshackling their religious bonds and restrictions, for a railway carriage, or a tram-car, knows nothing of untouchability—they are purely democratic conveyances. But their gods have not loosened our caste rules, because we have refused to honour their shrines or to meditate upon the ideals which indwell their idols. We go to India to earn our pay, to gain a living or to shoot a tiger. We do not stop there, no white man wishes to die in the country, for it is never a true home to him. We do not understand the Indian, because we have never tried to understand him. Our every-day life is given up to making money, and to amusing ourselves—India is no more than our workshop and our club. For us these must be efficiently and decently run. But in the East efficiency and decency, from the European points of view, are minutiae of an over punctilious mind. Whilst we are contented only with the best, the

Oriental is always satisfied with the second-rate; for to him second-rate systems being less mechanical leave room for wonder and mystery and happy chance. He does not want our damned efficiency, but he wants to enjoy the fruits of power, and to enjoy them in his own slipshod and crooked way. He has a million gods within him, all unknown to us; we have one god outside us—the Machine—known to us and through us to him. If spiritual power is an illusion, then indeed is the future unfathomable; but should it be a reality, then of a certainty are the dice of Fate loaded against us.

The answer to the riddle of India is within us and not without us; to-day it lies on the lap of some god, perchance a god unborn. To seek this answer we must find this god; if we fail to do so, then will he remain hidden from our eyes, and out of this sightlessness will Kali awake from her repose.

INDIA IN REVOLT

CHAPTER I

THE EUROPEAN AND ASIATIC REFORMATIONS

THE horoscope of peoples is not to be foretold from the position of the stars, but from the events of history, general rather than particular; for to predict the future of any one people it is more profitable to turn from its own history and seek the answer in the histories of other peoples which have passed through similar cultural phases. Civilizations rise and fall so rhythmically, that Spengler and other psychological historians have attempted to deduce a law governing them all.

Is there such a law? I, for one, doubt it. Further still, I much doubt whether any law conceived by the mind of man is anything more than a convenience, a prop, to support his ignorance; for there appears to me to be little essential difference between the doctrine of the predestination of the damned as held by St Augustine¹ and Spengler's law of civilization. Both

¹ To St. Augustine this world was of Satan. He says: "Though they all betoken themselves with the token of the Cross of Christ, though all say the Amen and sing the Hallelujah, though all be baptised, enter the churches, build basilicas—the children of God are in no wise different from the children of the devil, save only through Charity."

are but symbols of an Absolute Fate which is shrouded from man's mind; symbols which are formed by the finite understanding of man, and which even if true reflections of that Something beyond mind are equally beyond rational proof, and are consequently metaphysical conceptions.

In place of a supreme Power, whether divine or mathematical, I prefer to base historical enquiry, which is a human study, upon what I will call social morphology, the changes of form in societies. These are largely due to diseases which with almost mathematical regularity afflict mankind until they are prevented or cured. I believe that a pathological study of history is far more important than a metaphysical study, though I have always felt that when the historian is confronted by any vital problem his one great difficulty is not to write metaphysics but to stop writing them. Should the true study of history lie in this direction—a *post mortem* examination of the past—then it follows that there is nothing extraordinary in the coincidences which the histories of peoples and civilizations offer us; but it does not follow that these coincidences are inevitable—of God or by Law. In place it may be that when once the pathology of civilization has been mastered, as great changes will be effected in social life, as have been effected in man's life itself. Once smallpox was considered a punishment for sin, and not so very long ago a mathematician could have worked out to a decimal point the number of people *who must die* yearly from this disease—a di-

sease which seemed predestined to afflict human-kind. To-day, it is all but unknown, for the mind of man has conquered this pestilence; yet, so it seems to me, there are also diseases which only the spirit of man can conquer.

Here, for a moment, I must make a digression, but one of such extreme importance, that without it this book will be without a foundation, a veritable house built upon sand.

The study of civilizations is one of men as living creatures and not of marionettes dangling from the cords of law or chance, dancing this way or that, and bowing before us as the hand of the historian plays upon the strings. My starting point is, therefore, man; for this book is an attempted study of the fears and hopes of men. And to me it seems indisputable that man began to change from his beast-like chrysalis into human form when once his eyes were opened and he realised the difference between good and evil; only then as a moral creature did he really begin to think. Further, that this differentiation took upon itself a god-like (metaphysical) form, directly this knowledge endowed him with sufficient light to understand that it was and must be finite. Leading him onwards through the folly and wisdom of his thoughts, it brought him to an abyss shrouded in darkness and impenetrable to the light that was his, which, glowing into the Void, caused his countenance to be reflected, as it were, upon it. Then from this reflection he fashioned a god-like being—himself, yet infinitely more

understanding than himself, his higher self, a dream-form possessed of the knowledge of the Abyss.

Man the animal guided by the cunning instincts of the beast; man the rational creature perplexed by the "why" and the "how," and man that wondering spirit surrounded by hopes and fears, such is the human protoplasm out of which all peoples are formed, and out of which civilizations rise and back into which they sink.

Thus, from man the human protophyte, to the world as it appears to us, the world we call "reality," to the worlds of Plato, Gautama Buddha, or Einstein, to the worlds dreamt of in Bibles, Alkorans, Vedas or Zend-Avestas, man stands the archetype; for in all these worlds we discover the beast, the human being and the god. Therefore, it seems to me, that when we set out to study any great world problem, and the subject of this book is a world problem, and not merely a British and Indian argument, we should remember that its structure is animal, human and god-like, or, in other words—sensual, intellectual and spiritual. That there is no single road of force, of reason, or of religion, to guide us over its pitfalls and across its many swamps, but always a triple path—the human way.

To turn back now to the disease: What is civilization? Many definitions can be given, such as: "The difference between two states of barbarism"—a cynical void; or "The gradual suppression of the anthropoid," which to me seems to infer "The gradual emanation of the god-form"—a hope rather than a

description. Is not a truer answer: A social order based on man's threefold nature (what is fixed in man), in which a controlling idea (what is fluid in man) attempts to establish a harmony through fixing authority? Civilization is human order?

Man has never doubted the necessity for order, a fundamental conception in society, whether animal—the herd or the hive, or whether human—the tribe or the nation (the western compromise between race and government). All he has ever doubted is the controlling idea, not so much in the form of a hypothesis, a word which to my mind conjures up a rational supposition, but in that of the Holy Grail of an idea, of a myth, a conviction infused in the very lives, thoughts and works of a people. That mystical sap which coursing through their veins mingles with their blood and endows a civilization with a complexion of its own. As long as this myth is believed in as a reality, social order is maintained; but directly it is doubted, that is it comes into conflict with another myth, a fermentation is set up which challenges authority.

Of these myths which guide and also obsess a people there are many forms, some of which I will examine later; but they all fall into two categories which I will call the freedom and the fate ideals.¹ The first is largely a rational urge, the second a spiritual; both attempt to control and direct the animal nature in man

¹ Not only ideas of an opposite nature, but also the positive and negative aspects of one and the same idea. No single idea can actually exist as a force without some opposition.

by establishing authority, that is the machinery of order, or changing the form of authority. When fate comes into conflict with freedom, or freedom with fate, a fermentation is set up in the social order which we call progress. Of this conflict Peter Wust in his illuminating little essay, "Crisis in the West," says:

"There is no constancy whatever in the relationship between these two historical forces, liberty and fate. On the contrary, the latter force, fate, is always developing by its own momentum until the opposing force, freedom, seems reduced to the minimum of a mere potentiality. The marvel is that this mere potentiality of freedom though faced by a fatality grown so excessively powerful is sufficient to enable the human will to rise superior to fate, and, at times, with such catastrophic force that in one night, so to speak, it uproots the jungle of poisonous growths fostered for an entire age by a destiny whose sway had known no check. This occurs whenever personalities inspired by a fervent belief in their mission intervene at the right moment in the casually determined course of events. . .

"We have only to look about us to find contemporary examples of the spiritual energy which at times a single man can infuse into his age. In Italy, for instance, Mussolini appeared, and Italy followed him. In Russia Lenin, and Russia abandoned the lethargy of Oriental mysticism and took his path. I am certainly not suggesting that in future the world must travel along one or other of these two routes. These two figures, both of daimonic power, are simply examples of what man's personal will can accomplish when face to face with a destiny apparently overwhelming. . ."

This conquest of destiny does not necessarily mean the emanation of a better order from out a worse one, but of a different order, for progress, a moving away from, is not governed by morality but by intellectuality—that is by a change in the prevailing idea of

good and evil. For instance, and I shall return to this subject a little later on, the medieval order of society was founded on the spiritual element, whilst the modern order is founded on the rational. The one was a universal spiritual order, the intellectual lever moving the human world upon the fulcrum of God-Satan; whilst in the other, this fulcrum growing less and less stable, the lever was compelled through its restless energy to shift itself little by little from the spiritual to the animal side of man's nature, with the result that to-day it has become firmly established upon the fulcrum of greed—the natural appetites of animal man.

Thus in any dogmatic system of authority does the intellect of man, the human side of his nature, found its aspirations upon either the spiritual or the sensual side of his nature. It is because this is so that I have said that progress is not governed by morality. The status of a cave-man, a hundred thousand years ago, was in all probability a far more moral one than that of the average citizen of modern London or New York; yet intellectually it must have approached zero. Truly has Rivarol said: "The most civilized Empires are as close to barbarism as the most polished steel is to rust; nations like metals, shine only on the surface."

As an example, I will take China. For over two thousand years her civilization has remained stable in spite of the fact that her history has been described as "a series of paroxysms." The myth which upheld this stability was a very simple one, namely: "The first

duty which man owes to Heaven and to his ancestors is to have posterity." This myth has periodically resulted in over-population followed by civil war. Thus, to take a recent case: In 1720 the population of China numbered 125 millions; in 1780—283 millions; in 1812—360 millions, and in 1842—400 millions. Then came the Taiping rebellion, and by the year 1862 the census had fallen to 261 millions, and this in spite of the fact that 45 million people perished of famine between the years 1810 and 1830. The recent outbreak of anarchy is but another such occurrence; for a population of 400 millions is the saturation point in China, and such a point was reached during the first quarter of the present century. The fact to note, however, is this: Until recently Chinese civilisation has not changed because the myth upon which it was founded was the greatest of realities to her people; and not until they accept it as a disease, as they are now doing, on account of their contact with the West, will this civilization change.

During the Dark Ages¹ in Europe, the counterpart of the Chinese myth of fecundity is to be found in the myth of salvation. Lacking physical force, the Church, with a wisdom which was truly remarkable, by degrees established order through a spiritual terror. The

¹ I use this term conventionally to cover the period lying between the fifth and twelfth centuries, that is up to the date of Innocent III, when the Papacy reached the zenith of its power. From then on, the Middle Ages begin and last until the middle of the fifteenth century. This period, I consider would be better called the Early Renaissance. The Dark Ages were economically but not spiritually dark.

creation of the Devil was the greatest act in political life until the establishment of standing armies in the seventeenth century. Once the Devil became a reality some form of law and order was established; for hell was a spiritual jail, and the demons which emanated from it were spiritual policemen. Yet whilst in our modern system, far less imaginative, prisons and police forces are established to be respected, so profound was the philosophy of the Church that these very forces of evil were utilized to create conditions of virtue, and yet remain so separated from goodness that plunder as a cause of disorder was in the larger part replaced by something more desirable, namely, the conquest of the Devil and all his followers. Of this period Jacques Maritain writes in his essay, "Religion and Culture":

"The Middle Ages . . . fashioned human nature according to a 'sacral' type of civilization, based on the conviction that earthly institutions, with all their vigour and strength, are at the service of God and divine things to realise His Kingdom on this earth. The Middle Ages doggedly strove to realise that Kingdom on earth, dreaming . . . of a hierarchically unified world, in which the Emperor on the summit of the temporal should maintain the body politic of Christendom in unity, as the Pope on the summit of the spiritual maintained the Church in unity. . ."

Such was the dream of the Holy Roman Empire, a division of authority, which like most such dualities at once set up an internal fermentation which led to its decomposition. To enforce the myth of salvation, which in its day was to the masses the highest of realities, millions of people perished by sword and stake. So it happened that civilization remained stable, that

is unprogressive, until this myth, recognized as a disease, a maladjustment between the elements of man's threefold nature, was replaced by a new idea, the myth of material greed—worldly wealth as the foundation of worldly happiness.

This myth is still to-day the mainspring of Western civilization, yet by a few it is beginning to be recognized as a disease, in spite of the fact that by the masses it is looked upon as the highest of realities. The result is an increasing discontent and friction; a new myth is being born and an old myth is dying; consequently these present days in which we live are days of change, conflict and progress—the moving forwards from a myth which is ceasing to be a reality towards a reality which in its day will be recognized as a myth.

In themselves, fecundity, religious awe (wonder), and wealth are not diseases; for without the first the human race would perish; without the second, mankind would sink into an animal state, and without the third, a return would be made to barbarism. It is only when these essentials of existence and of culture, inflicted with an elephantiasis, monopolize the intellect of man, that they become monstrosities, cancerous growths and social poisons which lead to anarchy and wars. Should these be endowed with a progressive spirit, the body social will be purged of its disease, but if not they will simply leave it temporarily enfeebled and in no way cured

Intellectual progress is not, therefore, a concomitant of civilization, for it manifests only during cultural

periods which may, or may not, according to faith in the new myth around which intellect is beginning to revolve, or the strength of the myth which is opposing it, lay the foundations of a new form of civilization. A civilization based on greed must of necessity be warlike, and by this expression I do not mean solely conflicts of arms, though these are probable in the circumstances, but conflicts of wills and economies. The enthralling myth of heaven led to religious wars; greed of wealth to economic wars, and never more so since the Industrial Revolution which swept the God-idea, the ultimate expression of the medieval myth, with its obverse, the Satan-idea, out of Europe, replacing them by the Mammon-idea, the end-all of Western civilization.

Money, thus from a commodity, a convenience, has become a living organism, an incubus which lives on and in the blood of man like a malaria bacillus. The result of this stupendous change over from the fulcrum of spirituality to that of animality is, as it has been said: "a logical machine working in a void—a suicidal scepticism" and "the exposure of humanity naked to those sub-rational, vital and animal forces which, however indispensable and valuable in their subordinate place, cannot without disaster take control of a being who, after all, is not, and cannot be, a mere animal."¹

From this miraculous conception of the universe,

¹ E. I. Watkin in his Introduction to Peter Wust's essay "Crisis in the West."

humanity has ascended, or descended, according to which school of thought the reader belongs, to that of the universe as a piece of machinery, designed, if designed at all, by an omniscient mathematician. A universe in which human intellect and human outlook become as standardized materially as they were standardized spiritually in the Dark and Middle Ages. This standardization may quite possibly reach its zenith through the experiments now being worked out in Soviet Russia, for the denial of God carries with it the affirmation of the animal as the supreme human type—the blond beast-race of Nietzsche—which is to bring authority and order to this troubled world. To this Promethean idea I shall return later on.

Whilst these stupendous changes were transforming the social status of Europe and North America, by introducing a new cultural period, Asia remained wrapped in the Nirvana of heavenly dreams. But as all cultural periods are in nature progressive, that is movement away from the prevailing myth, the urge of expansion essential to the increase of wealth, compelled European nations intellectually and economically to invade Asia. Once the barbarians flooded Europe, now the merchants inundated the East, armed with a culture which was a sweet-poison to the Oriental myth which may briefly be defined as divine fatalism. The result was corrosive, the acid of freedom eat into the metal of fate. Little by little, and in recent years with increasing velocity, the new idea crept in-

wards from the sea-ports until Asia woke from her long sleep. To-day, Asia is where Europe was a century ago, and also where Europe was five centuries ago; further still, the intelligentsia of Asia want to be where Europe is to-day, consequently the greater part of this continent is filled with strife. Not necessarily wars in the ordinary meaning of the word, which are the outward and visible signs of inward discontent, but with an intellectual conflict, a struggle between the old myth of fate and the new myth of freedom—freedom to cast off an old destiny and take on a new.

What does this progress mean? Taking humankind as a whole, the essential differences between the desires of individuals, or even of nations, are insignificant, therefore does it not mean that Asia will follow in the footsteps of Europe, not those of the Europe of to-day, but of the Europe of the fifteenth century onwards? How long this will take no man can predict, for time is but relative to circumstances; but what is important to remember is, that by the date Asia is where Europe is to-day, the Europe of to-day will have vanished into the Europe of to-morrow. Either the existing myth will in whole, or in part, have been replaced by a new myth or it will have outgrown its cultural force and have developed into a static civilization. In either case the Asiatic idea will not coincide with the European, or Western, and when two fundamental world ideas are opposed conflict is inevitable. The probability is, however, that Asia will never catch up with the Europe of to-day, but in place, will within her bowels evolve

out of the leaf and wood of Western ideals the silk of a new culture. The likelihood is, therefore, that there will be a difference, and should this be a radical one, then conflict in one form or another is inevitable. What process of evolution must Asia pass through before this new culture takes definite form?

This question, so it seems to me, can only be answered by analogy. She must discard her present myth, this is certain, and she must either full-heartedly take on the Western myth, which is doubtful, or she must replace it by a new myth which would in existing circumstances appear to be impossible. What is more likely is that slowly or rapidly, according to the conditions in which she is compelled to work, she will, as Europe did, effect a compromise, and by mating freedom and fate, give birth to a new idea which in its day will evolve into a culture and at length into a civilization. Should this be so, then are the hordes of Asiatic peoples likely to pass through, in some modified form, the stages Europe passed through between the Renaissance and the present age.

The first of these was the slow replacement of the God-idea by the economic-idea. This change-over led to social disruption and religious wars culminating in the Thirty Years' War. This devastating war was the outcome of a disturbed age—the Renaissance—itself no compartment of history, but the surging upwards of the will of man and the activities of humankind. These, after the decline of the Roman Empire, were wrapped in the heavy sleep of the Dark Ages. A dream

life burning bright with supernal suns; a world still partially polytheistic as the old gods of the Classical Age crept away over heaths and fastnesses in the form of goblins and Robin Good Fellows, and little by little, as the new light gleamed upon them, faded away into a shadow world of demons and evil spirits, chased into the outer darkness by the terrifying clang of the church bell. Yet in man does the great god Pan live on.

It was a life totally different from, yet in essence similar to, the life we dream to-day: The one a world of demons, angels, saints, spells and exorcisms; the other a world of potentialities, of energies, abstract creations of our own mind, electrons and protons and photons vanishing in a four dimensional continuum, which is only dimly perceivable to the human mind in the form of three dimensional symbols. Shadows of a "Substance" which is still shrouded in the Abyss into which man gazes and gazes as he must.

What was the starting point of this stupendous change-over from the hierarchy of the saints to the hierarchy of the scientists? To me, rightly or wrongly, it was the impact of the creed of Mahomet upon the creed of Christ, and of the sensuous mysticism of Moslem culture upon the crystalline austerity of the Christian religion.

In the twelfth century the miracle stood as the highest expression of force, especially in the north, but in the south a change was taking form, and it was initiated by the Arab conquerors of Spain.

In 632, Mahomet died, and within twelve years of this date the Arabs reduced 36,000 cities, towns and castles in Persia, Syria and Africa, and thirteen years later, under the Caliphate of Ali, learning had become the settled principle of Moslem culture. This rapid progress, the most wonderful in history, was due to the sword, for in wars of conquest, other than by barbarians, phases of existence are passed through with extreme rapidity. Crossing over to Spain, by the year 732, the Arabs had reached the centre of France, and at Tours were defeated by Charles Martel. "That battle," says Draper, "fixed the religious destiny of Europe."

To the Arabs, Western civilization owes the origin of many of its present sciences and industries. Their culture fertilised Europe; nor was the spirit of Arabian organization and chivalry to be denied its influence upon the miraculous religion of this period, for in the twelfth century the Benedictine Monastery of Cluny set out to model the Christian world on the lines of Islam.

The changes which now swept over Europe were extraordinary to a degree, the most powerful being, economic revolution, loss of faith in miracles, and a return to military art, all three of which were interdependent. In the East the veil of barbarism was lifted, and what astonished the Crusaders most was that God could be so kind to the heathen. From the East came the silkworm, the mulberry, the plum, windmills, refined sugar, glass, silk, carpets, brocades

and Damascus steel. More important still—gunpowder, the mariner's compass and the art of making paper without which the printing press would have been as a man without a wife. The first founded the despotism of kings, the second led to the discovery of the New World, and the third to the stabilization of language and the spread of the democratic spirit. Simultaneously, the culture of the Moors crept into Sicily, southern Italy and over the Pyrenees, the rebirth of European literature dating from the songs of the troubadours, those songs begotten of the idealized womanhood of the hareems, and in a mysterious way begetting the medieval cult of the Virgin Mother—the sanctified and divine woman.

It was a period in which the reason of man shifted a hair's breadth from the fulcrum of the spirit towards the fulcrum of the senses. Then, as the Crusades caused a steady stream of money to flow into Italy, with this money came leisure and later culture. Culture in its turn began to loosen the bonds of serfdom, municipal liberties were founded, the population increased and the darkness was pocked and freckled with intangible desires, as sorcery, alchemy and scientific enquiry, however crude, awakened the slumbering consciousness of Europe. The crystalline speculations of scholasticism cracked, and arguments became searching, critical, corrosive. Then came Luther the child of these many things; doubting much he believed greatly, and when, in 1517, he nailed his ninety-five theses on to the wooden doors of the

Schlosskirche at Wittenberg, from the blows of his hammer resounded the distant thunder of the Thirty Years' War, a war between the economic and the spiritual, a war of fulcrums which was finally to lead to the liberation of northern Europe from the religious fate-idea.

The Reformation was due to the rationalism which preceded it, the shifting of the lever of reason towards the fulcrum of what was animal in man, and it led to the rationalism which succeeded it, a still greater shifting, until the anthropomorphism of the Christian religion was transformed into the anthropolatry of modern day rationalism upon which democracy is founded. The Reformation destroyed the pivot of a religious world order, which theoretically, though far from being so practically, was constituted upon the conception of a separation between church and state, upon "Render therefore unto Cæsar the things which are Cæsar's, and unto God the things which are Gods." The spiritual and the temporal powers were dissolved into one authority—the State. The God-idea was infused into it, and then became subservient to the political idea, and toleration replacing persecution God became nationalized, and nationalism became a religion.

The Reformation, which in itself was a revolution of thought (the passing of a myth), effected two great changes, it revolutionised religion and it revolutionised commerce. Change compelled people to think, and in thinking they discovered the joy of excitement; for in

those days, as Ulrich von Hütten says: "Men began to awake and live." Is not this exactly what Asiatics are doing to-day? Has not Asia also passed through her Renaissance since Vasco da Gama rounded the Cape? Have not we Europeans been to her what the Arabs were once to us? Have not we unveiled to her the West, by means of our gunpowder, our trade, and our education, and have not we cracked her scholastic speculations and fomented searching, critical and corrosive arguments? The answer is "Yes." The West has roused the East from her slumbers, just as the East once awakened the West, and to-day the discontent in Asia is with herself, just as the discontent in Europe was. In Europe, this discontent culminated in Luther, and all that this man symbolises—freedom, war, trade. May not we, therefore, expect a somewhat similar culmination in Asia, in which the fate-idea will be drastically reformed. If we may expect such an event, then this reformation is likely to herald, or coincide, with a prolonged period of war.

Can this war be avoided? In vacuum—yes. That is to say, were human beings by nature reasonable, in place of being endowed with a faculty called reason which to them it is torture to exert, seeing the close resemblance between the state of Asia to-day and that of Europe in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, they would make a *post mortem* examination of the causes of the religious wars, and, having diagnosed the disease, seek a remedy less drastic than the devastation of a continent and the destruction of millions of

lives. But the masses of mankind are anything but reasonable, therefore we may expect that the sloughing of the fate myth in Asia will be as painful an operation as it once was in Europe.

We may expect this, because the above *post mortem* examination will reveal to us that the main causes of disruption which once prevailed in Europe to-day prevail in Asia. In both spheres the quarrel is the same, namely, a religio-political one, and the bone of contention is the same, namely, an economic one. Had the medieval Papacy been willing to relinquish its temporal powers, in all probability there would have been no Reformation and no Thirty Years' War. The commercially-minded North would have prospered and the religiously-minded South have grown poor, yet both would have remained Catholic. But the Papacy would not relinquish these powers, because its income, and through its income to a large extent its control, would rapidly have perished. In India the present problem is very similar. The Progressives are not opposed to Western civilization, but to its control by a Western nation, they want this control themselves, because it means wealth, power and a reassumption of individuality. "The country is, however, divided on a religious question, namely the Moslem-Hindu problem, which is so predominant that no political question can be discussed without touching it. The Hindu will not divorce politics from religion, and neither will the Mahomedan. It was upon this same rock that Europe split in twain

during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. There is no saying for certain what is in store for India. Two men may be afflicted with the same disease, one may die of it and the other scarcely notice its effects; but when the disease first takes hold of them, it is not irrational to suppose that its course will be very similar in both cases.

The main political result of the Reformation in Europe was a change over from a centralized religious government to a number of independent national governments. It was not based on the ideal of a union of God and man, but on a union of a whole people cemented together by wealth; for it was wealth which produced national armies which could maintain the will of the government and so enforce law and order. Whilst in the Middle Ages the authority of the Church emanated from the Viceregent of God, since the Reformation authority has emanated from the State, that almost mythological national pontif. Once the most deadly sin was heresy, until quite recently it was anti-nationalism. This is clearly seen in the Napoleonic wars; for a threat to the State as it was represented in those days, brought the whole of Europe in arms against the arch-heretic. A crusade was proclaimed against him as surely as it had been against Saladin.

To-day in Asia we see a similar process taking form. The revolt in China and India though outwardly a revolt against European and British hegemony, is inwardly a revolt against Oriental stagnation. In

these countries nationalism is beginning to replace religion, and the struggle for freedom is one directed against the predominant fate myth quite as much as against foreign supremacy. We may, therefore, expect from similar causes similar effects. In Europe the rise of nationalism regrouped society; feudalism was gradually replaced by industrialism, the nobility and the peasantry sinking in political value and giving way to an economically-minded middle class which through their bankers and financiers established a new and powerful priesthood. In Asia we see similar changes taking place. The old economic systems are breaking down before the onward march of industrialism; the nobility and the priests are being ousted by merchants and men-of-letters; the Press is daily growing in power, and as in Europe the lawyer class is gaining more and more control over politics.

There is, however, one great difference, one which was not present in the European Renaissance. To-day it would appear that nationalism in the West reached its zenith with the World War, and that since then it has fallen into a decline; for in this war a new myth, which for a century had been in gestation, was born. Vaguely it may be called internationalism, an economic State in place of a spiritual Papacy. The war bankrupted victor no less than vanquished, it showed that so long as national politics are allowed to wage war on international trade by means of protective duties and tariffs, wars are inevitable. It also showed that trade had become so internationalised that war

meant economic suicide. The result was a wave of internationalism; on the one side ethical, as expressed by the League of Nations, on the other economic as expressed by the Russian Revolution. National liberation was demanded, but it was accompanied by a desire for social liberation, and more especially so in Russia, a semi-Oriental power, which may be said to link Europe to Asia, and a power which being blocked in the West is politically compelled to flow towards and through the East. How far the international idea, especially as expressed in its at present chaotic Russian form, will influence the rise of nationalism in the East it is impossible to say. But we know that whilst the bulk of Oriental peoples are still in a medieval state, and the bulk of the intelligentsia are daily proclaiming the virtues of nationalism, there exists a number of more profound thinkers, more especially so in India, who see in it no panacea for Oriental troubles, but rather a quack medicine which poisoned Western civilization and led to incessant international conflicts. To these thinkers it is obvious that the proof of the pudding is in the eating. That if a political order cannot maintain international peace, then it must contain within itself a radical defect. This defect is the intermixture of politics and economics, just as the Papal defect was the intermixture of politics and religion.

Yet there is another difference between the European and the Asiatic Renaissances, and this difference is to be discovered in the form of war, an activity

which though belittled to-day has always had a profound influence on the moulding of world affairs. The ways of religion were mainly destructive, but the wars of the English Empire, more particularly so since the loss of the American colonies, have been constructive. That is, in place of abolishing an idea, they have, unconsciously though it may be, inoculated their conquests with a new one—the freedom myth. On this question Wilhelm Dibelius in his book “England” says, that in England’s imperial wars “doubtless the desire for political power and economic influence was the actual motive. And yet there is an idealistic impulse in these wars which gives a sanction to England’s struggle for power in the name of civilization: England felt that she stood for freedom. . . . She had found a universal watchword in which every Englishman believed honestly and fanatically and which possessed the power of every gospel, not only to influence all mankind but gradually to purge its devotees of the dross which still hampered their energy. It is not pertinent to England’s place in world history whether the conception of English liberty in the eighteenth century was truth or legend. What is pertinent is that at a time when diplomats were haggling with all the arts of secret intrigue over villages and souls and alliances, England, in addition to all these arts, which she practised with masterly skill, had a watchword for mankind in which every Englishman believed. . . . From the end of the eighteenth century England became a world power,

for she ruled a considerable portion of the globe, and what is an essential corollary, she conferred upon the world a vital principle which at the time it needed and which has not yet lost its vigour. . . . England is the only State in the world which, even while pursuing its own interests, has something to give to other peoples, the only State in which patriotism is not synonymous with an attitude of defensive pugnacity towards all the rest of the world, the only State which always invites the co-operation of some part of the progressive, able, and idealistic elements in every nation."

Out of the Thirty Years' War, through the costly process of trial and error, arose modern Europe, the Germanic States not recovering their full vigour until the 1870 war, out of which emerged a poisonous vapour which intoxicated European nations. Until 1870 Great Britain was the workshop of the world. The steam engine devised by Watt, coupled with the gold released from India in the days of Clive and Warren Hastings, had made her for just a century the undisputed master of industrialism. Wealth beyond the dreams of avarice had been accumulated, and, during this quest of prosperity, England, besides her merchandise, brought to the East the ideals of nationalism and democracy, forged by the French Revolution, yet begotten by English philosophy. Like a subtle fluid they percolated through India penetrating into the very bones of her civilization, and thence into Islam and China.

Compared to other Empires, the British Empire

stands in a category by itself. Organized State action has played little or no part in its creation. Under the Tudors and the Stuarts, those men of the old feudal stock, soldiers by instinct, finding no place amongst the economically-minded aristocracy which the Reformation had given birth to, sailed for strange lands, Virginia and elsewhere, founding colonies as strongly individualistic as they were themselves. In India we see no deliberate conquest. At first the merchant-adventurers are mere traders, then they establish agencies, and finally when, in the eighteenth century, the Mogul empire tottered to its fall, in order to stay the anarchy which was sweeping over the land they re-established some semblance of order by leading the Indians to the conquest of themselves.

All would have gone well but for the rise of the German Empire; for, from 1832 onwards, a liberal spirit informed British colonial policy, which is proved by the fact that between 1846 and 1856 self-government was introduced in the provinces of Canada, Australia and New Zealand. In these Colonies parliamentary government was established, and it carried with it full ministerial responsibility.

In India a set-back occurred with the Mutiny in 1857; but the wound thus created might in time have been reduced to a mere scar had not the poison of an old idea, a discredited myth, which England had abandoned after the loss of her American Colonies, infected the politics of Europe and turned the Indian wound into a running sore. This idea was absolutism,

the myth of the old agricultural Europe, and the myth which England had helped to crush at Waterloo, but which Prussia had thriven upon until the battles of Metz and Sedan crowned her as the most powerful continental nation in Europe. The absolutism as expounded by a large number of German writers from Fichte to Bernhardi entered into the very marrow of her bones, engendering an arrogant and exclusive patriotism which grew into a veritable elephantiasis. Not only was Prussia's victory, a victory over France, but a victory over the ideal of freedom rendered manifest to all during the American Rebellion and the French Revolution. These upheavals gave birth to nationalism on ethnographical lines, but once Prussia, now the German Empire, had risen in the ascendant her ideal of nationalism, based on absolutism, took on an universal form, not that of internationalism but of hegemony over Europe. Militarism now became the doctrine, which began to purge Europe of its ideal of freedom—the militarism of the State founded for war in place of for peace, and also the militarism of protection, that is economic warfare during peace-time; for rapidly after 1871 Germany became industrialized, and an economic conflict with Great Britain was entered upon. This conflict led to the search after new markets and new sources of supply, and in the land-grabbing excursions which disgraced Western civilization during the next thirty years may be discovered the origins of many of the Asiatic and African problems which face European nations to-day. Asia became

alarmed. Were the high flown ideals of freedom and democracy true, or were they but stalking horses under the cover of which the non-European peoples and nations were to be plundered on wholesale lines? Then came the World War, a struggle for economic supremacy, a struggle in which nationalism played a similar part to that played by the Papacy in the sixteenth century; for politics, though they carry with them the right to control national affairs, possess no right whatsoever to control international undertakings, such as commerce between nations had become during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. In the sixteenth century and before, the Pope claimed political control of nations through his spiritual authority; in the twentieth century and before, the various national governments emulated him by claiming the power to control international trade by means of politics, a national instrument, and the result was much the same; for the World War like the Thirty Years' War was in nature an European civil war. In the one the international question was trade, in the other religion, and the acid which corroded both was a false assumption of political power. The results also are likely to prove similar, if politicians trouble to examine these causes of discord. The Thirty Years' War ended an epoch, and in the present aftermath of the World War may yet another epoch find its conclusion if politicians can be brought to understand, that should the peace of the World be desirable then international trade must be made as

free from political bonds, as nationalism was made free from Papal control, in 1648, by the Peace of Westphalia. Yet there is even a more profound result, a result which in history may fitly be compared to the aftermath of Alexander the Great's conquests. As the release of the hoarded wealth of Persia founded a new culture—the Hellenistic—which profoundly influenced Roman civilization and Christian culture, so, do I think, that the World War will be followed by a re-establishment of the Roman Empire in the form of a federated Europe, in which each nation will be politically autonomous, but economically internationalized. All now are comparatively poor on account of the shifting of wealth during the war, all still are suspicious, quarrelsome and truculent; but it should not be forgotten that the unity of the Roman Empire was not accomplished in a day, and that the present chaotic times may, from the economic point of view, be compared to the epoch of the Diadochi which followed on the death of Alexander, and out of which the Hellenistic Age arose.

CHAPTER II

INDIA'S RELIGIOUS RENAISSANCE

ACCEPTING the fact that there are close similarities between the general aspects of the European and Asiatic Renaissances, I will now turn to Asia and more particularly to India and examine the changes which took place from about the middle of the eighteenth century until the outbreak of the Franco-Prussian War, which so potently influenced European politics, and through them Asiatic evolution.

Two great changes occurred in the East almost simultaneously, and curiously enough they coincide with the first half of the greatest change which, since the fall of the Roman Empire, has taken place in the West, namely the Industrial Revolution. The first of these changes was the awakening of Islam through the Wahabi movement, the aim of which closely resembles that of the Reformation in Europe, for it was animated by a spirit of stern Puritanism. The founder of this movement was Ibn Abdul Wahab, who at the opening of the eighteenth century was born in Nejd in Arabia. Its inspirer was, however, Ibn Taimiya, an early fourteenth century theologian. This teacher rejected the orthodox interpretations of the Koran, declaring that every word of this sacred book was to be accepted

as true, and so true that all comment was heresy. Accepting this doctrine, to Ibn Abdul Wahab, the Koran, like the Bible in Europe, became a pivot around which Islam began to revolve, and from out this revolution, which, during the twentieth century, created a common spirit, or centre of thought, Arabian nationalism developed.

During the nineteenth century two other movements assisted in loosening the fetters of medieval Mahomedanism, and in so doing they stimulated the national idea; these were Babism in Persia and the Ahmadiya movement in India. The first was initiated, in 1844, by a youth named Mirza Ali Mohammed, and the second by Mirza Ghulam Ahmad, born in Qadian in the Punjab in 1838, who, however, did not declare himself a prophet until fifty-one years later. The first of these two religious reformers was put to death in 1850, and a few years later was followed by Mirza Hussain Ali, known later as Baha-ullah the founder of Bahaism. His doctrines were based on a religious liberalism, for he thought that "Everything is permissible that does not conflict with the common sense of humanity." He advocated international peace, education for both men and women, and the establishment of a world language. He taught his followers that "It is better that ye be killed rather than kill," and that "It is no merit to love your fatherland, but to love the world." In 1892 he died.

Mirza Ghulam Ahmad, who the writer met in Lahore in 1904, also held liberal views, and was

strongly influenced in his doctrines by the Arya Samaj and the Theosophical Society. He declared himself to be a universal Messiah, "the hope of all the nations of to-day," which among other things included "the champion of Islam, the reformer of Christianity, the Avatar of the Hindus, the Buddha of the East." Like Baha-ullah he preached pacifism and universal brotherhood. He died in 1908.

Though both these movements aimed at establishing a religious internationalism, their main importance lies in their corrosive influence on medieval Mahomedanism, to a rejuvenation such as Europe passed through during the Reformation, and to an eventual weakening of orthodox religion as the central factor in Islam. This was the ultimate religious change which the Reformation effected in Western civilization. All these religious disruptions, as well as the immediate contact of Turkey with Europe found their centre in the court of Abdul Hamid II, and gave rise to the Pan-Islamic movement; for this monarch made the Caliphate the focal point of the entire Mahomedan world.

The second great change which took form about the middle of the eighteenth century was the rapid decay of the Mogul empire in India, and the rise of British autocracy in that country. This brought Western civilization, and with it the freedom-myth, into close touch with Hinduism. Though English democracy and Islamic reform are activities which cannot well be compared, it should be remembered that the former

was the political and social expression of the Protestant Reformation, and that this reformation can in many respects be compared to the Islamic. The tendency of both these foreign currents was the same, namely, towards freedom, and it was during this early period that the first symptom of a national spirit may be sensed if not actually felt in India. In 1798 Sir Thomas Munro wrote:

"What is to be the final result of our arrangements on the character of the people? Is it to be raised or is it to be lowered? Are we to be satisfied with merely securing our power and protecting the inhabitants, or are we to endeavour to raise their character, to render them worthy of filling higher stations in the management of their country and devising plans for its improvement? . . . We should look on India not as a temporary possession, but as one which is to be maintained permanently, until the natives shall in some future age have abandoned most of their superstitions and prejudices, and become sufficiently enlightened to frame a regular government for themselves, and to conduct and preserve it."

Again, in 1821, when Governor of Madras, this remarkable man said:

"Our present system of Government, by excluding all natives from power, and trust, and emolument, is much more efficacious in depressing, than all our law and school-books can do in elevating their character. We are working against our own designs, and we can expect to make no progress while we work with a feeble instrument to improve and a powerful one to deteriorate. The improvement of the character of a people, and the keeping them, at the same time, in the lowest state of dependency on foreign rulers to which they can be reduced by conquest, are matters quite incompatible with each other. There can be no hope of any great zeal for improvement, when the highest acquirements can lead to nothing beyond some petty office, and can confer neither wealth nor honour."

These liberal and foreseeing views which coincided closely with the spirit of freedom as manifested in the French Revolution, would not, so I think, have fallen on arid soil had it not been for the Napoleonic Wars which effacing an epoch, as a hundred years later did the World War, created so many new problems in Europe, that the hold gained by England over India in the Seven Years War was to a large extent left unmodified by the lessons of the American War of Independence: a war which taught England what contented colonial government required, and what discontented must inevitably lead to. These new problems, and the rapid rise of industrialism in England, so occupied the thoughts of her people and her government as largely to obscure the freedom idea. Had England possessed less time wherein to work, and consequently more time wherein to think, Munro's foresight might well have fallen on fertile soil. This, however, was not to be. Nevertheless contact with Western civilization sowed the seeds of freedom, and from the close of the Napoleonic War until the advent of Swami Vivekananda who, towards the close of the century, definitely turned the religious ferment which had arisen in India into political channels, these seeds took deeper and deeper root. How did this ferment originate? From causes and through influences very similar to those which had given rise to the Wahabi and other reform movements in Islam.

Strongly influenced by Mahomedan monotheism, Ram Mohan Ray, a Bengali Brahmin, born in 1772,

stands on the threshold of the Indian religious reformation. Convinced of the necessity of a general religious purification, after watching the torments of his young sister who on the death of her husband was compelled by her religion to commit suttee, he entered the service of the British Government, and dedicated his life to social reform. He condemned suttee and polytheism, studied the Vedas and the Bible, translated several of the Upanishads into English, and, in 1828, founded a theistic society called the Brahma Samaj, the aim of which was to return to the Vedas, as the Protestants had returned to the Bible and the Wahabists to the Koran. His central idea was to re-establish primitive Brahmanism. "The eternal, inscrutable, and unchanging Being who is the Creator and Preserver of the universe" was not to be worshipped under any distinctive name or title; no religious statue, pictures or anything of the kind was to be used, and no sacrifices were to be offered, or any creature to be deprived of its life.

Ram Mohan Ray was the first Hindu to visit Europe and on his return he strongly advocated English education. "The ideal before him," writes Hans Kohn in his "A History of Nationalism in the East," "was the union of Europe and Asia, not a union in which Asia sacrificed her individuality and merely imitated, but rather one in which she adopted so much of Europe's intellectual treasure as advanced her own development." Under the influence of this remarkable man European thought began to penetrate into cultured Hinduism, and from the date of his death, in 1833, the

Indian Renaissance passed into the phase of the Reformation.

The successor of Ram Mohan Ray was Debendra-nath Tagore (the father of Rabindranath, the world-noted Bengali poet) who proclaimed that the true knowledge of God was to be sought only in nature and intuition. The moving spirit in social reform was, however, one of his disciples, Keshab Chandra Sen, who preached a universal theism and made use of the scriptures of nearly all religious denominations—Jewish, Christian, Mahomedan, Zoroastrian, Confucian, Indian and Buddhist during his divine services, to which both sexes were admitted without restriction. Thus, not only was orthodox Hinduism attacked, but also the infallibility of the Vedas. Little by little religious freedom was manifesting, and with it a national spirit which found its first expression in the Indian Mutiny.

The Mutiny which was outwardly a military rebellion, was inwardly a national revolt, the aim of which was reactionary rather than progressive, for its goal was not a unification of Indian States, in place the reassumption of their independence. Of it Sir Valentine Chirol says, in his "India, Old and New": "It was a violent upheaval, not so much against the political supremacy of Britain as against the whole new order of things which she was importing into India."

It was a war endowed with a national spirit, for it was waged by Hindus and Mahomedans in close co-operation, and it was the reaction against the

aggressive British imperialism which opened with the unjust and disastrous First Afghan War in 1839, and culminated in the Crimean War. In this last mentioned war, the fact that a Moslem power—Turkey—in alliance with Great Britain and France, defeated Russia was not lost on the Mahomedans in India. In 1843 Sind was annexed after a war for which there was no excuse; then in 1844, after two battles, Gwalior was brought under British administration. Then, the next year, came the First Sikh War, and Kashmir came under British control. In 1848-9 the Second Sikh War and the annexation of the Punjab, and in 1852 a war in Burma followed by the annexation of that country. As if these wars and annexations were not sufficiently disturbing, Lord Dalhousie, the Governor-General, initiated a policy of so disastrous and disruptive a nature, that India never recovered from it. This was the policy of "lapse," by which, unless a native ruler was followed by a direct heir, his State was absorbed by a British Presidency or became part of a British Province. Under this policy, between the years 1848 and 1854, seven states were absorbed including Nagpur and the Punjab, which with Oudh, annexed in 1856, totalled a quarter of a million square miles of territory. Had this policy never been adopted, not only would the Mutiny have not taken place, but to-day the number of Indian States would be more numerous, and the problem of federating India far easier. No man in the whole history of the British occupation of India has done a greater injustice to

India or disservice to the British Empire than Lord Dalhousie did during the years of his Governor-Generalship. His policy of "lapse" was utterly suicidal.

The results of the Mutiny were threefold: First, its atrocities, committed by both sides, embittered Indians and British; secondly, the East India Company vanished and India becoming an empire was brought into closer contact with the British Parliament; thirdly, and not the least important, the spirit of nationalism was recognized, grudgingly though it may be. Goldwin Smith even during the Mutiny acknowledged India's right to regain her independence; and under "The Indian Councils Act," of 1861, Indians began to take a minor part in making laws for their own country.

No sooner had the Mutiny closed than another conflict, the American Civil War, exploded, and though it took place in a land remote and unconnected with India, it had both a moral and economic influence on the progress of nationalism in that country.

First, it was a war for freedom—the right of a nation to maintain its unity, the right of individual States to manage their own affairs, and, more obvious to the peoples of India, a war against slavery and oppression. Secondly, it revealed India's powers as a cotton growing country, and gave a marked stimulus to her industrialization, which eventually led not only to the creation of a Labour Party, but eat into the caste system upon which Hinduism is founded; for in factories caste rules cannot be closely observed. Fur-

ther, the establishment of Indian Mills, quite as much as foreign competition, ruined the hand-workers who by their caste rules were precluded from seeking new occupations. Thus two discontented classes of people were created; the factory hands who became, as Al Carthill says in "The Lost Dominion," "the golden sheep of the slum landlord," and the hand-working craftsmen who were reduced through their own religious customs, as much as through the change in industry, to starvation.

The national movement had thus at the opening of the Franco-Prussian War progressed a long way from the embryonic condition it was in at the date of the death of Ram Mohan Ray. It had been influenced largely by war and by economic changes, but perhaps the greatest influence brought to bear on it was that of European education which was established, in 1835, in India on a sure footing by Thomas Macaulay. Macaulay was a man of steadfast Liberal views, he not only advocated freedom of the Press and the equality of Europeans and Indians before the law, but knowing nothing of Indian culture or philosophy, he aimed, as Kohn says, "to Anglicise India as Rome had Latinised Gaul and Iberia in the past." In his memorandum on education which he placed before the "Committee of Public Instruction," of which he was Chairman, he says :

"It may be that the public mind of India may so expand under our system that it may outgrow that system, and our subjects having been brought up under good government may develop a

capacity for better government, that having been instructed in European learning, they may crave for European institutions. I know not whether such a day will ever come, but if it does it will be the proudest day in the annals of England."

These words were strangely prophetic. R. G. Pradhan in the introduction of his book "India's Struggle for Swaraj" (published in 1930) says: "Modern India is, indubitably, the product of Western education. . . . The effects of Western education have been enormous and far-reaching. They have touched almost every sphere and phase of Indian thought and life. . . . For one thing, Western education has given India a common language in which her educated classes freely exchange their views and ideas. . . . It is impossible to receive Western education without imbibing the spirit of nationality. If ancient Hindu culture is synonymous with religious and philosophical idealism, modern Western culture is synonymous with nationalism, the spirit of patriotism, the love of freedom."

Western education created a spirit of introspection; it compelled a comparison which resulted in an increasing discontent with the lethargy and medieval outlook of Hinduism; in brief, it created a moral indigestion which soon manifested itself in an increasing peevishness against Western civilization itself.

Whatever may be said of the autocracy and despotism of British rule in India, the underlying fact is that the liberalism of Macaulay could lead to but one end—the extension of liberty and the desire for self-

government. Viewed from the distance of Westminster this may have seemed desirable enough; but at such a distance the jagged edges of Hinduism lose their sharpness, a sharpness apt to irritate and distress British officialism in India placed as it is in close contact with it.

Socially the English and the Indians were (and still are) separated by centuries; in one sphere what was morally pure was corrupt in the other. All nations are a little peculiar, and sometimes very much so when examined by other nations, and never more so than when two such different cultures as those based on fate and freedom are compelled by circumstances to live side by side. The ideal of what an English gentleman should be was totally foreign to what an Indian gentleman proved himself to be. The one was a well-mannered, grown-up schoolboy, not highly educated, but honourable, honest and brave; the other, a cultured, polite, and speculative man, who from the European point of view was effeminate and corrupt. The differences between such diverse characters had a twofold influence; they created a barrier of arrogance, and they diffused an atmosphere of awe. The Englishman would not, and in the circumstances could not, become intimate with the Indian, for his caste rule was the colour-bar; yet the Indian, accepting the gentleman idea as an idol worthy of his worship, began to judge himself by it, and in so doing encircled the Englishman's head with an aureole of prestige. In spite of all his veneration the colour-bar remained

adamant. Thus it came about that when the Indian, having modelled himself on the gentlemen-ideal, found that he was denied the fruits of his labour, and was denied a position in the leadership of his country, he, not so much out of revenge as out of a sense of moral self-preservation, became a leader of the dissatisfied elements and challenged the English gentleman's rule.

As may be expected in a country so religiously deep-rooted as is India, this revolt emerged from out of a religious school. This school was the Arya Samaj, which was founded by Swami Dayananda Sarasvati in 1875.

Dayananda, an orthodox Brahmin, was born in 1824 and he died in 1883. His real name was Mul Sankar, but he abandoned it as an earnest that he had completely cut himself off from home and family life. He became a wanderer and an ascetic, and in his meditations it was revealed to him that Hinduism was utterly opposed to the spirit and teachings of the Vedas. He attacked polytheism and the caste-system which the Vedas do not uphold. Like Rousseau he believed that all men by nature are born equal. Here then was a pivot around which those soured by British arrogance could conglobate.

The Arya Samaj was a religious and national movement, a movement focussed by the Vedas, as the Protestant movement in Europe had been focused by the Bible. A new centre of unity was given to Hinduism, and from this centre, and more especially from the Dayananda College emerged a new orientation of

education, namely, a national education in place of an European. It was laid down that "Education must be so imparted that the pupils may become the best possible members of their community. The bond uniting the individual and the national community must be strengthened. The customary system of education (in India) works in the opposite direction. It denationalises. The rapid inflow of alien ideas introduced with English literature has certainly succeeded in enlightening thousands and clearing their intellect, and the country has reason to be proud of some of them. But alien education has given rise to a rift in the community which is truly deplorable. An educated class has been created which lives its own separate life without being able to influence the uneducated masses or be influenced by them; such a class has nowhere been seen before. The remedy is national education."

In 1903-04, the writer came into close contact with the Arya Samaj in the Punjab, and was amazed at the efficiency of its organization and system of self-help and social welfare. In 1907, Sir Valentine Chirol considered the Arya Samaj a serious menace to British rule, and a more recent writer—Hans Kohn, in 1928, is of opinion that "The Society has revolutionised the whole of Indian life," and has "taught the Indian people that the West has never in its religions fathomed those depths and heights known to Indians thousands of years ago," and that Indian wisdom can solve Europe's social problems.

Out of the Arya Samaj emerged not only religious reform and national revival, but a religion of nationalism as fierce, and as truculent and all embracing as the ideal of nationalism begotten by the French Revolution. The nature of this nationalism was fully revealed by Swami Vivekananda at the World Congress of Religions at Chicago in 1893. He was not a follower of Dayananda, but of another religious master, Ram Krishna (1834-1886). On his return from this Congress he said:

"Once more the world must be conquered by India. This is the dream of my life, and I wish that each one of you who hear me to-day should have the same dream in your minds, and stop not till you have realized that dream. They will tell you every day that we had better look to our own homes first, then go to work outside. But I will tell you in plain language that you work best when you work for others. . . This is the great ideal before us . . . the conquest of the whole world by India. . . Let them come and flood the land with their armies, never mind. Up, India, and conquer the world with your spirituality! Aye, as has been declared on this soil, first love must conquer hatred, hatred cannot conquer itself. Materialism and all its miseries can never be conquered by materialism. Armies when they attempt to conquer armies only multiply and make brutes of humanity. Spirituality must conquer the West. Slowly they are finding out that what they want is spirituality to preserve them as nations. They are waiting for it, they are eager for it. Where is the supply to come from? Where are the men ready to go out to every country in the world with the messages of the great sages of India? Where are the men ready to sacrifice everything so that this message shall reach every corner of the world? . . . We must go out, we must conquer the world through our spirituality and philosophy. There is no other alternative, we must do it or die. . . The only condition of national life, once more vigorous national life, is the conquest of the world by Indian thought."

Here then, at the close of the nineteenth century, ended the epoch of Indian revolution in solution, hence onwards it rapidly began to solidify. Out of these words of Vivekananda a new myth was born, a myth that had already begun to take form in the West. To him Indian nationalism could only become a reality by the conquest of the world by Indian spirituality, in the West more and more was it becoming apparent that materialism in national compartments was an evil, and that for the peace of the world trade must be internationalised. The aim of both these orders of thought was freedom, liberation from the shackles of materialism and the evolution of a World State out of the then existing conditions of national life.

Neither side could, however, grasp the full purport of this tendency. It was seen by a very few. In the West nationalism plunged headlong towards the precipice of war; in the East, like the infant Hercules, it was strangling snakes whilst still in the cradle. Both were now endowed with a fighting spirit, the spirit of conquest; Western science conquering the material world; Indian philosophy conquering the spiritual. A clash between these two forces was inevitable.

CHAPTER III

THE HOTBED OF REVOLUTION

WHILST Indian reformers were revealing the real, or imaginary, India of Vedic times, and whilst European Orientalists were co-operating in this movement by popularising the Sacred Books of the East in translations, Indian nationalism, attracted to this ancient learning like a moth to a lamp, hitched its wagon to the rising star of religious revival; for as Warren Hastings once said: "In no part of the world is the principle of supporting a rising interest and of depressing a falling one more prevalent than in India." And this star shone all the more brightly because of the darkness of the sky of Western materialism in which it was set.

Originally autocratic, but not altogether exclusive, after the Mutiny and still more so after the Franco-Prussian War, the Government of India became more and more mechanical, passing rapidly from a living organism into a machine. The chaos of the final years of Mogul rule had been replaced by a prolonged period of peace, in which the incentive to material improvement was the first necessity, but not the only one, for "man cannot live by bread alone." This was proved by the fact that religious revival coincided with

increasing prosperity. The British Government took, however, no part in this revival. It is doubtful whether Englishmen were even conscious of its existence, for their "rule was," as Al. Carthill writes in "The Lost Dominion," "a thing of human invention imposed by foreigners, not an organization growing naturally out of national institutions. . . . The machine, however skilfully constructed and carefully tended, must eventually wear out and then there is nothing for it but the scrap heap." Further this writer says:

"It might also have come down from its Olympian heights and mixed with the people. It should have regarded its subjects, not as 'food-units,' or taxpayers, or algebraical expressions, but as men. It should have abandoned its arrogant contempt for Oriental culture. It should have conciliated public opinion—not the public opinion of intellectual hybrids, but the real genuine inarticulate public opinion of the masses. Its agents should have been taught that cold aloofness, even when coupled with austere and pure impartiality, is a vice in a ruler. The qualities it should have required from its district officers should have been, not so much efficiency and ability as geniality, sympathy (in its true and not in its debauched sense), and courtesy."

We did nothing of the kind. Even as early as 1860, we find Sir Bartle Frere writing:

"The addition of the native element [in the legislature] has, I think, become necessary owing to our diminished opportunities of learning through direct channels what the natives think of our measures, and how the native community will be affected by them. It is useless to speculate on the many causes which have conspired to deprive us of the advantages which our predecessors enjoyed in this respect. Of the fact there can be no doubt, and one will, I think, object to the only obvious means of regaining in part the advantages which we have lost, unless he is prepared

for the perilous experiment of continuing to legislate for millions of people, with few means of knowing, except by a rebellion, whether the laws suit them or not."

This is what happened during the forty years which followed the writing of this minute. We ruled India in the dark, a darkness in which we could feel material things but in which sentiments were utterly intangible. Industrialism swept all before it in the West, and more especially so when Germany became a competitor of Great Britain. Economics and not ideas monopolized the thoughts of the Government of India, hence it concentrated on the rural problem. It was the friend of the peasant and a despot to the rising intelligentsia; it overlooked the ethical side of rule and forgot that their ideas and their fulfilment were as necessary to social contentment as law, order and daily bread. It was an uphill game, for rural prosperity in place of enriching the peasants only added to their numbers, and though law-abiding by nature they became infused with a latent discontent through the never dwindling and ever-present dread of starvation.

Never entering into the lives of the people, and especially into the lives of those people we had educated, to whom the vast store-house of European literature had been opened, and from which the spirit of liberalism flowed like a mighty river to inundate the East; never bothering about their religious beliefs and customs, unless like that of suttee they actually shocked us into taking notice, we drifted on through darkness into a dream in which was created a mythical India, an

India which did not exist, an India which seemed to us to be a land of milk and honey, a land in which our prosperity was assured and our rule permanently established. We could not read the writing on the wall, because we could not see it, and even to the few who did see it to most of them it remained cryptic and meaningless, for its letters were not written in gold or silver, but in the invisible ink of the thoughts of a generation of young Indians, who, to the most seeing, appeared only as professional agitators and self-seeking journalists—flies upon the wheel of our mighty chariot.

Yet these flies, unlike the fly in the fable, were raising a dust which through the breath of many lips was being wafted over the land. The chariot, mighty though it was, was in fact stationary, it was not moving onwards towards any distant goal, it was standing still. Loaded with material things it was little by little being silted up by the dust which the flies did raise, and yet though the flies could bury it they were as yet impotent to move it. Their impotence should have been either our hope or our fear, it was neither; for we could not see the wood for the trees—at most the dust appeared to us a petty annoyance.

To say nothing in justification of our policy would be misleading. We had found the land in chaos and we had virtually recreated it in prosperity. We were the children of an economic age, and adepts in the sphere of worldly things. We were living in a lethargic country, the somnolence of which crept into our bones. We understood full well our own system of

government—that to identify the State and the nation was wrong; for the function of the State is to establish law and order, to foster prosperity and to regulate economic activities; it should not concern itself with religion, literature and culture, for these lie in the sphere of the national community, and appertain to its desires and beliefs.

• Outwardly our error was not this, for these things we had accomplished as certainly and surely as had we been at home; yet inwardly this was our supreme mistake, for inwardly we did not represent an Indian State, a State which can only be created by an Indian national community. Instead, we represented a foreign power, a despotism, benevolent though it might be. We could not understand the moral effect of our rule. We could not see that it must inevitably lead to a moral degeneration and decay, and that this decay could only be averted by the people of the country participating in public life. Though, for the time being, we had saved India economically, we could not see that our great work would never be accomplished until we had given her full opportunity to save herself morally as well. Without self-determination, that is power to regulate its own affairs according to its own racial and cultural peculiarities, a nation, or a congeries of nations, which India virtually is, becomes hypocritical and loses its self-respect. Foreign rule emasculates a nation's originality, and sterilizes its power of growth. "It lives a false life at all moments. Its best men feel cramped and oppressed with a sense

of want of harmony between the soul and the body of the nation. This process ends in the death of that soul. . . . The curse of the imitation of the superior foreign class destroys all springs of real life among the people. The nation then becomes only an intellectual parasite and ceases to contribute anything of its own to the moral and intellectual life of humanity." These words were written by Hamed el Alaily in his "The Future of Egypt," published 1910, and they are as applicable to India as they were to his own country.

One Englishman saw this clearly during the period under review, he saw that political servitude must lead to moral degeneration and a spirit of serfdom, this was Sir John Seeley who, in 1882, published his well-known book "The Expansion of England." In it may be read the following:

"Subjection for a long time to a foreign yoke is one of the most potent causes of national deterioration."

These words were unheeded, as unheeded as were the words of Thomas Munro and Goldwin Smith. They fell on fallow ground, because Englishmen are neither great readers, great thinkers nor great dreamers. They are for the most part practical men, insular and cautious. Their method of progress is as individual as they are themselves. They do not, like most people, work from a rational premise and prove a thing right, but from an irrational one and prove a thing wrong. For instance: if an Englishman is given a sheet of pink blotting paper he assumes that it is white,

spends years in attempting to prove that he is right in his assumption, and when he has exhausted all methods of proof and none clinch his argument, he is fully convinced that it is pink after all. This inverse method of proof has certainly one great virtue, and more especially so in politics: the Englishman never jumps to a conclusion, and, consequently whatever his policy may be, it is generally stable. Nevertheless this horror of buying a pig in a poke, until such time has elapsed that when the poke is opened it is found that the pig is dead, is apt to exasperate those who come into contact with him, and particularly a rising democracy and a democracy under foreign rule. This extreme cautiousness of movement is correctly gauged by at least one Indian writer. Mr. R. G. Pradhan, in his "India's Struggle for Swaraj" says:

"The Indian constitution, no less than the British, illustrates the British method of making no radical or revolutionary changes but of moving slowly and cautiously, and making only such advance as may be deemed necessary in order to improve the existing machinery of Government, or to prevent popular discontent from becoming too serious."

The answer to such caution is obviously to increase discontent, for the more potent it is the higher will be the acceleration in reforms. This is what happened in India, and is still happening to-day. It is important to realize this, for otherwise things will be seen in a false perspective. If the present goal of discontent is to throw off British rule, we are faced by one thing; if it is to awaken the British people and compel them to move,

it is something else. I will now examine how the machinery of discontent was constructed.

Discontent, the underlying cause of all revolutions, is a psychological factor the materialization of which into physical force, the outward manifestation of revolutions, depends on power to enforce the will of the weaker upon the stronger side. Nowhere more so than in the East do events assume a psychological aspect. Wars come and they go, and whilst in the West they are looked upon as means of gaining and losing things material—land, provinces and markets, in the East they are examined from the point of view of power. Who is losing power, who is gaining power? What star is in the zenith, what star is in the nadir? War thus becomes a horoscope of future events and possibilities, it is as it were the finger of God glowing in the night of ever-changing time, pointing out to those who can see the destiny of the weak and the mighty, the oppressed and the free.

In the years which followed the Mutiny, affairs in Afghanistan were not handled with marked skill. In place of going out of its way to conciliate the Amir, Shir Ali (a hostile buffer State is all but an anachronism), in 1878, the Government of India decided on war. Victories were won, peace was delayed, the Home Government changed, the Viceroy resigned, and Afghanistan was evacuated in a manner which resembled a forced retreat.

Was the British Raj invincible? Apparently not. Simultaneously came the Zulu victory of Isandlwana;

then, in 1881, the defeat of the "invincible" Red Coats at Majuba, and four years later the death of General Gordon and the abandonment of the Sudan. Not only was British prestige shaken throughout the East, but European prestige as well, the stock of which dropped heavily in the power market when in 1896 the Italians were routed in Abyssinia, and in 1897 Turkey defeated Greece.

This aspect of war, its repercussion on Eastern psychology, we as an Empire have seldom if ever troubled to examine, and still less to understand. Had we done so we should have grasped the fact that to maintain our prestige over Oriental peoples we must never suffer a reverse. To win a campaign, or a war, is not sufficient; we must win every battle, every engagement. Majuba, Khartum and Penjdeh were from a military point of view insignificant affairs; but to Indians and other Oriental peoples they were straws of Fate which pointed which way the zephyrs and storms of power were drifting.

During this period, a Liberal Government at home having, in 1880, come into power, the Marquis of Ripon replaced Lord Lytton as Viceroy, and to initiate a liberal regime he introduced a Bill known as the "Ilbert Bill" which aimed at removing the restrictions which prevented Indian magistrates trying European offenders. This bill was welcomed by all communities in India except the European, which not only attacked it with fury, but threatened to use force to prevent it becoming law. The result of this opposition was a

drastic amendment of the Bill, an intensification of racial hostility, and the realization among the Indian intelligentsia that only by organizing the national movement could grievances be redressed. Curiously enough the leader of this movement was neither a Hindu nor a Moslem but an Englishman—Mr. A. O. Hume, a retired Civil Servant.

Hume considered that though England had greatly benefitted India by establishing peace, her method of government "was out of touch with the people," that there was no safety for the masses so long as the administration remained unleavened by a representative Indian element. Realizing that the intelligentsia of a country, however small in number, are the natural leaders of the people, he formed an organization that "would afford a legitimate vent to the seething discontent then rife, and direct it along constitutional channels." This organization, or association, he christened "The Indian National Union," the policy of which was defined as follows:

"The Union is prepared, when necessary, to oppose by all constitutional methods, all authorities, high or low, here or in England, whose acts or omissions are opposed to those principles of the Government of India laid down for them by the British Parliament and endorsed by the British Sovereign, but it holds the continued affiliation of India to Great Britain, at any rate for a period far exceeding the range of any practical forecast, to be absolutely essential to the interests of our own national development."

A conference of the Union met under the presidency of Mr. Surendranath Bannerjee, at Bombay, on

December 27, 1885. In the circular convening it may be found the following interesting paragraph:

"Indirectly this conference will form the germ of a native Parliament, and, if properly conducted, will constitute in a few years an unanswerable reply to the assertion that India is still wholly unfit for any form of representative institutions."

At the first attendance seventy-two delegates were present, and the expression of these men towards the Government was one of marked loyalty. Mr. Bannerjee thanked England for "the inestimable benefit of Western education." Mr. Subramania Aiyar said: "By a merciful dispensation of Providence, India has been brought under the dominion of the great British Power. . . . The rule of Great Britain has, on the whole, been better in its results and direction than any former rule." Before dispersing the delegates resolved that the Union should henceforth be called "The Indian National Congress."

Little attention was taken of it at the time, but its logical sequel was the formation of the Moslem League in 1906 as a counterpoise to Hindu aspirations. This League declared itself loyal to the Government and asked for no reforms. Its formation showed, however, that behind the national movement stood the problem of religion, the fundamental problem in India.

The establishment of the Indian National Congress was the culminating point in a century of revolution ; a period which gave us India, and in which we had illuminated the land with Western culture, but had remained blind and deaf to the voice of its past history.

Had we learnt as much from India as India had learnt from us, we should have seen in the establishment of this Congress more than a passing shadow. We should have seen not merely a poor imitation of our own system of rule, but the beginnings of an indigenous nationalism as fierce and all-consuming as had been ours from the days of Queen Elizabeth to those of Queen Victoria.

From 1885 onwards, slowly at first, then more rapidly, the ideal of Indian nationalism became spiritualized in the utterances of such men as Swami Vivekananda, whom I have already quoted, and Ananda K. Coomaraswamy who in his "Essays in National Idealism" gave word to the following:

"We believe in India for the Indians . . . it is not merely because we want our own India for ourselves, but because we believe that every nation has its own part to play in the long tale of human progress, and that nations which are not free to develop their own individuality and own character are also unable to make the contribution to the sum of human culture which the world has a right to expect of them. . . . We are not merely striving for a right, but accepting a duty that is binding on us, that of self-realization to the utmost for the sake of others. . . . It is for us to show that industrial production can be organized on socialistic lines without converting the whole world into groups of State-owned factories. It is for us to show that great and lovely cities can be built again, and things of beauty made in them without the pollution of the air by smoke or the poisoning of the rivers by chemicals; for us to show that men can be the master, not the slave of the mechanism he himself has created."

To him, the India of the opening of the present century, in spite of all its peace and prosperity, was a land in which social economy was in a state of disintegra-

tion; architecture, a mere copying of "English palaces and French villas"; craftsmanship was ousted by "the mechanical vulgarities of Birmingham and Manchester"; music by "the gramophone or the harmonium. . . in a word, every man seeking to widen his own outlook, sees but his own face distorted in an Indian mirror."

' To Coomeraswamy "The true Nationalist is an idealist; and for him that deeper cause of the unrest is the longing for self-realisation. He realizes that Nationalism is a duty even more than a right; and that the duty of upholding the national Dharma is incompatible with intellectual slavery, and therefore he seeks to free himself, and through others like himself, his country."

Here we have presented to us the spiritual revolt, which if tamped down and restricted must in its turn explode into the physical revolt, a revolt which during the decade 1894-1904 indirectly gained much from the influence of war on Asiatic idealism.

First came the conflict between Japan and China in 1894, and though a war between two Oriental nations, by a number of the more progressive Indian nationalists, and more especially by Mr. Tîlak, it was looked upon as an indication that Asia was awakening; further, it showed the superiority of European military equipment, and that for purposes of self-protection Asiatic nations must adopt it.

Next came the war in South Africa, in 1899. Once again Great Britain was quite unprepared to wage it,

and eventually, in 1902, the war was ended by the attrition of the weaker side. "Indian Nationalism," as Mr. E. Thompson, in his "The Reconstruction of India" writes, "grew to strength in Africa," and this we shall see is no exaggeration, when I come to examine the activities of Mr. Gandhi. Equally did this war prove that though the British Empire won through and prevented the secession of the Transvaal and the Orange Free State from the dream of Cecil Rhodes, she did so only by exerting her full strength. Conversely this proved the strength of even a small and poorly armed people when fighting for freedom, and this lesson was not lost on Asia.

Barely had the war in South Africa ended than war clouds gathered in the Far East. Then the storm burst, and, in 1904, the Russo-Japanese war was declared between a European nation on the one side and an Asiatic on the other. "A stir of excitement passed over the North of India," writes Mr. C. F. Andrews in "The Renaissance of India." "Even the remote villages talked over the victories of Japan as they sat in their circles and passed round the *hugqa* at night. A Turkish consul of long experience in Western Asia told me," he says, "that in the interior you could see everywhere the most ignorant peasants 'tingling' with the news. Asia was moved from one end to the other, and the sleep of the centuries was finally broken."

The drama of Port Arthur, of Liao-Yang, of Mukden and of Tsushima swept from the Shanghai to Fez. It

resounded through Africa and through Egypt, and as M. Pavlovitch asserts: "The Russian Revolution of 1905 played the same part in the life of the Asiatic peoples as the French Revolution had formerly played in European countries. It gave the impulse in Turkey to the revolutionary activities which led to the fall of Abdul Hamid. It made an overwhelming impression upon Persia, which was the first Asiatic nation to start a simultaneous struggle against its own despots and against the rapacity of European governments. The same is true of China. But everywhere European intervention frustrated the fulfilment of dreams of national liberty."

With a total lack of knowledge of the psychological influence of war, this was the moment upon which the Government of India decided upon the Partition of Bengal. A decision which shocked the Hindu peoples to the bone. The following year the Indian National Congress put forward a demand that India should be made a "self-governing colony."

The influences of the Russo-Japanese War coinciding as they did with this unpopular partition, which was regarded by the Hindus as an act of social murder, led to the introduction of the Swadeshi (belonging to one's own country) movement and the boycott. I think, therefore, that Mr. Pradhan is right when he says: "It is impossible to exaggerate the effects of the Japanese victory on the Indian mind." Indian students began to study the history of Japan in order to discover what enabled her to wound so deeply one of the greatest

military Powers of Europe. The answer they found in Japanese patriotism, self-sacrifice and national unity. Here were miraculous powers beyond the might of armaments. The rise of Japan was looked upon as "a divine dispensation." Indian students flocked to this rising Star of the East, and then in the years 1907, 1908 and 1909 they returned haloed with knowledge, both true and spurious, to take part in the Swadeshi^e movement, to help on a cause which the Japanese victories had endowed with a vigour undreamt of before the war.

The reforms in government which followed this demonstration of enthusiasm, I will touch upon later. Here I will complete the war picture up to the date of the outbreak of the World War, for both the war in Tripoli and the Balkan Wars had marked influences on Indian affairs.

The Moslem League, as I have already noted, came into existence in 1906, a year after the Russo-Japanese War closed—a significant date. Established as a counter-poise to the Indian National Congress, during the troubled years 1907-1910 its members stood aloof from the revolutionary movement. Its loyalty was unshaken, for the Partition of Bengal and the Morley-Minto Reforms of 1909 had been all in its favour. Then in 1911 came the war between Italy and Turkey, and further to vex the situation the annulment of the Partition of Bengal. What could the Moslem world think? It lost trust in the word of Great Britain, and it became convinced that the Christian nations were still the

deadly foes of their faith. Next came war in the Balkans. "This," as is stated in the Montagu-Chelmsford Report, "was represented as a struggle between the Cross and the Crescent and led to much bitterness of feeling. Indian Muslims showed their sympathy for Turkey by despatching a medical mission to her aid in December, 1912; and a section of pan-Islamists began to teach that the first duty of Muslims is allegiance to the Khalif, and founded a new organization—the *Anjuman-i-Khuddam-i-Kaaba*—whose members took an oath to sacrifice life and property in defence of the holy shrine against non-Muslim aggressors." In 1913 the Moslem League proclaimed its adoption of the cause of colonial self-government for India. This declaration brought its political aspirations in line with those of the Indian National Congress, and though this in no way resulted in a union between India's two great religious factions, it established the possibilities of an alliance which bore fruit during the Khilafat movement in 1919.

CHAPTER IV

THE INFLUENCES OF THE WORLD WAR UPON EUROPE AND ASIA

THE period of conflict in Western civilization which opened with the Crimean War, the Indian Mutiny and the American Civil War, culminated in the World War of 1914-1918. In this war the Western myth of national freedom reached its summit, and since 1919 it has fallen into a visible decline. Democracy is not the power it was, and to many it has been discovered that this god in common with all political gods has feet of clay. The World War, like the Thirty Years' War, was the outward expression of an inward change. In itself it was not a revolution, in place the fever begotten by a revolutionary period—a surging upwards of under-ground currents compressed into action by the weight of nationalism itself. It proved that the world was an economic unit, all parts of which must live in harmony if this unit is to maintain its health. It also proved that the political autonomy of nations is still sound, if the people are ethically united, and so long as national politics are divorced from international trade. It struck, therefore, a heavy blow against Imperialism, and suggested in its place the ideal of a World Federation in which ethnographical groups of

peoples would be politically free to develop along their own lines, each group being linked to all other groups by unrestricted intercourse and trade.

Its creative influences on the world as a whole, and the many myths which controlled it, were far greater than the destruction it wrought. Among these I intend to examine four, namely the upheaval of the Western economic system; the revolt against the standardization of life; the loss of European prestige in Asia, and the Russian Revolution.

The first of these influences may be dismissed in a few words. The loss of man-power was insignificant, for long before the war the world was suffering from over-population. The loss of fixed capital was also insignificant, but the disorganization, social, intellectual, moral and financial, was colossal. The chaos resulting in the peace which followed proved that if Western civilization could find no better settlement of its difficulties than war, then every argument when carried to its ultimate conclusion must lead to bankruptcy of victor and vanquished alike. Whilst European nations were cutting each other's throats, which from the world point of view did not much matter, they were destroying their common property, and as they destroyed it industrialism was accelerated in the East, consequently two or three more such conflicts would result in the industrialization of Asia and the bankruptcy of Europe. During war-time the economic centre nearly always shifts away from the seat of war, and as long as Western conflicts could be restricted

to parts of Europe, what these parts lost neighbouring parts gained. But once European nations were industrialized and commerce became more and more internationalized, this restriction vanished, with the result that neighbouring continents in place of countries benefited. During the World War economic wealth flowed into North America, and though some also trickled into Asia, her main gain, as we shall see, was a moral one.

As the war left Europe in economic chaos, so also did it leave her in moral doubt. To see this clearly we must turn to the vanquished nations, and particularly to Germany the country which suffered most.

During the war, beset on all sides by powerful armies, eventually confronted by the entire civilized world; blockaded, starved out and vilified, Germany struggled on to the bitter end. In the war she lost much: 2,000,000 men killed, her entire invested wealth, her extensive colonial possessions, and the health of the bulk of her people. Though these losses were hard enough to bear, her most shattering and devastating loss was the realization that the myth of her past and passing greatness was no more than a blown shell—a shell which the war had crushed into powder. This realization—that aggressive nationalism was a failure, that the Cæsarism, or imperialism, emanating from it, and the militarism and racial arrogance upon which it depended, were but blind alleys leading nowhere except to destruction shattered her faith. From this realization emerged what vaguely may

be called "The victory of the European mind over the National spirit." A vision totally unseen at Versailles, where elderly statesmen, men of a past generation, of a past political order and of the passing shadow-show of a dying world-myth, wrangled over the bones of the slain and cast lots for the belongings of the living, like the Roman soldiers at the feet of the crucified Christ. Had they looked upward the vision must have smitten them, but they looked downwards into that past hell which had created the war, and their minds were dulled by its smoke and their thoughts tinged by its fires. But to the youth of Germany it was otherwise, for as Kurt Pinthus says in his "Menschheitsdämmerung" ("The Twilight of Humanity") out of the "fermenting, chaotic, explosive" days in which they lived, "In the luxuriant flower of civilization they smelt the reek of decay, and their prophetic eyes saw a hollow factitious culture and a social order propped up solely on mechanism and convention, and already in ruins." Count Keyserling truly says in his "Travel Diary of a Philosopher," published within a year of the close of the war, "It is not that the machine kills the man, but that it reduces all that is spiritual to material, all that is organic to mechanical terms, by showing that without soul, cultural interests, or emotional cultivation, it is possible to live a full and busy life." To re-create the German soul, and not to resuscitate the before-war German body, has been the one great Teutonic problem since the close of the World War. We see this in the "Movement of Youth,"

in the cult of Nature and Nakedness, in Keyserling's "School of Wisdom" at Darmstadt, in the late Rudolf Steiner's "Anthroposophical Society," in Ziegler's tremendous book "Der Gestaltwandel der Götter" ("Transformation of the Gods"), in the writings of Walter Rathenau who saw, as C. H. Hereford describes in his Essay "The Post-War Mind of Germany," "In the soulless labour of the millions who worked that exquisitely elaborated machinery . . . an enslavement of the spirit to mechanism, an enslavement in no wise redeemed by the profusion of resulting dividends which maintained a growing class of profiteers in affluent idleness. No socialist, he yet believed with the socialists that no society is healthy in which there is either a proletariat or a parasite; but his final measure of social health was not economic at all: the end of society was the development of soul."

In his book "The New Society" Rathenau says:

"We are endowed as no other people is for a mission of the spirit. Such a mission was ours till a century ago: we renounced it because through political slackness of will-power we fell out of step; we did not keep pace with the other nations in internal political development, but devoted ourselves to the most far-reaching mechanical developments, and to their counterpart in bids for power. It was Faust, lured from his true path, cast off by the Earth-spirit, astray among witches, brawlers and alchemists.

"But the Faust-soul of Germany is not dead. Of all peoples on the earth we alone have never ceased to struggle with ourselves. And not only with ourselves, but with our dæmon, and God. We still hear within ourselves the All; we still expand in every breath of creation. We understand the language of things, of men, and of peoples. We measure everything by itself, not by us; . . . We are all alike and yet all different; each of us is a wanderer, a brooder, a

seeker. Things of the spirit are taken seriously by us; we do not make them serve our lives, we serve their life with ours. . . Only on Thoughts and Ideals can our existence be staked. We can and must live by becoming what we were designed to be, what we were about to be, what we failed to become: a people of the Spirit, the Spirit among the peoples of mankind."

"It is not we who liberated ourselves," writes Rathenau "it was the enemy; it was our destruction that set us free." In one word it was the war, that great liberator which unloosened the shackles of the nations.

I have selected this quotation with a double purpose. First to show that in Central Europe a strong reaction is taking place against the very foundation of Western civilization; secondly to show that this reaction is in spirit closely allied to that which is working in India against Indian civilization. The words of Rathenau may with interest and profit be compared with those of Vivekananda which I have already quoted, and with those of Coomaraswamy from whom I have also quoted and from whom, a little further on, I will quote again. The portentous fact is that the revolt against Western materialism and against Eastern theocracy appear to be moving towards similar goals. Unfortunately we in England have not so far been attracted into either orbit. We still remain outside the psychological currents of a rejuvenating world. André Siegfried, an acute observer, says of us in his book "England's Crisis":

"The Englishman not only shirks from the effort needed to solve his problems; he will not even formulate them. His mental laziness is extraordinary. It bores him to think, and he is particularly hostile when anyone raises a discussion of principles upsetting his

peace of mind. When he is forced into a corner he contents himself with half-explanations, or some snap judgment which will give him an excuse to think no more about it. Perhaps this explains why these people, who live so leisurely in comparison with others, also gives the impression of charming repose. Their traditional calm is so soothing to the nerves that with little effort we could imagine that time itself had ceased to flow. Such an atmosphere is fatal . . .”

This I think is true. We are reposing in the shade of a twilight world, a world which is rapidly vanishing into night. We abhor genius because it upsets our repose. We no longer produce great men of action, because we do not allow them to act, or do all in our power to prevent them from acting. Inflicted by so pronounced a mental lethargy as we are to-day we have learnt little or nothing from the war, except that it proved itself an inconvenience, an unrestful epoch. Inflicted with such a coma, how can we solve the vital world problems which now face us? We cannot, for unlike the Germans we have ceased to struggle with ourselves, and unlike the Indians we have ceased to struggle with others. Whenever we succumb to the yells of the agitator, which really distress us, or adopt a half measure, or frankly give way we at once proclaim our action to be either miraculous, courageous or the quintessence of statesmanship. More than any other nation we won the war, this was our great misfortune; for it left our frontiers intact and our souls contented. Had we lost it we might have fallen headlong into chaos, but is such an end less noble than rotting in the armchair of peace?

To turn now to the third of these influences, as I have already shown, each outbreak of war since about the middle of the nineteenth century has lowered European prestige in Asia. The World War proved no exception to this rule, much the reverse. Into the pool of Europe was hurled a rock, the waters were uplifted and fell, and the ripples washed the uttermost shores of the entire world. In truth the World War did far more than this, for like a tidal wave it swept through what Spengler would call the "pseudo-morphosis" of Western civilization in the East, and by so doing Europe as a whole sustained the greatest moral defeat in the history of her civilization. To Ku-hung Ming in China, to Rabindranath Tagore and Gandhi in India, Western civilization had proved itself a curse and not a blessing. Gandhi declared that the war clearly showed its Satanic nature, but it was left to another Indian Ananda K. Coomaraswamy, to set out the Asiatic point of view in its full significance. In his "Message of the East" he says:

"The Western nations, after a period of unparalleled success in the investigation of the concrete world, 'the conquest of nature,' and the adaptation of mechanical contrivances to the material ends of life, are approaching in every department a certain critical period. The far-reaching developments of commercialism are undermining their own stability. One-tenth of the British population dies in the gaol, the workhouse, or the lunatic asylum. The increasing contrast between extremes of wealth and poverty, the unemployed and many other urgent problems point the same moral. Extreme development of vulgarity and selfishness imply the necessary reaction. To Europe in this crisis the East brings a message: the East has indeed revealed a new world

to the West, which will be the inspiration of a 'Renaissance' more profound and far-reaching than that which resulted from the rediscovery of the classic world of the West. As the message of the West has been one of diversity, analysis, and the separate self, so the message of the East is one of the unity of all life, of synthesis, and the universal self. But the modern civilization received from Europe threatens to smother true Asiatic civilization. A century of 'progress' has brought India to a stage where almost everything of beauty and romance belongs to her past. But the West has this advantage, that it has learnt to subordinate material aims to spiritual values, whilst the East has only borrowed the former from Europe. There is no object in achieving a political revolution and winning independence of European domination, if at the same time the East remains in spiritual subjection to European influence. India and the East must proclaim their own message through their own life. That is their obligation towards mankind. That is their service in the creation of a new humanity. Therefore I say, awake while there is yet time. Ye are the salt of the earth: but if the salt have lost its savour, wherewith shall it be salted? And even if you persist in believing that every European is fair and everything Indian barbarous, yet remember that the highest ideal of nationality is service. You will be judged, not by what you successfully assimilate, but what you contribute to the culture and civilization of humanity. Not merely is it impossible for you to reproduce (you can only caricature) the outward forms of Western civilization, but it is a mistaken aim. In the lofty words of Sri Krishna: 'Better is one's own duty, though insignificant, than the duty of another, even though performed with brilliance.' The West will not fail to unearth and sooner or later assimilate the message of the East. But how different the power of that message delivered by the teachers of a living people whose one inspiration it still is, and its power if merely found to be implicit in their ancient culture, and not realised in their actual lives. How great is the responsibility of those who are the hereditary guardians of this message. Theirs is the choice between intellectual and spiritual slavery, and intellectual and spiritual service. One choice is death, the other life."

There is much of truth in this comparison, and

much, as regards the Eastern message, which is unconvincing; for behind the words of this writer glow the fires of European and American education. Nevertheless, it cannot be doubted that the World War brought a fullness of life to the East, and endowed the yearnings of such men as Coomaraswamy with a fierce energy.

Before I examine further the influence of the World War upon Asia, and more particularly upon the revolution in India, I will turn to the fourth influence, the Russian Revolution; for Russia, a semi-Oriental country, is the ethical link between the West and the East.

The Russian Revolution, like most others, was not a carefully laid plan, but the result of economic strain that burst an abscess which had been forming since the days of Peter the Great. Foreign trade had been the foundations of Russian prosperity, this trade was cut off by the war, with the result that the cost of living rose, and social unrest soured into revolution. On November 7, 1917, Vladimir Ilyitch Ulianov, better known as Lenin, formed his government, and a new chapter in world history was opened.

How this dire event took place is outside the scope of this book, but to understand the aim of its informing genius is of importance, for Lenin realized that Russia was "the natural bridge between Europe and Asia," and that consequently, if he could not directly attack the capitalistic and imperialistic nations of Europe by debouching from this bridge, he could with ease threaten them in rear—that is by fomenting revolution

in Asiatic countries. He himself said: "The road to London leads through Delhi."

What was his philosophy? To him wage labour was the Beast of his apocalypse; like Luther he was the slave of a vision. He says: "We are still hampered by old prejudices . . . but every hour these are fading. More and more effectually we now defend and represent seventy per cent. of the population of the earth . . . If our international comrades help us . . . no defeats can prevent the success of our mission. This mission is to bring to triumph the cause of the . . . World Revolution, to create the Soviet Republic of the World." Yet in this vision he is sufficiently child of his native soil to see Russia supreme. "I can see," he writes, "how science will leave her home in England, France and Germany, and come for some centuries to live with us."

A fanatic for organization, he saw himself as the founder of a new world system, the messiah of a new epoch, and like many another would-be messiah, tolerance was incomprehensible to him. What he said *was* orthodoxy; Karl Marx had endowed him with intellectual freedom, but this freedom was to be solely his, for with no one would he share it. Marx had freed him from the blind acceptance of dogma, but his freedom was to be the dogma of the new order.

Rivarol, once wrote to his master Louis XVI: "New states can only be built upon mud, blood and brutality; they are erected from the bottom upwards." This in no way frightened Lenin, for his world state was to be

built from the bottom upwards, and if it cost the world a hundred million lives and a generation of agony what were these horrors compared to its sublime end—the Communistic millennium.

Here, behind the skin of the material monster, we glimpse the soul of the religious fanatic. Spiritual terror was beyond his power, the army was in a state of dissolution, consequently the establishment of a social terror remained his sole tool; for with Napoleon he believed, that "There can be no social revolution without terrorism. . . . How can," exclaimed the young republican general after the events of July 14, 1798, "those who have the whole administration in their hands, who hold all offices, enjoy all advantages, simply be told to pack themselves off? They must be beaten down by Terror, driven to flight, and that is what the *lanternes* and the popular tribunals are for The masses only really grasped the Revolution when the Terror began."

To Lenin, as to Napoleon, terror was only a means to an end, to turn Russia, and then the entire world into one vast human machine—Detroit multiplied a million-fold. As Valeriu Marcu writes in his "Lenin": "The Bolsheviks would set the proletarians in motion, the proletarians the poor peasants, the poor peasants the 'middle' ones, the middling ones the rich—and this machine, built up of men, would function like a gigantic workshop for Socialism. Dictatorship was the leather belting that would link up the wheels and keep them in motion." And again: "Tens of thousands

of tractors, hundreds of electric power stations, synthetic fertilizer works, the wealth of the towns, the economic planning of the revolution in Western Europe, would show the small farmers of the countryside the unprofitable nature of private ownership. Socialized industry would bring the peasants all the technical assistance they needed, and Communism would put new life into everything. . . . the sufferers were comforted by the thought that they were building a house in which they would some day themselves live. As yet they were only putting up the scaffolding."

In one respect at least Russia resembles India, she is predominantly a peasant country. Her army is recruited from the peasantry, and the control of the peasantry is her crucial problem, a problem which is likely to direct her destiny. Like India, her intelligentsia is small, numbering some 3,000,000 people out of a total population of some 150,000,000. To hold in leash this inert mass rooted in the ground, and simultaneously to enforce his economic theories which were far from palatable to the people, Lenin fell back for his central political idea on the conception of government as expressed in the organization of the United States of America, and implied in that of the British Commonwealth. He was an "idolator of science," he dreamt of a technical advance on the American model. "Our salvation," he says, ". . . lies not only in a good harvest . . . not only in good conditions in the light industries . . . we still need the heavy industries. If we

are without those we are doomed as a civilized country." With the poet Stephen Vincent Benét, he stood entranced by the vision of a world gyrating round an apotheosized Henry Ford—

"Out of John Brown's strong sinews the tall skyscrapers grow,
Out of his heart the chanting buildings rise,
Rivet and girder, motor and dynamo,
Pillar of smoke by day and fire by night,
The steel-faced cities reaching at the skies,
The whole enormous and rotating cage
Hung with hard jewels of electric light,
Smoky with sorrow, black with splendor, dyed
Whiter than damask for a crystal bride
With metal suns, the engine-handed Age."

He did not copy to the letter either of these models, instead he applied to his own particular problem the spirit that underlay them. Self-determination was promised to all people inhabiting the territories of the old empire. The colour bar was removed and all economic frontiers vanished. In theory the Union of Socialist Soviet Republics created by him was to consist of a union of free nations living side by side within an economic federation, or super-State, the ultimate aim of which was to absorb the entire world; in which each group of peoples, or Soviet, was to be autonomous, possessing its own language and culture. The duality between Pope and Emperor, which existed in the Holy Roman Empire, was avoided by what appeared to be the simplest of all processes: the spiritual world was abolished, lock, stock and barrel.

In theory this ideal of ethically free nations revolv-

ing within an economically free sphere was sound enough, but the fly in the ointment was the control of the masses which from time to time might sicken of it. The solution of this problem was simplicity itself. Freedom had been the cause of past world disruption, freedom was therefore abolished. "The will of hundreds, of tens of thousands," said Lenin, "can be incorporated in a single person. . . . More discipline . . . more dictatorship, are needed A new war is now beginning, a war without bloodshed. March now to victory over famine and cold, over typhus and economic collapse, over ignorance and devastation." Such was his gospel. All that the multitudes had to do, was to look upon the existing order as hell upon earth, and any desire to enjoy its good things as Satanic. Only by following his word to the letter could the social paradise be gained. Such was the megalomania of this economic Mahomet.

It was proclaimed that all citizens of either sex over eighteen were entitled to vote, but as only one political party was recognized in the U.S.S.R., namely, the All Communist, or Bolshevik, Party, this freedom was nothing more than political slavery. No opposition parties were, or have been, permitted; consequently ever since the revolution, Russia has been ruled by an oligarchy as despotic as that of any former Czar. That this has been possible is largely due to the fact that all Asiatics love order and venerate authority; the slave instinct surges through their blood.

I have entered upon these brief details, as later on,

when I examine the revolutionary situation in India, it will be seen that the basic political problem in that country is not far removed from the Russian problem. Either India may model herself on the Russian ideal or the Russian reality. In the one case she is likely to remain within the British Empire, in the other to fall under the control of a number of despotisms of her own people.

The virulence of the Russian Revolution has to a certain extent obscured the fact that it was but part of a general Asiatic revolution which swept from the Mediterranean to the Yellow Sea. The World War, to use a metaphor, removed the lid of the magic jar which contained the spirit of nationalism, and as no coaxing would induce the terrible jinn which emerged to re-enter its prison, all that could be done was to pander to its aspirations. The liberation of Egypt was one of the prices Great Britain decided to pay for winning the war, and the promise of responsible self-government to irresponsible people in India was another. Passive as well as active resistance became universal, and in far distant countries took on similar forms. Thus, in 1919, in Egypt, Mahomedans fraternized with Copts just as they did with Hindus in India, not because they loved Copts or Hindus, but because all parties were faced by a common enemy—Western autocracy. In 1919, the Milner Mission was boycotted in Egypt, and, as we shall see, in 1929, the Simon Commission was similarly treated in India. The final settlement was a half-measure, Egypt was granted her independence,

but Great Britain maintained her military forces in the country, and there they are likely to remain. In India a similar settlement may perhaps be the answer to self-government.

In Arabia the impulse was much the same, it was towards a quickening of nationalism; so was it also in Persia, which since the war is becoming rapidly modernized; and so was it also in a lesser degree in Afghanistan. In China the first influence of the war was a development of her industries, which was soon followed by the outbreak of civil war mainly directly against her ancient civilization, which for centuries had prohibited industrialization.

In no Asiatic country were the influences of the war more strongly felt than in India, for during the years immediately preceding its outbreak India was ripe for revolution. At first agitation paused; a halt which penned up the floods of enthusiasm only to release them with greater force once the dam of pseudo-loyalty to Great Britain was broken down. The truth is, that the war flamed forth so unexpectedly, that its very appearance and dimensions forced a halt; further, though there were many loyal supporters of the Government, and more especially so among the Indian Princes, even the most progressive reformers were totally incapable of controlling, let alone governing, the country without British support. Again, open rebellion would of a certainty have been met by drastic repression, and in the circumstances no halo of martyrdom could be won, because it is contrary to human

nature for the masses of mankind to pay attention to a comparatively insignificant drama, when one of the greatest ever enacted was being played on the stage of the entire world. For India to have declared open revolt in 1914 would have been suicidal, and there can be no doubt whatsoever that the members of her National Congress showed wisdom and political insight in calling a halt. The fruits of this wisdom they reaped manifold before even peace was declared.

Besides the moral effect of the war upon European prestige, which influenced India even more strongly than other Asiatic countries, and which grew in intensity as the belligerents blackened each other's characters by infamous propaganda, this conflict affected India economically, socially and politically. In spite of the difficulties it created, the prohibition of imports from enemy countries was welcomed as it stimulated the growth of Indian home products. Her natural resources, mineral and vegetable are great. She has abundant coal, ample means of creating water-power and immense forests. During the war she furnished many military necessities, thus the war threw a strong light on the importance of her economic possibilities.

Economic growth carried with it Europeanization, the increase of the industrial proletariat, and the rise of a woman's suffrage movement. At first public attention was diverted from those influences by Mr. Gandhi and his followers, of whose activities an account will be given in a subsequent chapter; but this diversion was only momentary, for the prehistoric nationalism which

this group of reformers was seeking to establish found no basis of reality in the circumstances of the war itself, or in the period following its close.

This social awakening, which during the years succeeding the war has grown in ever increasing intensity, was strongly stimulated by the widening of administrative and political authority. So many British officials were called away from India, that their places had to be filled by Indians, and generally speaking they proved themselves to be good and capable substitutes, for as may be read in the "Montagu-Chelmsford Report": "The war has given an interest in public affairs to many thousands who were indifferent before."

The effect of this and other changes was rapid, for, in 1916, both Mrs. Besant and Mr. Tilak formed a Home Rule League and opened an intensive propaganda in its favour. The result was a quickening of the sense of unity, a welding of the Indian intelligentsia into some semblance of a national oligarchy revolving in an atmosphere of some 300 million human asteroids, the peoples of India, "marching" as it has been said, "in uneven stages through all the centuries from the fifth to the twentieth"; slowly and then more rapidly sucking them inwards towards its own centre, absorbing them in the idea of freedom, and so endowing them with a mythological force, which if left undirected by wisdom and perseverance is likely to end in a Titanic turmoil.

This curious and enthralling astrological spectacle, this flaming forth of a new constellation in the East,

compressed into existence by the World War, came as a surprise to the British nations, as great a surprise as had the outbreak of the war itself. Since 1870, a world war was predestined, a war between European nations, or else a social explosion within the bowels of Western civilization. Since approximately the same period, the manifestation and materialization of a national spirit in India was also fore-ordained. Both had been unseen by those who should have first noticed them. Both were closely related. The one was a struggle against a hegemony of Europe by the German empire; the other a struggle against British Cæsarism in India. Both were a conflict between liberty and despotism in its several forms. In July, 1912, Lord Crewe, the Liberal Secretary of State for India, stated before the House of Lords that those Indians who looked towards a status in India in any way comparable to Dominion self-government would look in vain. He said: "There is nothing whatever in the teachings of history, so far as I know them, which makes the realisation of such a dream even remotely probable." On August 20, 1917, another Secretary of State for India, Mr. Montagu, also a Liberal, announced in the House of Commons: "The policy of His Majesty's Government, with which the Government of India are in complete accord, is that of the increasing association of Indians in every branch of the administration and the gradual development of self-governing institutions with a view to the progressive realisation of responsible government in India as an integral part of the British Empire."

“We take these words to be the most momentous utterance ever made in India’s chequered history,” so said Mr. Montagu and Lord Chelmsford in their Report. Momentous they certainly are, for who can fathom what they hold in store. In 1912, Lord Crewe considered Indian self-government a dream not even remotely probable, five years later Mr. Montagu, stated that the Home Government and the Government of India are in complete accord as to its desirability. Who then is right? At present it is impossible to say: but one thing is certain, namely, that this momentous change was due to the World War. Those who proclaim war to be purely a destructive trade may here learn a lesson. Of all creative activities war is probably the greatest. The world of 1919 resembled but remotely the world of 1913, and was almost as far separated from it as were the words of Mr. Montagu from those of Lord Crewe. Had this fact been realised, most of the world troubles since the close of the war might have been avoided. But this was not to be, for no sooner was the last shot fired than statesmen, politicians, soldiers, financiers and whatnots plunged “Adown Titanic glooms of chasméd fears,” to seek and rescue the world of 1913 which had vanished for ever.

CHAPTER V

THE INFLUENCES OF THE WORLD WAR UPON THE BRITISH EMPIRE

IN considering the future of India and the much discussed problem of self-government in that country, the influence of the World War on the status of the British Empire is a question which cannot be overlooked. The changes produced by this war were world wide, hence its name, and because Europe and the Empire were more highly organized than Asia, these changes were more profound. Whilst in the East they brought toppling to earth the edifices of a decayed civilization, in the West they cracked and crumbled the foundations of a social system which before the war was considered to be an unshakable and irremovable perfection.

At the opening of the present century the Empire largely stood apart from the world, then came the South African War which replaced the idea of Empire by that of a Commonwealth of Nations. In this war the Dominions played a man's part, and they demanded that freedom which is the essence of manhood. Next came the Russo-Japanese War, and Russia which had for a generation been looming over the Empire, like the might of Philip II in the days of Queen Eliza-

beth, went down before the heroism of Japan at Liao-Yang, Port Arthur and Tsushima. Then the world problem took on a more definite form, for Germany and Germanic aspirations were now left as the sole terror which confronted Great Britain and her satellites.

It must never be overlooked, for otherwise the whole problem will be blurred, that before the outbreak of the World War it was fear of German dominion which compressed sentiment within the Empire into tangible form, and that directly this fear was removed by the Armistice of November 11, 1918, sentiment, though it did not actually volatilize expanded into a somewhat different shape. In this history was only repeating itself; for a guarantee of security is always the strongest bond of friendship. Before 1763 fear of France was the cement which held the first British Empire together. Within twelve years of its removal the American Colonies sought their independence. In 1879 the destruction of Zulu military power had an identical effect on the Transvaal. In order to gain their independence the Boers rose in arms in 1881, and the result was Majuba Hill.

As I have pointed out in a previous chapter, the main influence of any war of importance is not material but psychological. Thus John Maynard Keynes says in an article on "The Economic Chaos of Europe": "All the houses destroyed in France and Belgium were not more than the normal building programme of a year or two in western Europe alone,

and the injury to their railways was far less than a year's new construction in an epoch of railway development. . . . The material damage to the mercantile marines of the world was not merely local, but world-wide. Yet by the end of 1921 it had been repaired completely." Economists and politicians began to realize the common fact noted by Adam Smith over a hundred years before this date, that the exports of one country are the imports of another, and that the whole purpose of exports is to gain imports. Further that trade is not greatly affected by armaments. That the old wars of conquest and enslavement, so profitable to the Roman Empire, can no longer be fought. That whole peoples can no longer be destroyed, that loss of life is insignificant;¹ that the enemy's trade can be crippled but not annihilated, and that through crippling it victor as well as vanquished suffer. That had Great Britain been defeated, seeing that her economic life is totally artificial, the British Empire would have flown to pieces like shattered glass. But it was not realized that, in spite of her success, her Empire must become unstuck like glued pieces of wood before a fire.

The glue was sentiment, the chilly atmosphere which caused it to adhere was fear, and the heat was freedom from this icy blast.

The destruction of fear was the main psychological result of the war, and more especially so as regards the

¹ In 1928 the populations of the nations engaged in war were greater than in 1914, and this in spite of the fact that the influenza plague of the winter of 1918-1919 caused as many deaths as the war itself.

British Empire. The elimination of fear, anyhow for the time being, led to a loss of discipline amongst the masses, and a rise in the sense of dignity among the Imperial nations. Canada was faced by the United States, she had done much in the war, quite as much as her great neighbour, and her self-esteem was wounded by the thought that politically she was not an equal, Ireland who had done nothing to win the war, unless it was to assist Germany, was afflicted with the same sense of dignity when she contemplated Great Britain. Not only in the thieves' kitchen of Versailles were the Dominions treated as independent nations, but also were they admitted to membership of the League of Nations on this understanding.

What was the real stake in the war? It was national freedom, and Austria's attack on Serbia and Germany's attack on Belgium were, to the spirit of nationalism, acts of murder, as heinous in the eyes of the modern world as was once the Saracen attack on the Holy Sepulchre. Wickham Steed writes in an article "The New Europe and the League":

"Out of the philosophy of the Reformation and its assertion of individual freedom of conscience came, in course of time, the philosophy of the French Revolution with its assertion of the rights of man. Out of the French Revolution, which stimulated the spirit of nationality, came the movements that culminated in the unification of Germany and Italy, in the progressive emancipation of Balkan peoples from Turkish rule and in the revival of Czech and Polish aspirations to independent national existence. The second half of the nineteenth century was marked by the resurgence of one submerged nationality after another, until the problem of Europe was whether this process of emancipation

should go forward to fulfilment, or whether it should be curbed by the desire of the great empires to maintain their sway irrespective of the wishes of subject peoples."

After the war what was the stake? Again it was freedom, and as concerns the British Empire, freedom run mad. Douglas Woodruff in his book "The British Empire," says:

"The question has to be faced whether we are not in fact witnessing the gradual but steady dissolution of the Empire. We are now at the stage of friendly independent action, and each new departure is applauded as an advance in freedom and made the text for a sermon on the British genius for reconciling opposites. It is certain that if the Dominions and Great Britain waged wars against each other there would be people to exclaim that nothing showed more truly the greatness of our Empire and its superiority to the Empires of Rome and Spain than this fresh evidence of the complete freedom of every part to do as it chose."

In 1926, eight years after the Empire shone in a united effulgence seldom seen in the history of empires, the dignity emotion, which is very closely related to the inferiority complex, swept the British Commonwealth into an eclipse from which it may never emerge. The year before, as if through the irony of fate, the British Colonial Secretary's title was changed to that of "Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs and Secretary of State for the Colonies." Then came the Imperial Conference of 1926 and in the "Balfour Report" we read:

"The Committee are of opinion that nothing would be gained by attempting to lay down a Constitution for the British Empire . . . There is, however, one most important element in which, from a strictly constitutional point of view, has now, as regards all

vital matters, reached its full development—we refer to the groups of self-governing communities composed of Great Britain and the Dominions. Their position and mutual relation may be readily defined. *They are autonomous Communities within the British Empire, equal in status, in no way subordinate one to another in any aspect of their domestic or external affairs, though united by a common allegiance to the Crown, and freely associated as members of the British Commonwealth of Nations.*”

The Empire has, therefore, become an immense engine without a fly-wheel. Appeals to the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council are now optional, consequently the Empire has no legal centre. Loyalty to the Crown is no longer an obligation. The Governors-General are now solely personal representatives of the King, consequently political contact between the British Government and the Dominion Governments is gone. Dominions are allowed to have Ambassadors of their own and to make treaties with foreign countries. There exists no machinery of co-ordination except the Imperial Conference. Cynically enough the only inter-Imperial organ of co-operation existing is the Imperial War Graves Commission which is financed by the various Governments in proportion to their war casualties. Well may Robert Stokes in his book “New Imperial Ideals” say: “In fact a single British Budget might conceivably dislocate almost the entire economic life of a Dominion.”

Is this freedom a reality? With the exception of Canada it is so only in the realms of dignity, and Canada, if not already such, is rapidly becoming an economic satrapy of the United States. It is not a

reality, but a myth, because the security of the whole is almost entirely the burden of Great Britain. Sentiment, however deep, is a fickle jade; interests change and vanish, but fear remains, and the English navy, a concrete thing, still exists, for how long no man can say, the one real "institution" of Empire. Added to this the English air force and army are potent weapons of defence, for though small they possess great powers of expansion.

From the above brief review, and much more could be added to it, we see that the dignity complex has not in fact led to freedom but to anarchy. For instance, the Australian States have direct contact with the British Government, and should they wish it, any one or more of them can claim separate Dominion status, whilst the Irish Free State has limited political rights to her citizens. Such individual caprices, which for the sake of dignity may now be multiplied indefinitely, must eventually lead to friction which will wear away sentiment and undermine interest, leaving fear, if it is sufficiently potent, as the sole Imperial adhesive.

"Individuals may form committees, but it is institutions alone that can create a nation" once said Disraeli, and yet the British Empire has virtually none, consequently I think that Mr. Stokes is right when in his above-mentioned book he writes: "In short, the Empire must co-operate or collapse, but it can only co-operate through institutions." Had it possessed such institutions, then the problem of India's future

would have been vastly simplified, for not only would it have become an Imperial problem, but it would have been dealt with by permanently established machinery, and not by "Heath Robinson" efforts of ephemeral governments.

In these larger questions of Empire the Imperial Conference is impotent. First it only meets every three years; secondly, its ability to deal with questions of foreign policy, always in a state of flux, is illusory, for few if any ministers attending, except those from Great Britain, possess the experience or knowledge to deal with them. The Committee of Imperial Defence, though it possesses a high sounding name is not Imperial but purely British, and can do no more than issue statements to the various Dominion Governments. In fact, whilst before the World War there was no question that in the event of a war the Dominions would support the Mother Country, since its conclusion Dominion jurists have elaborated a distinction between "active" and "passive" belligerency. Mr. Stokes says: "Admitting that a declaration of war by the King automatically places all his Dominions in a state of war, it has nevertheless been contended that the extent of their participation is entirely a matter for themselves. For instance, Article 49 of the Constitution of the Irish Free State lays it down that: 'Save in the case of actual invasion the Irish Free State shall not be committed to active participation in any war without the consent of the Oireachtas (Parliament).' In short, the theory is that the Dominions

are consulted about the common policy and share in it, but are not bound by it."

Whether the Empire can ever be cemented into one great co-operative organization is extremely doubtful, for to establish institutions in face of the dignity complex is surely a hopeless task. Further, since the close of the war the United States of America is daily attempting to establish an economic hegemony over the world. Little by little, this is forcing European nations to settle their differences and form front against this new terror. In this movement, which is now clearly perceptible, Great Britain is being dragged more and more towards her geographical, economic and military centre—Europe. Not only has she bound herself by treaties and pacts to support European nations in a variety of eventualities, but she is a member of the League of Nations whilst the United States is not. Not only does this membership pin Great Britain to Europe, and so in direct proportion sever her from the United States, but on account of her Mandatory Territories it also tends to cut her off from Asia. In these territories all is in doubt because their future is so uncertain. Nobody knows what their destiny is to be, consequently doubt is apt to create friction. For instance, in Palestine, on November 2, 1917, the Jews throughout the world were promised a "national home." What does this mean? It can only mean that the present Arab population is to be denied self-determination and is to be ousted. Not only does this mean the wilful creation of a centre of friction,

but as the Arabs are Mahomedans, it also means increasing resentment throughout the Moslem world. Here we have a problem which intimately affects India.

The major influences of the war upon world organization are now clearly discernible. They are the grouping of the nations into three great cartels, or blocks, of peoples. On the one side we have the United States with her obsolete though by no means dead Monroe Doctrine, economically establishing a hegemony over Canada and South America. To meet this international block we have Europe thinking, vaguely though it may be as yet, in terms of an economically federated continent—a European United States, with a thinking organ the League of [European] Nations. Lastly we have Asia, a conglomeration of peoples in all stages of civilization and turmoil, aroused by Western culture and intoxicated with ideas of nationhood. A conglomeration which eventually may find its centre in the Russian Soviet system. We have, therefore, three potential blocks, or leagues, of nations, and what will be their attractive forces upon the Empire?

First of all it should be realised that the Empire is not so much a Commonwealth of Free Nations as a congeries of Empires. The Dominions form three groups of empires,¹ India another empire, so also East Africa, West Africa and Malaya, and so also the Mandatory Territories of Palestine, Transjordan and

¹ Canada, Australasia and South Africa.

Irak. How are these eight empires going to be held together around a common Imperial centre, a centre which must automatically be dragged towards the European block. I, for one, cannot say, for I cannot imagine any institution which will exert so attractive a force. What seems more likely is: that Great Britain being drawn into the European block, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and possibly South Africa, will be drawn towards the American, and India and Malaya towards the Asiatic, leaving Great Britain with her extensive East and West African possessions until the disease of democracy rots their bonds.

Is this, however, a calamity? From the dignity point of view—yes; from the world point of view, possibly—no. To the common eye it appears undignified for nations, or empires, to grow smaller; but was not *the* economic lesson of the war—world interdependence? Trade cannot flourish in war, it was the forty years' peace in Europe which followed the Napoleonic Wars which so largely fostered the Industrial Revolution, and again it was the forty years' peace among the greater European nations following on the Franco-Prussian War which enabled the European continent to make such unparalleled progress. There can be no doubt in my own mind that the larger the national groups, or federations, the less prevalent will become wars of the first magnitude, and wars of lower magnitudes will become less and less frequent. It would be impossible to-day for the State of Virginia to declare war on the United States, so also in a European federa-

tion it may one day become as impossible for Germany to declare war on Europe. Self-interest may be a cause of war, but mutual support to effect an object of common interest is surely a deterrent. It is towards this common interest that I believe the world is moving. On this question of interdependence Sir Chiozza Money says in an article on "Economics and the Menace of War":

"What the world needs is an economic synthesis which will enable it to make the most of its limited resources. . . .

"There can be no possible doubt that if the resources of Europe could be used as an economic unit, just as the resources of the United States are used, there would be an enormous increment of wealth to the European peoples. Conversely, if the United States, instead of being established as an economic unit, was broken up into many political states, each with a customs tariff hostile to the other, every part of America would suffer disastrously. The progress of divided Europe, in face of constant war and preparation for war, can only be considered wonderful."

The fact is that there are too many contending interests, many petty yet powerful, in the British Empire to allow of it ever becoming an economic unit. Empire free trade, means close protection against all countries not of the Empire, and consequently against all European nations. Geographically Great Britain cannot divorce herself from Europe, for Western civilization alone, and Europe is still its centre, embraces her in the common culture of France, Germany and other European nations. American culture is very different, and so also are the cultures of the various Dominions. Great Britain for self-preservation

must adhere to Europe, but for self-preservation it is not essential that her Dominions must adhere to her.

That Europe as a federation of autonomous nations interlocked by free trade, and this is the freedom which Europe has not yet attained, has an enormous future before her cannot be doubted. All her modern wars have been generated by trade competition leading to the establishment of economic barriers which, if they cannot be stormed by argument, are stormed by shot and shell. War is now no solution to this problem, for curious to relate, and it certainly is not generally realized, the main economic virtue of war in the past was the destruction it wrought. It could depopulate whole territories, not only by fire and sword, but by pestilence and famine which followed in their wake. Economic protection is urged on by over-population which in the past has led either to revolutions or foreign wars. In Europe, as in Asia, over-population and the fear of it are to be found behind every war, and it is a problem which war can no longer solve, yet a problem which medical science has solved and society can adopt whenever it becomes wise enough to do so. Birth-control, that is the restriction of a population within its economic means, can eradicate one cause of war, free trade can eliminate another. These are two factors which however strongly fought against cannot in the end be resisted, unless European nations are stricken with insanity. These are two factors which have become manifest to all since the World War and its after-effects revealed the diseases of Western civi-

lization. And these are the two facts which make impossible a federated British Empire, and which I think in the end must lead to India eventually becoming an independent empire, or a federated State in an Asiatic league of nations, or else slip back into her old chaotic sleep of peaceful dreams broken by periodic nightmares.

CHAPTER VI

REFORMS AND ANARCHY

THE Montagu declaration of August 1917, as much a poppycake thrown to the Indian Cerberus as a loosening of his leash, was not swallowed by the revolutionaries. They spat it out with no feigned disgust, and at once set up a furious barking, making the utmost use of the liberty the increased length of chain gave them. The slowness in reforms on the one side, and the increasing demands for impossible reforms on the other (immensely accelerated by the war) set up such stresses and strains in the structure of government, that since the date of this declaration every extra inch of chain has only increased anarchy. And government, it should never be forgotten, does not consist merely in the enforcement of law and order, but in the willing co-operation of the governed in observing the laws and in supporting their enforcement.

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In democratic countries, the muscles of government are represented by popular opinion, working on the skeleton of military force, a force seldom seen in peace time but always present, and always forming the ultimate foundation of the will of the majority of the people. But India is not and has never been a demo-

cratic country. The majority has no will other than the will to live, for popular opinion finds its sole expression through the will of a minute minority of educated people, an exotically cultivated oligarchy floating in a vast ocean of mediævally-minded human beings whose daily routine is a struggle against starvation. There is in the land no semblance of a national army, without which no purely Indian Government, either autocratic, oligarchic or democratic, can exist or even form itself. These problems I will examine in subsequent chapters, I mention them here solely to make clear the stupendous difficulties which faced the Imperial Government and the Government of India when through the clamour of the educated Indian minority and through fear of losing the war, they were compelled to consider reforms.

The crucial mistakes committed by these two Governments were that they had never appreciated the true nature of the difficulties which confronted them. In the periodic changes of governments it was difficult enough to establish a progressive and evolutionary policy for the Indian Empire; nevertheless it should have been realized, certainly by the opening of the present century, that two things were essential to the future maintenance of law and order: First, the winning over of the good will of the minority—the only form of popular opinion in the country; and secondly, the creation of a true national army or militia to support this will as it grew, for that it possessed virility was beyond all doubt.

The slowness in grasping the changes which Western education and literature were effecting in Indian life, is clearly illustrated by the fact that between the passing of the Indian Councils Act, in 1861, and the introduction of the Morley-Minto Reforms, in 1909, except for Lord Cross's Act of 1892, which introduced a rudimentary form of election in public bodies, no changes were made in the administration of the Government of India. This unprogressive state of affairs might have continued even longer than it did had not the Partition of Bengal been decided upon in 1905; for until this question arose the Indian National Congress was not openly hostile to the Government.

This question led to the division of the members of Congress into two parties—the Moderates and the Extremists. On August 7, this year, the cry of "Bande Mataram" (Hail Motherland) was first heard in India. It was the "Marseillaise" of the present revolution. It was this same year that Mr. Gokale declared that "Self Government within the Empire" was India's political goal. This declaration was, in 1906, followed by another, for Mr. Dadabhai Naoroji, who presided over the meeting of Congress at Calcutta, urged that "The whole matter can be comprised in one word, Self-Government or Swaraj, like that of the United Kingdom or the Colonies." Thus did the revolution, in two short years, establish a goal as well as create a battle-cry.

This agitation severely jogged the elbows of Government, and Government awakening from its prolonged

siesta attempted to allay the unrest by the Morley-Minto Reforms.

The Montagu-Chelmsford Report says: "The problem which Lord Minto's Government set themselves to solve was how to fuse in one single government the two elements which they discerned in the origins of British Power in India. They hoped to blend the principle of autocracy derived from Moghul emperors and Hindu kings with the principle of constitutionalism derived from the British Crown and Parliament; to create a constitutional autocracy" These reforms were not meant to lead to Parliamentary government, for as Lord Morley stated: "If it could be said that this chapter of reforms led directly or indirectly to the establishment of a parliamentary system in India, I for one, would have nothing at all to do with it." What was effected was small enough—one seat on the Governor-General's and one on each of the Provincial Executive Councils were in practice reserved for Indian members. All the legislative councils were enlarged and were given a substantial elected element and the right of discussing questions of public interest was also conceded to the councils.

These concessions which might well have been made thirty years before, in place of satisfying the revolution only made it the more hungry; so the agitation continued and gained strength: •

"You can stop a spring with a twig. (Said Sadi) Let it flow unchecked, and an elephant cannot stop it."

Such was the situation which now faced British

rule. What was to be done? Was the attitude to be that of the twig or the elephant? Drastic measures might wreck the reforms; leniency might do likewise. Hesitation begot uncertainty, uncertainty begot agitation. The sickly humanitarianism which obsessed England during the years following the South African War, and the pacifism which ridiculed Lord Roberts and sought to propitiate Germany by means of naval holidays, such were the ethical forces which had their repercussion on the Government of India. As the author of "The Lost Dominion" says: "Repression fitfully applied is a wanton and capricious tyranny." And again—"The policy of 'spanking the baby at one end while feeding it at the other' was not likely to produce a soothing effect. Still less was it likely to be effective when the castigation was administered casually and capriciously."

There was no definite policy at Home, and consequently no definite policy in India from the day that Lord Curzon was forced to resign the Viceroyalty. Then, in 1911, the King-Emperor visited India, the Partition of Bengal was annulled, and the capital changed from Calcutta to Delhi. Not a propitious sign, for the old saying is, that "He who builds a new Delhi, builds his own tomb." Then came the World War, and out of it the Montagu-Chelmsford Reforms.

These reforms, which took effect in 1921, came just ten years too late, even could they have been brought into force in 1917 they might have accomplished something ; for between this year and the year of their

inauguration the political atmosphere in India entirely changed. In the "Montagu-Chelmsford Report" its writers state:

"We have at present in India neither the best of the old system, nor the best of the new. Responsibility is the savour of popular government, and that savour the present councils wholly lack. We are agreed that our first object must be to invest them with it. They must have real work to do: and they must have real people to call them to account for their doing of it."

The problem was an exceedingly difficult one, begotten in turmoil, fostered in turmoil, and threatened by turmoil. The Legislative Councils were enlarged from sixty to one hundred members. A second chamber, the Council of State, consisting of sixty members, thirty-three elected, was added to the Imperial Government, and the Imperial Legislative Council became the Imperial Legislative Assembly. A franchise was established embracing three per cent. of the population. The main feature of these Reforms was "Dyarchy," a separation of legislative and executive functions, for certain subjects were "transferred" to Indian Ministers responsible to the Legislative Councils, whilst others classified as "reserved" came directly under the Provincial Governors. Of this system the writers of the "Simon Report" say:

"Dyarchy is a system which aims at assigning the sole responsibility in a certain list of matters to the official side of Government, while Ministers drawn from the ranks of elected members are supposed to concern themselves solely with their own departments. The popular element in the Executive could thus, in theory stand on one side and watch with detachment the handling of questions with which it was not concerned. But this is not the

effect in actual working. It has often been found impossible to isolate one decision from another, with the result that real responsibility becomes blurred. Dyarchy has doubtless provided provincial Ministers with a very valuable experience in the responsibilities of departmental work and in the art of commending ministerial policy to private members. But it is one thing to control a branch of administration and to work out a departmental policy; it is quite another thing to co-operate in reaching and carrying out a united decision involving co-operative action in times of crisis. Dyarchy cannot be regarded as affording much training in taking responsibility for unpopular, though necessary, decisions, and it does nothing to guarantee unity of control and policy when unity is most essential and when the strength which unity ought to give is most needed."

The problem was difficult, possibly beyond solution, though I do not think so, but the solution attempted was probably the worst which could be devised. It was a half measure, it was anti-democratic and was not fully autocratic, it did not meet the bill, it was sterile for it could not evolve; in a word it was a return to medieval rule. The author of "The Lost Dominion" does not exaggerate its influences for evil when he says:

"In the provinces a feeble and irremovable executive was confronted by an irresponsible legislature over which it had no control. At Delhi a feeble and irremovable executive was confronted by a legislature over one House of which it had no control. In both cases the Governor was armed with latent dictatorial powers. This was not the intention of the framers of the constitution. It had been intended that certain subjects in the provinces should be administered by a responsible ministry, while certain other subjects were dealt with by the irremovable executive. This preposterous scheme, which was affectingly called dyarchy, was still-born. No minister thought of resigning because he could not command a majority in the House. And this was

well, as there would have been no means of replacing him. If he resigned, it was on personal and factious grounds, and his successor was appointed, not from the leader of the opposition, for there was none, or rather there was nothing else, but according to the whim of the Government. . . Still more deleterious is any real separation of legislative and executive functions. The executive can do nothing without legal sanction and without money, and it is in the hands of the legislature to give the Government the powers which that Government thinks necessary, and to raise and assign funds. On the other hand, the executive is to carry out laws passed by the legislature, though it may think them noxious. England is well acquainted with the advantages of this form of government. She suffered from it for about a hundred years. Under it one king went to the scaffold and another to St. Germain's. There were three civil wars. The corpses of the brave, the loyal, and the patriotic polluted every market-place and every cross-road. The slums of Amsterdam and of Paris were filled with men who might have been the glory of the kingdom. England, at one time and soon to be again the arbiter of the destinies of Europe, ranked in the scale of nations below Portugal and Venice. It was this system which made Ireland what it is. It was this system which lost the American colonies. It was the abandonment of this system which preserved Canada. It is now an axiom of British politics that there must be the closest union between the executive and the legislature."

Dyarchy was a division of Government, and it divided the land. But before I examine the events which followed its introduction, I must turn back to the years which immediately preceded this event.

Mr. Montagu's announcement of August, 1917, in no way allayed the revolution, rather did it stimulate it, for if nothing else it showed a weakening in the Home Government. The patience with which the revolutionary movement was handled only stimulated its adherents; for in Asia, the patience, or generosity, of

a ruler is always transformed into fear, or craft, in the popular mind. To obtain convictions by jury became almost impossible, for no native-born jury would convict; to subpoena witnesses was most difficult, for terrorism shut their mouths. Between August, 1906, and November, 1917, one hundred and sixty-eight outrages resulted in sixty-one murders, yet only four executions took place. The result was that on December 10, 1917, the Government appointed a committee, under Mr. Justice Rowlatt to consider the question of special legislation, and this committee recommended the establishment of courts of three judges, without juries or assessors, to try cases of sedition. This recommendation was accepted, and the Rowlatt Act became law on March 17, 1919.

The passing of this Act was met by a howl of execration, and though through fear it was never put into force, Mr. Gandhi, who had returned from South Africa to India early in 1915, placed himself at the head of the agitation and opened his non-violent non-co-operation campaign, the object of which was to compel the Government to abdicate, through a refusal to pay taxes, and by organized mass disobedience. Gandhi proclaimed a Hartal (general strike) on April 6, and four days later, disobeying an order prohibiting him from entering the provinces of Delhi and the Punjab, he was arrested, sent to Bombay and there released.

"The agitation against the Rowlatt Act was frankly dishonest," writes Mr. Garratt in his book "An

Indian Commentary," "The Indian nationalists . . . spread the idea that under this Act all couples intending to be married were to be medically inspected, and that all assemblies of three or four people, including marriage ceremonies, were to be prohibited." Riots and open rebellion occurred in the Punjab, and the Hindu agitators were joined by Mahomedans, more especially by those who to support Turkey had inaugurated the Khilafat movement in India. This movement which was a preposterous one, for the demand made was that England should restore to Turkey the whole of her old empire, was supported by Mr. Gandhi whose *Hartal* was seized upon by Hindu and Mahomedan alike to carry out the worst of excesses. At Ahmedabad, the second city of the Bombay Presidency, where Gandhi lived and worked, a two days' riot occurred in which twenty-eight people were killed. Martial law was not proclaimed, and as Sir Valentine Chirol writes in "India Old and New," "The Bombay Government kept their heads, and there was nowhere any wholesale surrender of the civil authority into military hands."

Simultaneously in the Punjab rioting took upon itself a more pronounced form, European and Indian officials were murdered and buildings set on fire. At Amritsar the worst atrocities were perpetrated and martial law was proclaimed. At Jallianwala Bagh, on April 13, a large crowd assembled, in spite of the fact that Brigadier-General Dyer, who had arrived in Amritsar on the 11th, had issued a proclamation for-

bidding processions in or outside the city. He declared that "any such procession or gathering of four men will be looked upon and treated as an unlawful assembly and dispersed by force of arms, if necessary." Hearing that a large gathering was taking place at Jallian-wala Bagh, Dyer at the head of fifty Indian Infantry armed with rifles, and forty armed with kukris (curved knives) and two armoured cars marched there, deployed his men and opened fire on a crowd estimated at 5,000 persons. Firing was continued for about ten minutes, in which 1,650 rounds were expended, 359 people killed and 1,200 wounded.

This show of force put an end to the disorders, not only in Amritsar but throughout most of the Punjab. That this punishment fitted the crime from the point of view of martial law is probable as its after effects proved; but from a police point of view it was brutal, as to this there can be little doubt. If General Dyer was right in his action then he should have been forthwith exonerated; if wrong, then dismissed. In place of carrying out either of these courses, the Government of India shilly-shallied and appointed a Commission to enquire into the Punjab disorders. In the circumstances no greater act of folly could have been perpetrated, for not only did the Englishmen and Indians on this Commission produce separate reports, but the question was debated in the House of Commons and General Dyer was exonerated by the House of Lords. Meanwhile Dyer had been compulsorily retired. Every ounce of malice which could be

squeezed out of this sorry affair, by one party or the other, was squeezed out to sour England and India. Few things more perturbing to the future of the Empire, let alone India, have occurred during the present century than the lack of decision which was displayed over this question. The flaming headlines in the newspapers, and the unlimited abuse indiscriminately showed by Indians on English, and English on Indians were far more potent propaganda for the Indian Nationalist cause in its worst form than the massacre itself.¹ It was the Denshaw incident of June 13, 1906, over again, but magnified out of all recognition by timidity and procrastination.

The appearance upon the scene of Mr. Gandhi, who has never been a nationalist from the democratic point of view, was not only followed by dissension among the people, but by dissension within Congress. What with Mr. Gandhi and his medieval economic and religious ideals, and Dyarchy with its medieval political system, communal troubles grew; and these added to the fact that, as Sir Michael O'Dwyer says, the Government ignominiously capitulated to its enemies, India was rapidly approaching the melting pot and might well have been thrown into it had it not been for the folly and lack of unity within Congress.

¹ It is a fact worth pondering on, that had lachrymatory gas been used by General Dyer on the crowd at Jallianwala Bagh, there probably would have been no casualties. "Gas guns" are part of the every-day equipment of the U.S.A. police, and were Indian police furnished with them scores of casualties would be yearly avoided. In 1926 I recommended the use of this weapon to a high official at Delhi.

In 1920 the National Congress met at Nagpur, and such members who did not subscribe to non-cooperation were shouted down. All reason was lost in outbursts of extreme violence, and in the howling yells of the mob. In 1921 came the Moplah Rebellion, in which, as is related in the next chapter, Mr. Gandhi played a dubious part; also the Akali Sikh agitation in the Punjab which resulted in a number of atrocities; and finally the visit of the Prince of Wales which Gandhi's followers celebrated by a general riot in Bombay costing hundreds of casualties, and the murder of twenty-one policemen at Chauri-Chaura. At length, on March 10, 1922, Gandhi was arrested and sent to prison.

Meanwhile many of his followers had begun to see through him. He represented nothing but a mythical past and a bloody future. Under the stresses and strains of Gandhism the National Congress split into Swarajists and Independents, both with a right and a left wing. Out of the old Moderates arose the Liberal Party; and in Madras the non-Brahmins formed themselves into the Justice Party. The Moslem League growing stronger lost sympathy with Congress; the Sikhs formed a league of their own, and the Depressed Classes began to group themselves together.

From 1923 onwards it became clear that Dyarchy was unworkable. In Bengal and the Central Provinces it broke down utterly. In 1924 the National Congress met at Belgaum, and except for the prohibition of foreign clothing, resolved to put an end to non-co-

operation. The following year under the presidency of the poetess Sarojini Naidu a resolution was passed advocating universal military training so that the Indian nation might be responsible for its own defence. In 1926, at Gauhati, Congress passed a resolution "re-affirming its general policy, that forbade all members to accept any ministries or posts from Government, and ordered them to prevent the formation of ministries by any other party."

These years of political turmoil, though insignificant in themselves, show at least two things—the amazing patience of the British administration, and the total lack of statesmanship on the part of the Indian National Congress. To mention a few points: The passive-resistance of 1919, the non-co-operation of 1920, and the civil disobedience of 1922 placed in the hands of the people moral weapons which though they did not wreck British rule, produced such discord in the country as to make any form of Indian rule impossible. The fractionizing of the political parties clearly demonstrated the disunity which existed in the Indian ranks. The refusal to co-operate in government, if nothing else, clearly showed a refusal to learn the art of governing, and the advocacy of universal military training in a country of over 300 million people, few of whom are even fit to bear arms, and most of whom could certainly not be trusted with them, showed a lack of common sense which can only be denoted as nonsensical.

In the year 1927, in the middle of all this super-

heated air, Lord Birkenhead, Secretary of State for India, threw a lump of cooling ice. For long had the Indian National Congress urged the appointment of a Round Table Conference at which might be discussed the whole of India's future. He now agreed to this suggestion and added: "I have twice in three years during which I have been Secretary of State invited our critics in India to put forward their suggestions for a Constitution, to indicate to us the form which in their judgment any reform of the Constitution should take. That offer is still open." The result was the appointment of the Simon Commission and the Nehru Committee, called after its chairman the late Motilal Nehru. The first was met by almost universal boycott; the second produced a complex report "fissured with disagreement" which was unacceptable not only to Mahomedans and Sikhs, but to the Justice Party, Liberal Party and Indian Christians. In spite of this disunity, at the Indian National Congress, which met at Calcutta in December, 1928, the Government was given one month wherein to accept the Nehru Constitution. Whereupon Mr. Subashchandra Bose, the Bengali Extremist, moved an amendment establishing complete independence. This was defeated, partially on account of the prestige of Mr. Gandhi who stood for Dominion status.

This declaration of independence startled the Chamber of Princes, and in February, 1929, a resolution was unanimously carried against such a proposal. By so doing the Princes fell into line with the now formid-

able opposition to the Nehru Constitution, which if not aiming at independence could only result in anarchy. Whether to ease the mind of those who doubted that the Imperial Government intended to do anything, or to obliterate the idea of independence, on October 31, 1929, Lord Irwin, the Viceroy, announced that the definite aim of the Government was to establish Dominion status, and that a Round Table Conference would be held at which all parties would be asked to meet. This re-announcement of Dominion status, I consider was ill-advised, and my reasons for this are given in Chapters VII and VIII. In any case, on Congress it had an effect diametrically opposite to the one it was expected to produce.

On December 29, the National Congress assembled at Lahore under the Presidency of Jawaharlal Nehru, son of Motilal Nehru. This young man entered the city riding a white horse followed by a herd of elephants, a brigade of Mr. Subashchandra Bose's League of Youth, and a band playing "The Wearing of the Green." Amidst yells, waving of red flags and shouts from the President of "Shut up, shut up," Congress met. Of this amazing Hollywood performance, *The Times* of December 31, 1929, says:

"It is true that the proceedings in the tent began with women and volunteers singing 'Bande Mataram' in which the reporter graphically calls 'pin-drop silence,' but the pin-drop silence was rudely shattered when members of the Kirti Kisan Sabha, which is a society composed of labourers, artisans, and peasants, rushed the doors, refusing to pay entrance-money. They firmly took the best seats, which had been reserved for good Congressmen who

had paid for season tickets, which cost as much as fifty rupees. A sharp fight with the Volunteers followed, *lathis* being freely used, and there were casualties on both sides. Apparently the Kirti Kisan Sabha won the day, as this morning the Committee made a generous gesture and decided to allow them on the free list at future sessions."

The proposals made and the resolutions passed were in keeping with the pandemonium. Political crime was extolled, the Round Table Conference scoffed at; a resolution of independence was carried by 114 votes to 77; the national debt of India was repudiated and the flag of the Indian Republic was unfurled. Thus ended this session of the Indian National Congress, and with it, for the time being, common sense.

In 1928, Congress demanded a Round Table Conference, a year later it howled the idea down. Why this sudden change? The answer is that during these twelve months Congress had lost all cohesion and solidarity. Split up and fractionized it was unable to formulate or agree upon any resolution unless it was so soused with hysteria that it swept the mob off its feet. Even during this Congress, Subashchandra Bose, after a heated argument with the President—Jawaharlal Nehru—walked out of the tent with Srinivasa Iyengar and thirty members and formed a Democratic Party of their own. Rival bands, rival opinions, each man seeking for power and "close ups" effects; a shouting down and a shouting up; petty jealousies, walking-ins and walking-outs; no common centre to revolve around except hatred of British rule which exploded into hatred of each other, such in December,

1929, was the state of nationalism in India. Indeed a sorry picture which must have made the ashes of Ram Mohan Ray, Dayananda Sarasvati, Ram Krishna, and many another of India's great reformers quiver with shame.

Was this spirit of nationalism fit for anything outside Bedlam? Was it the surging upwards of a sublime unifying ideal, or was it but the noxious gases of putrefication rising from a decayed civilization? I think it was both. It was a social complex, the result of the corrosive acids of the West eating into the rotten theocracy of the East, and all that this theocracy stands for—caste, purdah, child-marriage, sycophancy, bribery, lethargy, corruption, fear, superstition and backwardness. Such a complex as to-day inhibits India it is indeed difficult to understand, and I think the most certain way to realize it is to take one of the present-day personalities in this tragic farce, for choice Mr. Gandhi, and to probe into his nature. In him, in microcosmic form, will be discovered more than one answer to the many questions which are now perplexing us.

CHAPTER VII

GANDHI—THE INDIAN COMPLEX¹

CONCERNING Mr. Gandhi, or Mahatma Gandhi, as he is variously called, much has been written both by himself and by others; but nearly all that I have read, by friend or foe, has, in my opinion, woefully misrepresented him as a sinner or a saint. His most fervent followers believe him to be an Avatar sent by God, his bitterest enemies class him as a dangerous revolutionary, and in between these two extremes a large number of people mildly regard him as a visionary and a humbug. All, I think, up to a point are right, but only up to a point; for Mohandas Karamchand Gandhi, to give him his full name, is all these things and many more besides. He is so complex a personality that it is only by comparing the various accounts of him, more especially those written by his admirers and disciples, that his true character can, so to say, be synthetically extracted from the mass of verbiage which has and is daily gathering around his name. Besides, his nature is at one and the same time so complex and so simple, so rigid and so flexible, so honest and so slippery, that to judge the man from one

¹ Reprinted from "The Nineteenth Century and After" by the courtesy of the Editor.

or two of his biographies, or his own autobiography, is altogether impossible. His nature is such that much earth must be sifted and washed away before the gold which is in him can be discovered.

He was born on October 2, 1868, of well-to-do parents of the Bunia, or trading caste, which is a comparatively low one. They were Vaishnavas, that is followers of the god Vishnu. One of the doctrines of this sect is Ahimsa, the principle of not harming any form of life, which in actuality means that no vermin is exterminated, and no suffering animal is put out of its misery. It is not so much love or compassion as indifference to suffering, and certainly, until the British put a stop to it, it did not discourage suttee, that is widow burning. This doctrine and the rigid caste rules laid down by Manu, Gandhi imbibed from his earliest childhood, and though an extremely shy and sensitive boy, he cannot be accused of lacking courage. Tempted by a friend to become strong like the English, whose strength it was thought was derived from eating meat, to reform himself he actually carried out this un-Hindu experiment, and passed a terrible night of anguish in consequence. "Every time I dropped off to sleep," he writes, "it would seem as though a live goat were bleating inside me, and I would jump up full of remorse." At the age of thirteen he was married, and when nineteen he decided to complete his studies in England, which decision at this time, 1888, shows a quite exceptional moral courage; for his caste-community not only looked upon a jour-

ney to England with abhorrence, but the headman outcaste him and threatened anyone who should help him or see him off at the dock with "a fine of one rupee four annas" (20 pence)!

From the medieval atmosphere of Gujarat and the endless recitals of the endless "Ramayana," the Iliad of Northern India, Gandhi set out, and in September, landed at Southampton in a white flannel suit which he had set aside especially for the occasion. Finding that he was the only person wearing such clothes, he became extremely shy and nervous; but once in London he soon settled down to his new life. Before leaving home he had taken an oath to live as a celibate in England and never touch wine or meat; and to keep this vow, he dined with crank vegetarians from whom he absorbed "advanced" doctrines. Next he visited Bond Street and spent ten pounds on an evening dress suit; wasted, as he says, "ten minutes every day before a huge mirror, watching myself arrange my tie and parting my hair in the correct fashion," and even became so civilized as to take lessons in dancing. From such trifles we see that, as a young man he was normally human.

With these superficialities of civilization as his canvas he began to read Tolstoy, with the result that his mental picture became blurred and out of perspective. Vain by nature, as nearly every Hindu is, sensitive as they all are, and both shamed and irritated by the colour bar, the spirit of the visionary and the reformer began to awake in him, and, little by little,

out of these heterogeneous elements his philosophy took form heavily veneered with Europeanisms. The influence of Tolstoy was profound, and on the Russian aristocrat-peasant mystic he began to mould himself.

In 1891 Gandhi returned to India, not the simple village boy of 1888, but a contending mass of conflicting cultures. He had watched the grandeur and sordidness of European life, had been terrified by its energy, its efficiency, and its heartlessness. Then back to his native city of Porbandar where time was of no account, where caste rules were rigid, and where the peasant ploughed as his forefathers had ploughed, these three thousand years. There he found himself still outcaste by a large section of his community, for not even his near relations were allowed to entertain him. Not wishing to hurt their feelings, the old spirit of Ahimsa, now clothed in a Tolstoyan smock, took possession of him, with the result that he discovered that such happiness as came to him was due to his own non-resistance.

The inward man had not, however, vastly changed, for there is still to be found lurking within him the boyish vanity, the touchiness and sensitiveness of his early days. In 1893 legal work, for he was now a qualified barrister, called him to Natal, where some 150,000 Indian emigrants had settled. A rough and ready country, where Dutch and English saw no great difference between an Indian and a negro, and where the colour bar was of iron. A country where a man must have a thick hide and a heavy fist, consequently

at every turn Gandhi was met by insult, for he has no fist at all and his hide is of the thinnest. Each insult is a nail driven into his soul, each sinking into him and wounding his instinctive vanity, jarring on his moral courage, and awakening it into compassion for his fellowmen—the outcaste and untouchable coolies of the white man's land. Here he read Arnold's "Light of Asia," and studied "The Sermon on the Mount"; was persuaded to become a Christian, but would not; yet he claims that through the words of Christ a great joy welled up in him, and that thus the full meaning of passive resistance was revealed to him.

I must hasten through this period of his life, though it is one of great interest. In 1899, when the South African War broke out, he offered his services to the Government and raised an Indian Ambulance Corps. He did this, so it seems to me, out of true nobility of heart, and also because it would prove to the white man that the downtrodden coolie was equally a man of courage, courage being, as Gandhi rightly guessed, a predominant factor in Western civilization. Then after the war he organized a plague camp; was immensely influenced by the principles of the simple life as laid down in Ruskin's "Unto this Last"; took part as an ambulance worker in the Zulu rebellion; founded a communist settlement at Phoenix; and finally, on account of the Government of South Africa refusing to repeal the poll-tax on Indian workers, he found it impossible to pocket "this insult offered to the mother country" and so started his Satyagraha (Soul-force)

movement, which mainly consisted in a passive resistance¹ campaign for which he was thrown into jail on three successive occasions. Yet the movement grew, spreading from the Transvaal to Natal; monster meetings were held; strikes proclaimed, and masses of Hindus marched about the country alarming public opinion in Africa and exciting it to frenzy in India. The outcome was victory. The tax was undoubtedly unjust, and, in 1914, shortly before the outbreak of the World War, it was repealed, and Natal was opened to free Indian labour.

In the crucible of South Africa Gandhi's sensitive soul was turned to iron, yet the outer man remained as flexible as high grade steel. His contact with Christian missionaries and his meditations on the "New Testament" had taught him, in Milton's words "the irresistible might of meekness"; even more important than this, his struggle with the Government had revealed to him the Achilles heel of democracy. He discovered that

¹ Passive resistance has always been the weapon of the weak. In the early days of trade unionism in England, Benbow, a disciple of Robert Owen, wrote: "There will not be insurrection, it will simply be passive resistance. The men may remain at leisure: there is, and can be, no law to compel them to work against their will. They may walk the streets or fields with their arms folded, they will wear no swords, carry no muskets; they will present no multitude for the Riot Act to disperse. They merely abstain, while their funds are sufficient, from going to work for one week or one month; and what happens in consequence? Bills are dishonoured, the Gazette teems with bankruptcies, capital is destroyed, the revenue fails, the system of government falls into confusion, and every link in the chain which binds society together is broken in a moment by this inert conspiracy of the poor against the rich." This may be called the "Gospel of Gandhism."

majorities are always weak, because they rely on numbers in place of ideals; on physical force in place of spiritual, or what he prefers to call "truth" or "soul," force; on popular opinion, fickle and ever-changing, in place of religious authority which comes from God.

In these days he became intellectually a Manichæan, the world had to be freed from darkness and every thing sensual in man was the outflow of this evil element. Mani, that dire and fateful religious master of the third century A.D., had forbidden marriage, killing and impure speech. So now did Gandhi. From the Western point of view his behaviour to his wife is utterly brutal, whether dangerously ill or not his will must dominate her will as well as her physician's. At his settlement at Phoenix he compelled her to do sweeper's work and clean the bedroom and empty the slops of a Christian clerk, a Panchama (untouchable). In his relation of this he adds: "I would have her do it cheerfully." Why? Because of his unbendable humility. Here we see the oriental despot creeping out of this humble saint. Not only has his meekness turned to combativeness, but his vanity to disciplinary resolutions, trials of will power, his will against his body, his reason, his common-sense, and against any will outside him.

In South Africa he passed through the fire of persecution and the smoke of the colour bar, not to emerge a saint, but a spiritual Masochist. "Pain to a Satyagrahi (one who practises Soul-force) is a pleasure," he writes, and again: "Progress is to be measured by the amount of suffering undergone . . . the purer the

suffering, the greater the progress." Though "you must not try to compel another by physical force to become good," you may make use of the most refined mental tortures to achieve this end. This is the identical outlook of many of the magicians, sorcerers and monks of medieval Europe, and right through Gandhi's life it is astonishing to see how again and again the early impressions of his childhood in Gujarat draw him back to medievalism making him a reactionary.

As his struggles against established power succeeded, unconsciously, I think, but nevertheless surely, did his vanity grow into an obsession. The complexities of life began to vanish, and more and more did his aim become the simplification of existence rather than its development. Tolstoy and most other mystics have passed through a similar spiritual phase, which is in fact the first step towards self-apotheosis, a combination of selflessness and selfishness. He holds fast to the theory of reincarnation because it is so simple; it cramps initiative by throwing the whole onus of progress upon God. What is the good of a Shudra (the fourth caste—a labourer) striving to better himself in this life, for according to his faith in God, will God reward or punish him in his next incarnation. This comfortable belief belongs to the oriental half of Gandhi's complex nature, for its occidental counterpart is diametrically opposite. Politics are his life blood, and like the medieval Papacy he confounds temporal and spiritual power, weaving the one into the other in order to accomplish his end. He is em-

phatic on this point, he says: "There is no other God than Truth," but like Pilate, neither does he give nor gain a definition of this most perplexing word. He writes: "Those who say that religion has nothing to do with politics do not know what religion means"; and again, "politics bereft of religion are a death trap" and "for me, politics bereft of religion are absolute dirt, ever to be shunned. . . . Therefore, in politics also we have to establish the Kingdom of Heaven." And what for? To change the lives of men? No, not exactly, for it must never be overlooked that Gandhi is essentially the self-centred mystic. But, as he says: "To reduce myself to zero." That is politics represent a magical operation, in which the lives of men are the pentacles, wands, paraphernalia and victims of the magician, which if correctly used will lead to annihilation of self and to at-oneness with God.

As to this there can be no doubt to those who carefully read his writings. "Every moment of my life," he says, "I realize that God is putting me on trial"; that God has willed that he should establish Rama Rajya, the kingdom of Rama, or righteousness. Again why? And here is the answer in his own words:

"I am a humble seeker after truth, impatient to realize myself, to attain spiritual deliverance in this very existence. My national service is part of the training I undergo for freeing my soul from the bondage of the flesh. Thus considered, my service may be regarded as purely selfish. I have no desire for the perishable kingdom of earth. I am striving for the Kingdom of Heaven, which is spiritual deliverance. . . . For me, the road to salvation lies through incessant toil in the service of my country and of hu-

manity. I want to identify myself with everything that lives. In the language of the Gita, I want to live at peace with both friend and foe. Though, therefore, a Mussalman or a Christian or a Hindu may despise me and hate me, I want to love him and serve him even as I would love my wife or son, though they hate me. So my patriotism is for me a stage in my journey to the land of eternal freedom and peace."

Thus far, Gandhi the man—a complex personality begotten of complex circumstances, a struggle between the oriental and the occidental within him, in which the former wins through, though strangely tainted by the latter. Before turning to his activities in India after his return to that country in 1915, I will briefly examine his subversive and reactionary philosophy.

His theories and doctrines may be divided under the headings of Destructive and Constructive, though in actual fact his whole system is a negative one. He considers that England has ruined India, and by ruined he means has changed her from what she was. That India has been bled white by British rule, an allegation entirely unsupported by facts; incidentally, since the year 1900, India has absorbed £800,000,000 of gold and silver, and is to-day absorbing 30 per cent. of the world's yearly output of gold. His quarrel is not so much with England as with Western civilization, and with Gold as the god of the West; because, though formerly "men were made slaves under physical compulsion, now they are enslaved by temptation of money and of the luxuries that money can buy." "A man labouring under the bane of civilization," he writes, "is like a dreaming man." It scorches the people with

an apparent goodness and "like consumption has an attractive hectic flush." Civilization to him is the Kali Yug, or Dark Age. In 1920 he wrote:

"The last war has shown as nothing else has the Satanic nature of the civilization that dominates Europe to-day. Every canon of public morality has been broken by the victors in the name of virtue. No lie has been considered too foul to be uttered. The motive behind every crime is not religious or spiritual, but grossly material. . . Europe to-day is only nominally Christian. In reality it is worshipping Mammon."

What are his remedies? He has none, but to out-Bolshevize the Bolsheviks, for the whole of this diabolical order must vanish. Democracy is a snare and a delusion: "Parliaments are really emblems of slavery" . . . "That which you consider to be the Mother of Parliaments is like a sterile woman and a prostitute. . . It is like a prostitute because it is under the control of ministers who change from time to time." Education is evil: "Do you wish to make" the peasant "discontented with his cottage and his lot?" Post offices enable "anyone to abuse his fellows by means of a letter for one penny"; "Medical science is the concentrated essence of black magic. . . Hospitals are the instruments that the Devil has been using for his own purpose. . . They perpetrate vice, misery, degradation, and real slavery." The profession of pleaders (barristers) is as "degrading as prostitution." A thief should not be punished, but the house left open to him in order to shame him into honesty; yet, somewhat illogically, railways must be abolished, because "bad men fulfil their evil designs with greater rapidity," and

as the good are never in a hurry, "railways can become a distributing agency for the evil one only." Taxation is all but to disappear, for in this ideal world there will be no armies, hospitals, schools, etc., for the State to support. But the vials of his utmost wrath are poured out on the machine and all that the machine stands for. "Machinery is like a snake-hole which may contain from one to a hundred snakes"; it is "the chief symbol of modern civilization; it represents a great sin"; it enslaves nations by creating money which is "as much a poison as sexual vice." The machine must go, and yet Gandhi is not such a fool as not to realize that, if it were possible to abjure all modern inventions in India and revert to medievalism, the death warrant of tens of millions would be signed.

Are these the ravings of a maniac, or the frothy utterances of a hysterical demagogue? No, neither, they are the considered opinions of an educated man whose honesty is beyond doubt. When Gandhi uses the word "Satanic" it is no figure of speech, but as grim a reality as it was five hundred years ago to our forefathers. Here he speaks like a pure Manichæan to whom compromise with Satan is the sin of sins.

Having destroyed Western civilization in India, root and branch, what does Gandhi propose to substitute in its place? If Western civilization is Satanic, then obviously—Indian civilization must be God-like, for such is the logical conclusion of his Manichæan outlook.

The question now resolves itself into one of defini-

tion: what does he mean by God-like? His answer is both as simple and complex as he is himself. Follow his doctrines to the letter, carry out his message of non-co-operation in all its details, with the utmost regard for the principles of Ahimsa, non-violence, and Rama Rajya can be accomplished within a year.

His difficulty is not, however, solely one of overcoming Western civilization, but, curiously enough, of Europeanizing Hinduism. He is a firm believer in the sanctity of the cow. "Cow protection," he says, "is the gift of Hinduism to the world; and Hinduism will live so long as there are Hindus to protect the cow." He is an equally fervent believer in the caste system. He writes: "We cannot choose . . . our own parents, or our own birthplace, or our own ancestry. Why should we claim as individuals the right during this present brief life-period to break through all the conventions wherein we are placed at birth by God Himself." Thus far he is a conventional Hindu, but now the European in him creeps out; he will not tolerate "untouchability." To him all men are as equal as they were to Rousseau or Tolstoy, and though this heresy may win European and American sympathy as well as gain the support of a few democratically minded Indians, it is anathema to the bulk of the people, and damnation to the Brahmins. Rama Rajya in a year is consequently a sheer absurdity.

His doctrines may be divided under three headings—political, ethical and economic, these I will now examine in turn.

"To say that British rule is indispensable is almost a denial of the Godhead. We cannot say that anybody or anything is indispensable except God," he writes, and again: "If India copies England, it is my firm conviction that she will be ruined." What then is his idea of nationalism? It is "that my country may become free, that if need be the whole of the country may die, so that the human race may live. . . It is the absolute right of India to misgovern herself"; also "Anarchy under home rule were better than orderly foreign rule."

This is not a cheerful conception, yet it is crystalline in its honesty, for to Gandhi disorder spells salvation if through order India is to lose her faith in *his* conception of God. Democracy means nothing to him, he has never supported national independence from a democratic point of view, and he has always condemned those among his fellow countrymen who have aimed at it. He believes in a civilization of entirely separate and self-supporting villages, the inarticulate whole, called India, having nothing whatever to do with outside nations. "One must not expect the people of one country to provide for the needs of another, even for philanthropic reasons." And again: "We should avoid being intimate with those whose social customs are different from ours. . . Every man is a brook. Every nation is a river. They must follow their course, clear and pure, till they reach the Sea of Salvation, where all will blend."

This curious monastic and medieval outlook is the

heart and soul of his Swadeshi movement. We must accept what God has given to us; to renounce tradition is sinful; social conditions are fixed by birth, and men must remain, in the words of the Church of England Catechism, "in that state of life to which it has pleased God to call them."

How is this negative social status to be attained? By Swaraj (self-government), which is a combination of sex-suppression, non-violence and self-support.

Mr. C. F. Andrews, a fervent admirer of Gandhi, says: "There is no question that Mahatma Gandhi is one with the medieval saints in a passionate belief in celibacy as practically the only way to realize the beatific vision of God." Like Mani he holds that everything that ministers to the flesh is evil. "I cannot imagine Sita," he writes "ever wasting a single moment on pleasing Rama by physical charms." And this by a man who one supposes has studied the "Ramayana" and also the "Mahabharata," both of which epics are replete with sexuality. "Chastity," he says, "is one of the greatest disciplines without which the mind cannot attain requisite firmness. When a husband and wife gratify the passions, it is no less an animal indulgence on that account. Such an indulgence, except for perpetuating the race is strictly prohibited. But a passive resister has to avoid even that very limited indulgence, because he can have no desire for progeny." If marry you must, no marriage is to be out of caste, this is pleasing to the Brahmins; but then, once again, the European emerges from his

hidden lair, for out of genuine sympathy for the millions of young widows in India, many of whom are virtually outcaste, he says to his followers: "I want you to make this sacred resolve that you are not going to marry a girl who is not a widow; you will seek out a widow-girl, and if you cannot get a widow-girl you are not going to marry at all"—a union which to a Brahmin is worse than incest. Birth-control, so necessary in India, he holds in abhorrence; but when one of his students seemed somewhat perplexed over the sex question he said to him: "Then you fear there will be an end of creation? No. The extreme logical result would be not extinction of the human species, but the transference of it to a higher plane." Why not then a transference by instalments? No This does not entail suffering.

The killing of all desire, which includes all home life and the love of wife and children, is part of Gandhi's interpretation of the doctrine of Ahimsa which forbids the taking of life (apparently according to him also the begetting of it), and which in India has become an all but unbearable burden. Gandhi, as may be supposed, ~~takes an ultra view~~, far out-distancing that held by the Lollards, Quakers and other idealist minorities in the West. Not only is self-protection evil, "but, I go farther," he writes, "if we resent a friend's action, or the so-called enemy's action, we still fall short of this doctrine." Cowardice, however, is no part of this belief, because it is "a negation of all force," it is "impossible to teach a mouse non-violence in respect

of a cat. He would simply not understand what non-violence could be, because he had not the capacity for violence against a cat." Such subtle distinctions may be logically correct, but I much doubt, when ignorant peasants and artisans are called upon to carry out non-violent non-co-operation, whether they are altogether clear to them. Also, I am not at all certain whether they are clear to Gandhi himself; for in his letter to the Viceroy, before beginning his civil disobedience campaign, he says: "Lacking inward strength we have been reduced by all but universal disarmament to a state bordering on cowardly helplessness"; and in another letter he writes: Disarmament has resulted in the "emasculatation of the whole nation." But as usual Gandhi is consistently inconsistent.

To turn now to his economic doctrine, it is as simple as it is impossible. It can be expressed in one word—Charka (spinning-wheel), or in that of its resultant—Khaddar (home-spun cloth). To Gandhi, the spinning wheel is the panacea of all human ills, its powers are nothing short of magical: "And how will the spinners bring Swaraj you ask? I say, nothing will have to be done after you have universalised the spinning-wheel. You will have acquired a power and a strength which everybody will automatically recognise." It is true that for nearly half the year cultivators in most parts of India have little to do, and that home spinning may with advantage be encouraged. Gandhi clearly sees this, but refuses to acknowledge that, until all machine looms are abolished, it is useless to expect large num-

bers of handlooms to replace them. The cheapest hand woven cotton cloth, and then of a poor and coarse quality, costs 8 annas (8 pence) a yard to produce, which is a high price when compared to similar machine made material. But Gandhi's object is not entirely an economic one. He considers that free time and leisure are a curse to Indian women, and consequently, should they be given more efficient machines their time and leisure would be spent in wickedness. The spinning-wheel will kill time, it will kill thought, it will kill violence. A lawyer must give up his profession and "take up a hand-loom." A doctor must give up his medicine, and "rather than mending bodies, he should mend souls . . . he must take up the hand-loom." A wealthy man must devote his money "to establishing hand-looms," and so on *ad infinitum*.

Such is Gandhi's philosophy: a narrow exclusive nationalism of self-supporting and non-co-operating villages; an ethical code which destroys all morality—Christian and universal, and an economic system based on the most primitive instruments of hand-labour—the plough and the spinning-wheel. Well may Rabindranath Tagore, the great poet and still greater seer, exclaim: "In olden days, in our primeval forests, our sages, gurus, in the plentitude of their vision, called on *all* seekers of truth. . . Why does not our guru, who wants to lead us to action, make the same call?" His only command is, "spin and weave! . . . Is this the gospel of a new creative age? If large machinery constitutes a danger for the West, will not small

machines constitute a greater danger for us?" Nations must co-operate. "The awakening of India is bound up in the awakening of the world. Every nation that tries to shut itself in violates the spirit of the new age."

To turn now from his philosophy to his activities in India. As soon as his struggle in South Africa was over he sailed for England, landing there on August 4, 1914. He at once offered to enlist as an ambulance bearer, was accepted, fell ill, returned to India, where he was well received by the European community in Madras.

During the war his actions are as usual contradictory, and whether this was due to the general war neurosis which, at the time, inflicted so many, or to a mixture of loyalty and cunning, it is hard to decide. To me it seems that the European within him urged him to support the British Empire, and the Oriental to carry on his task of self realization by leading every discontented cause. Or was it vanity—eagerness to display the man?

From enlisting villagers to fight Turks and Germans, and appealing by means of a recruiting leaflet for the repeal of the Arms Act, which he stated was among the many misdeeds of British rule the blackest history would look upon, he carried out an intensive campaign of agitation in Kathiawar, Champaran, Gujarat and elsewhere, in which Satyagraha was consistently preached, and the magical spinning-wheel offered as the Universal Solvent. In South Africa he had been rich, earning several thousands of pounds a year, now

sworn to poverty, a poor man he was accepted by the poor. He convinced them by simple arguments, sometimes of the most illogical nature, and when tripped up would turn the laugh against the tripper. Should he be asked for his autograph, he would answer: "My price, sir, is moderate enough—half an hour's spinning every day for the country and a promise to wear Khaddar." He proclaimed untouchability a sin, was strongly opposed by the Brahmins; founded an Ashram (place of retreat) for his students who were compelled to take a vow of celibacy, and where the pupils of four years old and upwards were separated from their parents who had to renounce all authority over them, and who were not even allowed to visit them until they were grown up. By means of this medieval establishment he expected to create a new and sterile race.

Whilst Gandhi was carrying out his missionary work amongst the peasantry, sedition was boiling over in the towns. Home Rule, not in Gandhi's form of self-government, but of democratic government (which was anathema to him) was being demanded by a host of extremely energetic and unscrupulous agitators. In 1917, Mr. Montagu, Secretary of State for India, promised the gradual development of responsible government, and foolishly, so I think, in order to check revolutionary outrages, on March 19, 1919, the Rowlatt Act became law. By this Act special courts of three judges, without juries or assessors, could try cases of sedition. This was met by fierce opposition, and

Gandhi, I feel, both through conviction and vanity placed himself at the head of the agitators and, on March 30, 1919, opened his first passive resistance campaign in India.

This Hartal was like spark to tinder. The Hindus, Sikhs and Moslems joined hands against the Government, open rebellion broke out in the Punjab; at Amritsar the mob fired the Anglican Church and the Town Hall, burnt the goods station, looted and murdered. This led to the proclamation of martial law on April 13, and the killing of 359 and wounding of 1,200 Indians by General Dyer at Jallianwala Bagh, which, however, broke the rebellion.

Gandhi had lent all the prestige of his name to a congeries of seditious parties, who in no way supported his religious views. This was the inevitable result of mixing politics with religion; for his name as a saint was used by his unscrupulous confrères to urge their already hysterical followers "to fight to the death against English cheats and to dishonour English women."

In December 1919 the Montagu-Chelmsford reforms passed the House of Commons; this split the agitators into Moderates and Nationalists. At the same time an organized Moslem agitation, known as the Khilafat Movement was set on foot with the object of compelling the Imperial Government to restore the Sultan of Turkey to his pre-war footing. Once again Gandhi entered the arena, for as he said: "Such an opportunity of uniting Hindus and Mohammedans . . .

would not arise in a hundred years." Here again he blundered, for the whole of this movement was a make-believe, which collapsed not through British action but through Turkish, for Mustapha Kemal abolished the Califate. In support of this movement Gandhi opened his non-co-operation campaign which consisted in his adherents voluntarily withdrawing from government service, schools, law courts and legislative bodies, besides which the soldiery and police were to be encouraged to mutiny.

Having succeeded in gaining the support of the National Congress, he went up and down the country preaching his subversive doctrines, and at Nagpur he made the following ominous declaration: "Before the battle with the British Government was ended, they might have to wade through seas of blood." This could have but one result—turmoil, and by the beginning of 1921 disorders had broken out in many provinces. In February, 130 Akalis (a sect of Sikhs) were butchered by the Abbot of the Nankana Sahib Shrine in the Punjab. In August the Moplahs revolted, in which revolt Sir Sankaran Nair, says:

"More than two thousand Mahomedans killed by troops according to official estimates, thousands more in other ways, larger numbers wounded; the number of Hindus butchered in circumstances of barbarity, skinned alive, made to dig their own graves before slaughter, running into thousands; women, and purdah (veiled) women too, raped, not in a fit of passion, but systematically and with calculated revolting and horrible cruelty for which I have not been able to find a parallel in history. . . . All this due directly to the visit of Gandhi and Shaikat Ali and to the organization of Khilafat associations."

What does Gandhi say concerning this rising? Of the Moplahs, who are Mahomedans, he said: "The brave God-fearing Moplahs, fighting for what they consider as religion, and in a manner which they consider as religious." Why did he say this? There are two possible answers. The first, and the most probable, is that the politician within him had for the time being enthralled the saint—his aim was to keep the Hindu-Mahomedan entente alive; the second, that the saint had mastered the man; religious anarchy with all its horrors being infinitely to be preferred to law and order under Satanic British rule.

Not being quite mad, though a little before this, he had taken a vow to drink no milk or eat milk products, and to live on groundnut butter and lemons, the man emerged, and in the next outbreak held in leash the saint. This occurred in November, when, through an act of extreme folly, the Home Government decided to send the Prince of Wales on a visit to India. In August, before his arrival, Gandhi had already caused riots and disturbances in Bombay, for, imitating Savonarola's act in Florence, he had ordered all foreign clothes and materials publicly to be burnt, and thus unwittingly stirred up the destructive instincts of the mob. Then, when the Prince landed, he declared a Hartal. The streets were at first deserted, then mobs collected, and in the ensuing riots many houses were looted and burnt and 53 persons were killed, and 403 wounded. Certain of the leaders being arrested, Gandhi demanded their release, but a

tragedy directly due to his campaign, the responsibility for which he did not disclaim, brought him to a halt. At Chauri-Chaura, in the United Provinces, a mob of 3,000 frenzied men led by his volunteers stormed the police barracks, and amid scenes of revolting cruelty burnt 21 police constables alive. This brought him to his senses: "God spoke clearly through Chauri-Chaura," he writes, "I must undergo a personal cleansing," and he held a prolonged fast.

From now his influence began to wane. On March 2, 1922, he writes in a Masochistic mood: "I have become literally sick of the adoration of the unthinking multitude. I would feel certain of my ground if I were spat upon by them. . . . If we do not take care, we are likely to be drowned in the waters whose depth we do not know." Then on March 10 he was arrested, and sentenced to six years' imprisonment.

In deep waters he had sailed, deeper than he could fathom. He began to feel that he had been exploited by others, "My only safety lies in my shamelessness," he writes, ". . . the only tyrant I accept in this world is the 'still small voice' within." I think that joy filled his heart as he passed into his prison; the Avatar was left outside, the humble human being went within with gentleness and compassion towards all men. Yet the man in him remains inconsistent. In 1924 he fell a victim to appendicitis. Medical science he had declared to be "black magic," and hospitals "the instrument of the Devil." Now he was offered the

service of his own Ayurvedic physician,¹ but he was wise enough to leave himself in official hands, and was successfully operated upon by a "Satanic" surgeon.

Soon after his recovery Gandhi was released. Meanwhile a new political party, called the Swaraj party, had arisen. Realizing the failure of boycott, its aim was to wage a war for freedom in the legislatures themselves. In 1924 it urged full responsible government in India, and, for that purpose it demanded the assembly of a representative Round Table Conference to thrash out the ways and means.

Of Gandhi's further activities little remains to be told. In May, 1925, he expressed his doubts as to Hindu-Moslem unity, and said: "So long as untouchability disfigures Hinduism, so long do I hold the attainment of Swaraj to be an utter impossibility . . . that gift would be a curse upon this land." Once again he changes his mind. In 1929 he was elected for the Congress Presidency, but stood down in favour of Jawaharlal Nehru, then learning the art of government in Moscow.

On December 29, 1929, the Congress met in turmoil, and Jawaharlal Nehru announced "the complete repu- diation of India's national debts," and, on the 31st, he unfurled the flag of the Indian Republic. In this excitement the politician once again sloughed the saint; for, on the 30th, Gandhi wrote to the Viceroy

¹ Medical treatment according to the Vedas, in which cow dung figures largely as a cure all. In India I have seen it applied to open wounds, and, when working as a Cantonment Magistrate, I remember two men dying of tetanus as the result.

stating that he would call off Civil Disobedience if certain offers were accepted forthwith. Among these were: total prohibition, halving of the land tax, abolition of the salt tax, halving of military expenditure and free licence for fire-arms. Failing to win acceptance to these impossible terms, in March 1930, he set out on his Salt-Tax March, and on April 6, clad in a loin cloth he entered the sea, scooped up a handful of sand and salt water, and thus once again twisted the Lion's tail. On May 4 he was arrested and imprisoned.

Towards the end of the year the Round Table Conference met in London, and its one great achievement was that it took place, for this fact alone put all those members of Congress who had boycotted it in the wrong. Whilst they were creating disorder in India and on the frontiers of India, the Englishman honoured his word. The Indian National Congress through its vanity and childlike irresponsibility was thus placed in the wrong, and to save its face Gandhi was once again released. A tired old man, and I think somewhat disillusioned, he left his jail with his spinning wheel to creep up the steps of the Viceregal Lodge. The Viceroy met him as an equal, and endowed with a higher spirit of Ahimsa than is generally to be discovered in the East, he pacified the saint and so left untarnished the vanity of Congress which stalked behind him.

Whether this generosity will be met by gratitude is extremely doubtful. Gandhi himself talks cryptically,

he promises peace and he promises "before long to discharge every one of the political prisoners . . . possibly even those condemned to the gallows." I doubt whether he himself knows exactly what he means; but I for one think that his saintly bolt is spent. His halo saved the face of Congress, and in the saving of it it has, so it seems to me, lost somewhat of its lustre, for the man who crept up the steps of the Viceroy's house was the politician and not the saint.

Had he never left India to become contaminated by Western trickery he might have become an Avatar, somehow he feels this himself: "I am really too ambitious to be satisfied with a sect"; and to a Hindu who apologised to him for not knowing him, he answered: "How can you? I shall be known only after I am dead."

As a boy he came to the West full of the mystic faith of the East, there, from the hands of Tolstoy, he drank of the cup of Rousseau. The fumes of Western politics intoxicated him. India was to be transformed, and in her transformation was he to find salvation; yet unlike Christ, one of his spiritual masters, he never learnt the statesmanship of the words: "Render therefore unto Cæsar the things which are Cæsar's, and unto God the things that are God's." He will pass his way like many another who has trodden his thorny path, a saint who for the love of God has sinned against humanity, and on the tomb of his memory will the words *Non pacem sed gladium* be inscribed in letters of blood.

CHAPTER VIII

THE PROBLEM OF FEDERATION

IT is a fact worthy of notice that it was not until the Gandhi complex took upon itself a national form that Great Britain began to stir herself. The worse things got, the more earnest became the Government in Westminster. In this there was nothing new, for British instinct is never guided by policy, and British character to show itself at its best requires chaos to work in. There is something grand in creating order out of muddle, and be it remembered, the Englishman is not a thinker but an improviser. He hates disorder and fears the unexpected, yet these are the conditions in which he works best, so instinctively he does nothing until they manifest, then he takes his coat off with one idea in his head—to put it on again as soon as possible.

The worse things got, the more earnest the Government became, and as agitation was approaching the last ditch of British passivity the politicians set to work as they had done a few years before in the Suffragette movement, in the Irish rebellion, and in the independence upheaval in Egypt. The more earnest they became the more hostile grew the Indian National Congress, and this was all to the good, for had its

members been friendly the task would have had to have been carried out in an atmosphere of hysteria in which an Englishman works at his worst. Congress boycotted the Simon Commission, because it was not a "mixed" one, this was the outward reason, but the inward one undoubtedly was that its leading members felt themselves incapable of co-operating. Their organization was fissured with jealousies, and they knew that they could no more solve the problem of the Indian States, communal representation, and the Moslem question, than the white committee could. Further, they knew that the only common doctrine they possessed was abuse. So they vilified the Simon Commission, proclaiming it "an insult to India."

The dignity complex was at the bottom of this particular agitation. Or, if you will, the inferiority complex, which is but another name for this disease. The Simon Commissioners undoubtedly realised this, for in Vol. I of their Report they write:

"We have indicated the strictly confined range within which the flow of political consciousness manifests itself; within those limits there are many cross-currents. But what is the general direction of the Stream? We should say without hesitation that, with all its variations of expression and intensity, the political sentiment which is most widespread among all educated Indians is the expression of a demand for equality with Europeans and a resentment against any suspicion of differential treatment. The attitude the Indian takes up on a given matter is largely governed by considerations of self-respect. It is a great deal more than a personal feeling; it is the claim of the East for due recognition of status."

In this difficult atmosphere, so loved of by English-

men, the Commissioners set to work to reconcile the doctrine of Western democracy with medievalism in its crudest form. I think they must have really enjoyed their task, for when the Englishman does get to work he loves jobs before which the gods pale in terror. "The people best fitted for democratic government," writes Mr. R. Grant Brown in "Burma as I saw it," "is an intelligent peasantry with no aristocracy and no rich middle-class." If there is any truth in this statement, then in true English fashion the Commissioners turned the problem upside down. This enabled them largely to ignore the peasantry, and concentrate their attention on the aristocracy and the middle-class, which in India have as much in common as a feudal baron and an itinerant pedlar of the fourteenth century.

The Commissioners, guided by the idea of carrying out the Montagu declaration of 1917, lay down four guiding principles in their Report. These are as follows:

(a) That their scheme must be susceptible of development by Indians themselves.

(b) That by Indians is meant all the peoples of India, consequently the scheme must embrace the Indian States.

(c) That the only practical organization is a federation.

(d) That during the period of transition security and law and order must be maintained.

Broadly speaking, the recommendations may be classified under two main headings—the Central and the Provincial Spheres. In the first dyarchy is to continue, for it is suggested that the executive should be irremovable and responsible to the British Parliament, and that the legislature should be elective. In the second, self-government is to be established; but the Governors are to be provided with emergency powers to guard against disorder. There are other provisos, but the ones quoted make it perfectly clear that whilst the Indian National Congress considers (perhaps it does not) that it can establish responsible government in India, the Commissioners take an opposite view, but nevertheless endeavour to make the best of a bad job.

The question of the Centre is perturbing, for even if at first the scheme suggested works smoothly, sooner or later friction is bound to arise between the irremovable executive and the elected legislature, and, judging from past events, the Viceroy's power will be undermined, just as the Provincial Governors' powers have been restricted in the suggested scheme, which none can deny is the result of the last ten years agitation.

Amongst a host of problems which result from the above suggestions, two are outstanding, namely, internal security and defence. As regards the former the police are to be transferred to the control of Indian Ministers; as regards the latter the British Army is to remain under*the Governor-General, and an Indian

Army "of a Dominion pattern commanded by officers holding a Dominion commission" is to "be recruited for purposes of internal order," because, "it appears to us that it would be impossible to contemplate the use of British troops to quell civil disturbances at the unrestricted bidding of Ministers popularly elected and answerable to popularly elected legislatures . . ." and "that troops recruited under Imperial authority ought not to be used in support of a policy for which the Imperial Government is not ultimately responsible."

I shall be dealing with India's military problem in another chapter, so all I will say here is this: The whole of this problem, which is the basic problem of responsible and stable government is most confused, and seems almost purposely designed to create civil war. That the Statutory Commissioners aimed at this is of course absurd, so I cannot help feeling that the military advice they received on this subject must have been of the meagerest.

The difficulties which faced the Commission were immense; but I, for one, feel that the Commissioners were obsessed by the preceding years of agitation, and that consequently they focussed their thoughts far too much on the noisy demands of the intelligentsia, forgetting that India is a land of one vast majority, the peasants, and also a land of many minorities, the various religious sects within and without of Hinduism. I shall be dealing with the religious aspect of this question in Chapter x, here I will only quote

from Richard Jebb's book "The Empire in Eclipse," a paragraph which the Statutory Commissioners might well have considered:

"The elementary needs of the 300 odd silent millions in India, mostly unambitious peasants, remain what they always have been and always will be: first, protection of person and property against lawless violence; second, an earthly providence to 'drive the road and bridge the ford' and ward off famine; third, by a long interval, so much liberty of thought and speech as are compatible with the other and paramount interests. There was reason to fear before-hand, and sad experience has already proved, that the tendency of the recent reforms is diametrically opposed to these elementary and permanent interests of the people; who themselves neither asked for nor appreciate them."

If this is true of the Montagu-Chelmsford reforms, it is equally true of the suggestions made by the Indian Statutory Commission. The peasant is overlooked, if not forgotten. In the circumstances, were a small body of agricultural agitators to shout for reforms in Great Britain, it would be just as sensible to ignore the whole of her industrial population and produce an ideal scheme for this agriculturist minority.

To turn now from the Statutory Commission to the Round Table Conference which followed it. The first point to note is that it was as vehemently boycotted by the National Congress as was the Commission itself, consequently it was a half-baked show the importance of which, as I have already noted, lay in the fact that it was held, and that consequently the National Congress was put in the wrong. It must have been a bitter pill to many of its members that they soon found

themselves in jail in place of at the dinner tables of Lords and Maharajahs.

I do not intend to deal at length with this Conference, spread as it was on the top of Mount Pisgah. The atmosphere was on the whole balmy and soothing, so much so that no one could tell whether he was gazing on the first beams of India's dawn or the last glow of the Imperial sun-set. Realities were eschewed, magical formulæ were muttered and whispered around: responsibility as a cure for irresponsibility; responsibility with safeguards, what does this mean? Presumably that the Indians will have a chance of continuing their present policy. They will compel the Government to enforce these safeguards and then knock them down like nine-pins by non-violent non-co-operation. There was no mention that India cannot govern herself, and no word of generosity for what Great Britain had done in the past. Federation was much talked about, but it was never hinted that the Indian States are not British, and that consequently federation cannot be accomplished by an act of Parliament unless the Indian Princes give Parliament the power. There was much "Schwärmerei," yet as Thomas Carlyle says: "You will admit that swarmery plays a wonderful part in the heads of poor mankind, and that very considerable results are likely to follow from it."

To turn to its conclusion, they were these:

- (a) That federation for all India should be carried out forthwith.

(b) That Provincial autonomy must be taken for granted.

(c) That the Central Government must at present be strongly bolstered up by "Reservations" and "Safeguards."

These proposals were made in spite of the fact that the arguments urged by this side and that conclusively showed that the Hindu-Moslem problem was as acute as ever, and in itself it denied any known form of democratic government or federation. The safeguards decided upon were defence, foreign policy, to some extent finance, and power of intervention should federation or government show signs of collapsing.

The whole of these proposals centre round federation, and curiously enough, federation whatever form it may take depends far more on the good will of the Indian Princes, who are the natural rulers of the land, than on the threats of the National Congress, most of the members of which must appear to the Princes as the veriest canaille. I will, consequently, consider the question of the Indian Princes in some detail, and will then turn to the problem of federation and attempt to show what it means.

In the future of the States, and not in that of the British Provinces lies the answer to the future of India, and, unless the past history of these States is consulted, the possibilities of establishing a form of federation which will remain stable are remote in the extreme. In this history lies the true story of India's social and

political life, and in it, so I think, lives her destiny. Whatever we may think and say of our own rule, the fact remains that the peoples of British India are on the whole far less contented than those of the States, because the freedom and orderliness which British rule has established are in many ways antipathetic to the fatalistic and haphazard spirit of the East. In one sphere life is a mathematical problem, in the other a game of chance. In the "Report of the Indian State Committee" (Butler Report) may be read:

"In the Indian States nature assumes its grandest and its simplest forms. The eternal snows of the Himalayas gather up and enshrine the mystery of the East and its ancient lore. The enterprise of old-world Western adventure now slumbers by the placid lagoons of Travancore and Cochin. The parched plains of Rajputana and Central India with their hilly fastnesses recall the romance and chivalry of days that live and inspire great thoughts and deeds. The hills and plains of Hyderabad and Mysore, famed for gems and gold, for rivers, forest, waterfalls, still cry out great names of history. Over the dry trap plateaux of the Deccan swept the marauding hosts of the Mahrattas, eating here and drinking there, right up to ancient Delhi. From the west, the ports of Kathiawar with their busy progressive people stretch out hands to the jungles of Manipur in the East with their primitive folk and strange practices. The marching life of Mogul and Mahratta times has yielded to the sustained quiet of British rule, but the old spirit survives in many a story and many a hope."

It is in this hope and in this history that the riddle of India's future is to be sought, and not in the Occidental veneer of British India. These States, in changed and changing forms, have watched one empire after another arise in India and crumble into dust. From the West and the North-West has come every invader,

and all came by land except ourselves, and all swooned away in the suffocating heat of the plain lands, and were assimilated by the countless millions directly the gateways of the Western Frontier fell to a foreign power. On this problem of the frontier, Professor L. F. Rushbrook Williams in a published lecture on "The Native Princes of India" has many things of vital interest to say, such as:

"The problem with which each empire before ours has been confronted has been simply this. How could the ruling race maintain unbroken the line of communication with the cooler country from which they came, so that they could fill the gaps in their fighting-line, administrative as well as military, and thus repair the ravages of the climate? Every empire before our own failed to solve that problem, for the simple reason that they depended upon land communications. No empire which attempted to rule Hindustan could long be successful, or has ever been successful, after it had lost military control of Afghanistan. . . Therefore in the case of previous Indian Empires, they had been confronted always with the dilemma that, if they wished to maintain their position in India, they had to maintain unbroken a long line of communication; otherwise they could not replace their skilled administrators and generals, of which the climate had taken toll."

When the passes of the North-West Frontier were closed, this is what followed:

"When Babur came to India in 1526, and conquered the country, he introduced the fashion of court portrait painting. Some of his noble families can be traced roughly from 1526 to 1710 or 1712, and it is extraordinary to notice the changes which accompany the appearance of the people. When these generals and administrators first came to India, you see them big, ruddy men, with high riding boots, whiskers and beards, carrying enormous swords—altogether very vigorous men. A generation

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goes by and you will see them turned into slim, elegant people, with heavily embroidered and brocaded coats, and a court rapier by their side. Another generation goes by, and then you see them clad in transparent muslin and holding a rose."

In these pictures lives the whole drama of past empires in India: they came with the sword and vanished with the rose. They were one and all loose federations cemented together by military power at the centre. Each of these Empires was built out of the Indian States, which as long as the centre held firm remained moderately docile, but as soon as it began to decay became truculent and warlike until a new military centre was formed.

When we came to India we found contending States. We came to trade and not to fight and conquer; but trade demands peaceful surroundings and not warlike, consequently trade demanded military protection. When in the seventeenth century the directors of the East India Company at home complained to their officials in Bombay and Madras that they were there to trade and not to build forts and recruit soldiers, back came the answer: "We are compelled to adopt this course and policy unless our honourable masters will send to India such as are stick-free and shot-free, and such as can digest poison."

When we began to gain control of the land, the Indian States were India, and until Lord Dalhousie introduced the fatal policy of "lapse" and annexation they still remained the greater part of India. In 1860,

writes Lee-Warner in his book "The Protected Princes of India," "Lord Canning laid down the two great principles which the British Government has followed ever since in dealing with the States: (1) that the integrity of the States should be preserved by perpetuating the rule of the Princes whose power to adopt heirs was recognised by sanads granted in 1862; (2) that flagrant misgovernment must be prevented or arrested by timely exercises of intervention." In the Proclamation which transferred the power of the East India Company to the Crown, Queen Victoria declared: "We hereby announce to the Native Princes of India that all Treaties and Engagements made with them by or under the authority of the Honourable East India Company are by Us accepted and will be scrupulously observed; and We look for the like observance on their part. We desire no extension of Our present territorial possessions; and while We will admit no aggression upon Our dominions or Our rights to be attempted with impunity We shall sanction no encroachment on those of others. We shall respect the rights, dignity, and honour of the Native Princes as Our own; and We desire that they, as well as Our own subjects, should enjoy that prosperity and that social advancement which can only be secured by internal peace and good government." In 1921 King George declared: "In My former Proclamation [1919] I repeated the assurance, given on many occasions by My Royal predecessor and Myself, of My determination ever to maintain unimpaired the privileges, rights and dignities of the Princes

of India. The Princes may rest assured that this pledge is inviolate and inviolable." More recently still, in June 1929, Lord Irwin, the Viceroy, said: "I make no secret of my view, that in any proposals that may be made it is essential, on every ground of policy and equity, to carry the free assent of the Ruling Princes of India, and that any suggestions that the treaty rights which the Princes are accustomed to regard as sacrosanct, can be lightly set aside is only calculated to postpone the solution that we seek."

The importance of these various declarations cannot be exaggerated. When in December 1929, the Indian National Congress passed a resolution proclaiming independence as their goal, the Chamber of Princes replied: "So far as the ideal of independence is a matter affecting British India only, it is no concern of ours, that is a matter between Great Britain and British India; but in so far as independence is an ideal which is likely to affect the whole of India, we regard it as being inconsistent with the treaties which bind us to the Crown, and also contrary to the true interests of the country." This declaration cut away the ground from under the feet of any idea of Dominion status on the lines laid down by the 1926 Imperial Conference. The Indian Princes will not tolerate a Vakil-raj, yet at the Round Table Conference they unanimously welcomed the policy of an all-India federation. What kind of federation had they in mind? The answer is obvious: A federation in spirit similar to that of the old Mogul empire brought up to date. That is a decen-

centralization of administration and a centralization of military power. The Provinces being brought into line with the Indian States, and the Central Government remaining British backed by such might that no State or Province will attempt to encroach upon another.

From this basic principle of Indian political reform I will turn to that magical word "federation" which means everything or nothing, unless the groups of peoples who wish to federate possess not only the desire but the ability to do so

The problem which faced the American Confederacy after the overthrow of British rule was a simple one compared to the problem which now faces India; yet the system of federation adopted led to one of the most devastating civil wars in history. The weakness of the first attempt at American federation was that it was a "Staatenbund," that is a group of States each possessing the right to secede, and a central Government which did not possess the military power to prevent secession. When Mr. Montagu talked of "a congeries of self-governing Indian provinces . . . with possibly what are now the Native States of India finally embodied in the same whole," that is one thing; but when the "Manchester Guardian" hails India's goal as something "greater than either Dominion status or independence—a self-governing federation unparalleled in the world's history, free and strong to shape its own destiny," that is another. It is neither free nor strong, for such a self-governing federation is

almost identical with the first attempt made to federate the States of the United States.

In the early days of the American federation there was no master in the land, no supreme power to point the way and restrict the dignity complex of individual States. In Canada it was otherwise. Lord Durham in his famous Report said: "It needs no change in the principles of government, no intervention of a new constitutional theory, to supply the remedy which would in my opinion completely remove the existing political disorders. It needs but to follow out consistently the principles of the British Constitution." He recommended, therefore, the establishment of responsible government. In local affairs the colonists were to be as free as Englishmen, but in imperial affairs, such as defence, foreign policy and external trade the Imperial Government must for a long time remain supreme. Canada was successfully federated, not in spite of but because of the power of the Imperial Government which maintained law and order in the land until the Canadian Federal Government could guarantee internal security. It was not until many years later that the last British troops were withdrawn.

Unfortunately the Indian problem bears very little resemblance to the Canadian, and will be utterly confounded if the British troops are not looked upon as an instrument whereby law and order are to be maintained. The fundamental difference is what I will call the problem of "The Sword and the Rose," that is the degeneracy of every government India has ever seen

through climate. Democratic government for India would appear to be little short of madness, for it would simply lead to an oligarchy of shopkeepers and lawyers which the Indian Princes would never tolerate. The true solution would appear to be in the other extreme—in aristocratic government. This could only be effected by reconstituting the Presidencies and Provinces as States, so that the whole of India may once again be ruled by princes. This might have been accomplished before or immediately after the Mutiny, at present I doubt whether it is a feasible suggestion, though a generation hence it may well be one, seeing that the decline of the democratic system of government is one of the most noticeable political changes in the period following the World War. In Russia this system is anathema, over a large part of Europe it has been discarded for various forms of autocracy, and in such countries as Great Britain, France and Germany it has ceased to produce great statesmen; the great politicians of the nineteenth century have vanished, chatterers, mud-slingers and sleight-of-hand men having taken their place. What the many require is not the theories of the few. The many test a pudding by eating it, and a political system by its results—its power to govern. They may be flattered by such twaddle as "Government of the people by the people for the people," but what they are really concerned in are tranquillity, an ideal to live up to, and low taxation. It cannot be said that democracy has supplied the masses with these very human requirements. In

place it has given them wars, strikes, revolutions, unemployment and super-taxation, and it has done nothing to foster an ideal or a religion, which the masses can hang on to. Socialism has in the main been the history of ideal lies. Once the Christian Church adopted a similar system of hope. It was found out, and now it has sunk in power to a polite convention. The same fate seems to be hanging over democratic government, and in chapter x I will examine this problem as it affects India, and in relation to religion and religious rule which is nothing else than spiritual autocracy. Meanwhile, in the next chapter, I will examine the military problem, for without a military foundation federation and Home Rule in India are but castles built upon clouds.

CHAPTER IX

THE MILITARY FOUNDATIONS OF HOME RULE

A GREAT deal has been said and is being said about Dominion status in India; but what is meant by this? Were I asked to give a definition, I should say: Dominion status is *nationalism plus a sentiment*, the sentiment being the expression of a common origin, common customs and a common literature and history. Nationalism not only carries with it the right of political independence, but it also includes the duty of government, namely, the enforcement of law and order without which a nation however homogeneous is nothing more than a mass of people split up into hostile bands.

Ever since the loss of the American Colonies, a principle of British Imperialism has been to recognise the inherent right of a colony to assume the status of a self-governing Dominion as soon as it had established within its frontiers a sufficiently powerful military force to maintain law and order. No Home Government has ever insisted on this force being so strong that it could single-handed meet a foreign invasion, and in not doing so the sentiment of "united we stand, divided we fall," which at bottom is military, must be

added to the above sentimental components. It is because the Dominions and the Mother Country may require each other's assistance that the Empire has become a Commonwealth of free nations. Defence is the axle-pin of union, and without the internal security of all parts a full-hearted defence is impossible.

This is generally recognised. For instance, in Volume II of the "Report of the Indian Statutory Commission," it is stated that "One condition . . . of a self-governing India must be its ability to maintain without the aid of British troops the essential of all good government, viz; public peace and tranquillity." Yet the authors of this Report foreshadow in the vaguest way the possibilities of creating a national army in India. Why this reticence? The answer undoubtedly is that though a spirit of nationalism does to-day exist among the educated classes, the means of incarnating this spirit in the masses of the people do not, and until they do it is as foolish to talk of Dominion status as it is for a pauper who desires to be rich to consider buying a costly estate and living at the rate of ten thousand a year. Nationalism may be stimulated by ideals, but to create a nation demands something more substantial than entrancing dreams.

The most cursory examination will show that the whole problem of India bears no relationship whatsoever to the problem of the early Colonies and present Dominions. For instance, take Canada and South Africa. Though in the one we find French and British, and in the other Dutch and British, these three

peoples are of European stock, they belong to the same civilization and believe in forms of the same religion. Though in both of these Dominions non-European races are to be found, this matters little, because white civilization has to a large extent replaced red and black; the Indians of Canada and the Negroes of South Africa now speak English, French or Dutch, and for the most part are converted to Christianity.

In India diametrically opposite conditions prevail. The British population in size is insignificant; the native population is immense, and more heterogeneous than in any other part of the world; for in India there are scores of races, languages and religions. Worse still from the military point of view, the bulk of the people is divided into two diametrically opposed hostile camps. On the one side stand 216 million war-fearing Hindus, and on the other 70 million war-loving Moslems. Differences of religion divide the whole land, which is inhabited by peoples in every stage of civilization, some but emerging from the stone age.

In the past, and equally so to-day, Great Britain's military responsibilities have been vast, in fact the whole of her military organization at home and abroad has been and is pivoted and shaped on the defence of and maintenance of internal security in India. This includes the safety of 6,000 miles of coast line; the control and defence of the North-West Frontier; the maintenance of internal security which is mainly concerned in preventing Mahomedan-Hindu

feuds; and the establishment of peaceful conditions between the Indian States and British India. Before India can become an independent self-governing country, all these responsibilities will have to be taken over by a national army; and before she can become a Dominion, all except coastal defence must be provided for. In order to realize what these responsibilities entail it is of some interest to enquire into the problems of frontier defence and internal security.

Though the North-West Frontier is to-day the most important, it must not be forgotten that India also possesses a Northern, and North-East Frontier. It is generally overlooked that Nepal lies on the southern slopes of the Himalaya Mountains, and that Assam may one day become an important gateway between India and China. In fact, should China settle her internal difficulties and develop into an industrialized nation, in time the North-East Frontier is likely to become as important as the North-West. Such importance lies, however, in the future, but not so that of Nepal, which though a small country contains no less than 2,000,000 potential fighting men. The warlike propensities of the Gurkhas is well known, and Nepal lies alongside Bengal, a rich province and one inhabited by talkers and not by fighters. Similarly with the North-West Frontier, here also is to be found a hardy and pugnacious people. Since 1850 there have been over seventy expeditions against the North-West Frontier tribesmen who are ever on the look-out for some disturbance in India as an incentive for them to

come down from their mountain villages and carry fire and sword through the plains of the Indus. In this area peace never reigns. In the four years following the close of the World War, in spite of our elaborate system of defence the tribesmen carried out 1,315 raids in which 578 civilians were killed, 669 wounded, and 981 kidnapped, and between Peshawar and Quetta property to the value of £175,980 was looted.

The frontier problem is one which members of the National Congress recognize but which they refuse to discuss. For instance, when Mr. Gandhi was once asked how he was going to defend the frontiers against the tribesmen, once the British Army and the British officers of the Indian Army had been got rid of, he replied: "I will send them my Charka [spinning wheel] and that will arrest their progress." Similarly, when asked how he would protect the country when the British Army had left, his answer was: "There are thousands and tens of thousands of ex-officers in Germany; we will employ them." On one occasion his suggestion was to make use of magic, on the other foreign leadership; so I think the point to note is that on neither occasion did he suggest that Indian officers were capable of leading their own men.

The fundamental problem of the North-West Frontier is an economic and not a military one, and one worth considering here in some detail, because we are now after half a century of haphazard trial and error in the process of solving it, and it is all but a certainty that should it be handed over to the tender mercies

of an Indian War Minister all that we have done will be undone in a few years.

The history of the defence of the Frontier is an interesting one. The country is poor and the population is comparatively large. It cannot live on the land, therefore it must either starve or raid, consequently it raids. Until a few years ago our policy was to maintain the tribesmen in a state of barbarism, so as to establish a human "wire entanglement" through which an invader would be compelled to force his way before entering India. This policy appealed to many, and particularly to those whose lack of imagination ever suggests inertia as the line of least resistance; but fundamentally it was immoral, because there is no choice but to march with civilization or against her. If throughout our history this inverted policy had guided us, the British Empire would to-day be a wilderness of howling savages. To this policy was added a rider: If the tribesmen raid our fertile lands and villages, we will punish them by entering their territory and destroy their crops and herds. Starvation was the cause of raiding, and our cure for raiding was to render starvation more sure. So inverted an action would, I think, be impossible outside India, and even in so inert and lethargic a country it is difficult to realize that this was our policy for over eighty years.

After the Afghan War of 1919, Lord Rawlinson went to India as Commander-in-Chief, and mainly due to his energy and foresight this inane policy was changed. He started to open up the Frontier by building good

motor roads. His policy was a combination of occupation and tolls. The roads, such as the Bannu-Razmak-Jandola highway, were not primarily built for economic purposes, but to facilitate military movement. To prevent military interference on the part of the tribesmen we pay large tolls to them in one form or another, the Waziristan Khassadars (a type of tribal militia) cost the Government of India many lakhs of rupees yearly.

This road policy has proved eminently successful, for in spite of the fact that the roads are military ones, they have opened up the country to trade. If this policy is continued, there is every likelihood, within the next generation, of the North-West Frontier of India becoming as peaceful as the Punjab. But will it be continued, this is the question, for it means not only the expenditure of money, and there is no government more parsimonious than the Indian, but also military occupation until the tribesmen are sufficiently civilized to be controlled by police.

The policy of paying tolls is undoubtedly an evil one, but it has been forced upon the Government who were, and still are, faced by a choice of two evils, namely, tolls or conquest, and they have accepted the lesser of the two, which incidentally conforms with Indian morality. The danger of this system is that the more money we pay the tribesmen the more rifles do they buy, and as they cannot live on rifles, any dropping off of the toll may lead to war.

The present system requires, however, rectification

Our usual policy is to pay tolls for little or no service. The tribesmen like to offer some service, and the Khasadar system suits their likes very well as it permits them to maintain armed men at our expense, and so not only is this system a source of revenue but of military strength. The situation is paradoxical, for tolls will not keep the tribesmen permanently quiet, only civilization can do this. If under the present system permanent quietude appears likely, the tribesmen at once imagine that the tolls will cease, consequently, now and again a raid is carried out if only to keep them alive.

This inverted way of thinking and acting is patently oriental. For instance, if two villages in our administrative area have a quarrel, the result is a battle fought not to inflict casualties but to sustain them, as each side has to pay the other compensation for the enemy it kills. Frequently the result is that during the battle each party privately gets rid of a few old men and women, and when peace terms are discussed these losses are debited against the other side. It may be of interest to note here that the Pathans claim to be descended from the lost tribes of Israel.

Our future policy should be one of civilizing the tribesmen, as our surest frontier protection lies in establishing trade and prosperity, and so compelling the inhabitants of these wild regions to depend for their comforts on India, and to possess wealth which is worth securing by peaceful behaviour. This policy should run concurrently with road building, as the

construction of roads brings much wealth into the country, all contracts being given out to local chiefs. It must, however, be remembered that it is not the road itself which will civilize the tribesmen, but the pedlars and traders who make use of the road. One highly placed Indian soldier recently said to me: "I have several times strongly advocated a scheme of subsidized pedlars, men who will sell luxuries and not merely necessities to the tribesmen. If the wife of a chief washes his pyjamas with Lux, the difference when compared to normal hill laundry work is so great that he will insist upon his wife always using Lux. Luxuries will by degrees grow into necessities, and there will be less money for rifles. It was not the roads built by General Wade which civilized the Highlanders (the Pathans of the eighteenth century) but the pedlars who used them. Much of the Frontier could be made productive, but lack of the meanest luxuries of life has kept these hillmen barbarous and lazy to a degree."

The idea of conquering the Frontier by soap in place of rifle may seem far-fetched, yet it is perfectly sound and logical. It is the trader who is the true missionary of civilization, and not the soldier who, once he has made it possible for the trader to enter the country, protects his activities. The conclusion is that road construction and subsidized trading should go hand in hand, so that the money obtained through contracts may be spent on luxuries and not on rifles. If this is done, much of the money spent on

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road building will flow back into its normal Indian channels.

I will now turn to a purely military problem of Frontier defence. From its tactical aspect the North West Frontier may be divided into two areas, namely, Chitral to the Zhob, and from this river southwards towards the coast. The northern of these areas is extremely mountainous and hilly, yet the country is intersected by a number of broad valleys, and many of the nullahs widen out and run through comparatively level spaces. As long as we have to fight tribesmen there can be no doubt that in the northern area infantry must continue to remain the principal arm. But as roads are built, the greatest difficulty of a Frontier campaign will be overcome, namely maintenance of supply, because lorries will be able to replace pack transport. As regards tanks, their movement will be restricted to roads and nullahs, and as the latter frequently pass through gorges which can be held by a few good riflemen, these weapons should prove extremely useful, for in most cases they will be able to penetrate these defiles and attack their defenders in rear.

The southern area which includes the important and historical route from Quetta to Kandahar, and thence via Farah to Herat, is eminently suited for all types of mechanically propelled supply and fighting machines. In a few years' time with a small mechanized force it should be a simple operation to advance from New Chaman to Kandahar in twenty-four hours,

certainly in forty-eight; even to-day motor cars traverse the seventy odd miles between these two places in twelve hours.

From this brief account of our Frontier policy it will be seen that neither the spinning-wheel nor the German ex-officer, now somewhat old, and in any case a man who could have no real interest in India outside that of increasing his pay, are unlikely to solve this problem. Further, an Indian Army led by Indian officers, if such an army could be raised, which later on I will show is more than doubtful, would be such a heterogeneous mass of men, fissured by religious discord and frayed by corruption that it is more than unlikely that it would be able to hold the line of the Indus, let alone civilize the tribesmen, and maintain mechanized forces in their territories.

The recent policy of the Indian National Congress leaves it in no doubt what would happen were the British Army withdrawn. In place of assisting in the civilization of the Frontier its Working Committee has carried out a ceaseless propaganda towards barbarizing it. One influence of the British occupation has been partially to dissolve the old feudal system which for thousands of years has held the tribesmen together. As these fetters are loosened, discontent against the existing social regime increases, as it always must in such periods of transition. Realizing this, the National Congress has not left a stone unturned to weaken British rule on the Frontier. This action has been purely vindictive, and without any

eye to future results. The barbaric Pathans utterly despise the Bunias of the Plains; the idea of democracy in its modern meaning is utterly foreign to their nature. Its establishment in India would be scoffed at by them, and, once we, like the Roman legions of Britain, had departed, they would soon prove to the inhabitants of the Punjab, and perhaps even to the jewellers of the Chandni Chauk in Delhi that a spinning-wheel was a poor weapon of defence against the rifle and the knife.

As regards the maintenance of internal security, the one great difficulty is impartiality. In a Moslem village, or town, a Mahomedan policeman, or soldier, cannot help favouring those who belong to his creed, and so must also a Hindu in a Hindu town, or village. As the population is generally mixed, in order to maintain law and order it is essential to have a referee. In a game of football, the referee belongs to neither team, consequently he is impartial. The British soldier is a neutral, and is under no suspicion of favouring Hindus against Mahomedans. or *vice versa*. Frequently it happens that in times of communal excitement, one side or the other (and sometimes both) urges that the local police administration be handed over to an Englishman, and if this is not possible, then to an Indian Christian. Here is a problem which must also be solved before any form of national government can be established in India, and as long as the present communal differences exist, in which religious opinion is a law unto itself, its solution will remain unsolvable.

What national force will be required for internal security and frontier defence? Certainly not less than that employed to-day, and seeing that half Asia is in a turmoil, that Russia threatens the stability of all organized countries, and that the spirit of nationalism is surging through the East, it would seem probable that the existing military forces will not only have to be increased but completely modernized, and provided with large quantities of arms and munitions which are not manufactured in the country. To-day, hordes of men are of little account in war, and a well-equipped modern army would have nothing to fear from an Indian horde equipped with arms which the arsenals of India can to-day provide. Alexander the Great taught India this lesson over two thousand years ago.

The military forces which are now stationed in the Indian Empire are divided into two main categories: the British Army and the Indian; the first comprises some 60,000 officers and men, and the second 156,000 as well as 34,000 reservists.¹ The first is purely a mercenary army, and the second has no resemblance to a national force, because all its senior and most of its junior officers are British, and many of its men are recruited from outside India, such as the Gurkhas from Nepal and the Pathans from the North-West Frontier; it is also largely a mercenary force. These two armies yearly cost the country about fifty-five

¹ About half the British forces and one-fifth of the Indian are reserved for internal security.

crores of rupees (£41,250,000), a large sum for India, but one which can scarcely be cut down, seeing that the army in India is always in a chronic state of unpreparedness for war. This military organization can in no possible way be juggled into a foundation for a national army; for though we have policed India efficiently, we have as yet done nothing towards building up a national defence force; and even if India were inhabited by a homogeneous people of no religious differences, I much doubt whether, accepting the liabilities as they are, such a force could be created under twenty or thirty years.

This however is not so. Where then can this army be recruited? It can be recruited only from those Provinces which are inhabited by fighting races, and all of these lie in the north of India, and the bulk are not predominantly Hindu. Of the total number of combatants in the Indian Army, 140,600 are drawn from the North-West Frontier Province, Kashmere, Punjab, Rajputana, United Provinces, and Nepal;¹ whilst from Central India, Bihar and Orissa, Bengal, Assam, Burma, Central Provinces, Bombay, Hyderabad, Madras and Mysore,² the number is 15,400. The Punjab and Nepal (essentially non-Hindu) provide 62 per cent. of the recruits of the whole army, whilst Bihar and Orissa, Central India and Central Provinces supply a total of 600, and Bengal none. In the war it was much the same; the Punjab and the United Pro-

¹ Total population 91 millions.

² Total population 225 millions.

vinces with a population of 70 millions enlisted 492,000 recruits, whilst Bengal and Orissa with a population of 86 millions enlisted 14,000. More remarkable still, Bengal with a population of 48 millions recruited 2,000 men, less than Ajmir with a population of half a million. In the four years of the war, the Sikhs, from a total population of two and a half millions, furnished no less than 90,000 combatant recruits, that is one-eighth of the Indian total. If a national army is to be raised, then it will consist of Punjabis, Mahomedans, Pathans, Sikhs, Jats, Rajputs and Mahrattas, and is it likely that these men will honour and obey a Government mainly composed of Bengali Babus, Bombay Bunias, and Madrasi pleaders?

The undeniable truth is that, though there are certain warlike races in India, the bulk of the people is pacific and totally unfit for military work. The war casualties show this clearly: "The death casualties for all India with 320 millions of people," writes Sir Michael O'Dwyer, "were less than those of Canada with her 8 millions, of Australia with only 5 millions, and only double those of New Zealand with little over a million people." These figures are however somewhat misleading, for more than half the Indian casualties must be debited to one Province—the Punjab. Thus, from a fighting point of view it may truthfully be said that this Province is worth the rest of India put together.

"Indianization," as far as the military future of India is considered is another of those magical words

which is dimming clear thinking and entrancing those who repeat it like a mantra (sacred saying). Besides the above difficulties there are many others. The question of raising a corps of Indian officers I will deal with later on. Here I will examine certain physical and moral difficulties which appear to be radical, and consequently can only be circumvented by means which are totally foreign to Western armies.

First, the average Indian attains adolescence earlier than the average European, also he ages much more rapidly, with the result that if he remains on in the army the senior ranks will be filled with senile commanders, and if he does not, which is much more likely, because the average Indian abhors responsibility, the army will not offer a full career to the bulk of its officers.

It is an interesting fact that since the days of Alexander the Great, Indian soldiers have always fought best under European leaders. In the eighteenth century runaway sailors and deserters from the French and British fleets frequently rose to the highest military ranks in the armies of Indian rajahs. The reason is that the Indian is a "passive" soldier. He can follow, but he can seldom command; he can obey an order, but he can seldom enforce one. Sir Reginald Craddock hit the nail on the head when in a recent letter in *The Times* he said that Indian soldiers lack two qualities—"quick decision in emergency, and readiness to take responsibility." Then he adds: "There are, of course, brilliant exceptions, but these are relatively few. The

martial races are educationally backward. They are capable of desperate valour under commanders whom they trust, but are most deficient in initiative. When these races take to higher education, they quickly drift towards more otiose civil avocations."

We are here once again confronted by that ancient god—Climate. Climate which saps the vitality of all people living in India, making of them fatalists and thinkers rather than workers and warriors. It would seem that even to-day the Indians are not fully acclimatized, and perhaps the climate is such that they never will be. Responsibility is always shirked, and decision left in the hands of God. When a few years ago I was last in India, the following incident took place in a small city situated some miles from a railway station. A holy man, I do not remember of what creed, but probably a Mahomedan, died in the main street, little more than a lane. His followers forthwith proceeded to bury him in the centre of it, and proposed erecting a shrine over his remains. This operation completely blocked the street, and the shopkeepers, fearing loss of trade, appealed to the city magistrate, or district officer, who was an Indian, asking him to issue an order to have the saint buried elsewhere. There was no precedent for such an action; he did not know what to do, so like every other Indian he did nothing, and the road was blocked. The shopkeepers were about to resign themselves to their fate, seeing in his lack of action the finger of God, when one of their number suggested sending a deputation to the

railway station which was in charge of a British corporal. The deputation went there and consulted the corporal who, no doubt for a small consideration, consented to see what he could do. Arriving at the city he found a large gathering of followers worshipping around the tomb. On seeing him they all began to talk, for his uniform roused their suspicions; whereupon he shouted: "chup raho!" (shut up), and then in a mixture of English and Hindustani he said: "Take that b— old b— away!" The assembled worshippers salaamed and took him away; and no doubt in this action did the Magistrate, the worshippers and the shopkeepers also see the finger of God.

The Indian National Congress has never tackled India's military problem with any sincerity. It is true that Mr. Gandhi has on more than one occasion, in spite of his love for non-resistance and non-violence, demanded the repeal of the Arms Act which he considers has reduced India "to a state bordering on cowardly helplessness." But why is this Act enforced? Because without it there would have been an unending guerilla war between Hindus and Mahomedans. The "Nehru Report" (Report of the Committee appointed by the All-Parties Congress, 1928) scarcely touches upon this subject. In its introduction a recommendation is made to transfer the control over the Indian Army to the suggested National Government. Obviously the British Army in India cannot be handed over to an Indian Legislature, and without this army the men of the Indian Army could only be transferred

because the bulk of the officers is British. Such an army, a vast mob of officerless men without a British Army to keep it in check, recruited from the fighting races and in no way a national force, would overturn any National Government in a fortnight.

The authors of this Report quote Professor Keith who said:

“Self-Government without an effective Indian Army is an impossibility, and no amount of protests or demonstrations or denunciations of the Imperial Government can avail to alter that fact.”

And comment on this observation as follows:

“This is true, but we do not accept the constitutional position that without an Indian or Dominion Army India cannot obtain Dominion status. In the first place the Indian Army has not to be created; it exists there already. In the next place historically the position taken by our critics is not correct.”

The first of these statements is obviously incorrect. No true Indian Army exists; in place an army manned mainly by Mahomedans, Sikhs and Gurkhas, and officered by Europeans. The second is equally beside the point, for the authors confound the two duties of every national army, namely, to maintain law and order within the country, and to repel a foreign invasion. Their contention is that historically “none of the colonies was in a position to assume its defence at the time when a self-governing status was granted to it.” This is correct, but it begs the question; for equally true is it to-day that no single Dominion is capable of repelling a first-class Power. The whole meaning of

Empire is based on this fact. What, however, is true is, that no Colony became a self-governing Dominion until its military forces were capable of maintaining law and order within its frontiers; then, and then only were the British regular units withdrawn.

In turn, the "Simon Report" offers no solution, for all its authors do is to point out difficulties, such as:

"We appreciate the fact, however, that, in the end, a self-governing India can only hope to function with reasonable prospect of success if it can command military forces of its own." And: "One condition, therefore, of a self-governing India must be its ability to maintain without the aid of British troops the essential of all good government, viz: public peace and tranquillity."

The only suggestion made is that India might be encouraged to organize, train and equip certain military and naval forces of its own; but the authors add: "This involves technical questions into which we do not enter."

The most important of these technical questions is the raising of a corps of Indian officers. With this aim in view, vacancies for ten (in future twenty) Indian cadets are yearly offered at the Royal Military College, at Sandhurst, and a few at the Royal Military Academy at Woolwich and the Royal Air Force College at Cranwell. Yet it was not until November 1929 that, for the first time, "the number of Indian candidates qualified for Sandhurst exceeded the number of vacancies offered." With reference to this question an

interesting point is mentioned by Sir Michael O'Dwyer who, writing in 1925, informs us that: "In India, in the three years 1922-24, forty-five candidates were selected for the I.C.S. [Indian Civil Service]. Of these forty-one were Hindus; there was not a single European or Mahomedan. On the other hand, the Indians admitted to Sandhurst are almost all Sikhs or Mahomedans. So that in the future the divorce between the Hindus holding political power, and the Mahomedans and Sikhs in the Army, will become even more marked than at present." With such a division of power between talkers and fighters the establishment of a stable national government is impossible, and no Indian military colleges will alter this fact.

The more one examines the military proposals of this Report the more bewildered one becomes. In chapter VIII I have already noted that according to the Statutory Commission the British Army in India is to remain directly under the Viceroy, and that the Indian Army is to be completely Indianized and become a Dominion Army. The danger of such a division of force I have already pointed out, but it must also be realized that to establish two armies in a country, the one controlled by an irremovable executive and the other by an elected legislature must give rise to constant friction, especially if these two controlling instruments of government fail to see eye to eye. It would appear more rational in place of attempting to create a Dominion Army in a short time to continue the present slow process of Indianization, and as units

become fully Indianized to hand them over to the Government of India, and simultaneously reduce the strength of the British Army until the one is completely replaced by the other.

Even such a process of replacement has serious disadvantages. First it will prove excessively slow and so give rise to agitation; secondly it may prove abortive. To fall back on the Indian Territorial Force as the foundations of a Dominion Army would be even worse, for this organization does not attract men of the military castes, but as General Sir George Barrow has said: "Only waifs and strays from the docks and bazaars and indigent wayfarers who joined up for the sake of the food, pay and clothing, and who after a single training departed to return no more." The truth is that from whatever angle one looks at this problem, sooner or later one is confronted by the fact that India is not a military country, and further that unless the leopard can be induced to change its spots, India cannot be endowed with a military spirit. This seems to have been the conclusions of the Statutory Commission, for in the Report we read:

"The plain fact is that the formation of an Indian National Army drawn from India as a whole, in which every member will recognize the rest as his comrades, in which Indian officers will lead men who may be of different races, and in which public opinion will have general confidence, is a task of the greatest possible difficulty, and the Indian intellectual has, as a rule, no personal longing for an army career."

Yet the fact remains that the foundations of Indian rule right through her history have been "military

power reinforced by hereditary or religious sanction." When this has not been so, then in place of rule there has been anarchy.

The Statutory Commission may I think be forgiven for not having solved this apparently unsolvable problem. But when the Commissioners turn from the organization of military force to its employment, confusion becomes worse confounded. To-day this problem is simple, both the British and the Indian Armies are responsible for internal security and frontier defence. According to the Statutory Commission the Indian National Army is to be responsible for the first and the British Army for the second. This division of force leads to a curious administrative problem: law and order is to be the responsibility of elected Ministers whilst the maintenance of the public peace is to be the responsibility of the British Parliament. No definitions are given differentiating the meaning of "law and order" and of "public peace"; but reading between the lines, one comes to the conclusion that the first limits rebellion within the powers of the Dominion Army to quell it; but that, should this army join the rebels, then to maintain public peace the British Army must be called in. This is the only interpretation I can place on section 213 of volume ii of the Report.

Whether I am right or wrong in this interpretation is of no great importance for all proposals set forth in the Report are but suggestions. But what is alarming is that apparently the British Government in no way realized the importance of the military problem, in

fact, they ignored it completely. In the Round Table Conference what do we see: the assembly of nearly one hundred men and women representing all classes and opinions, and not a single British or Indian soldier competent to advise the Conference on the military problem. Such an omission can only be compared to the assembly of a committee to discuss the public health and omit to include a physician amongst its members. The truth is that since the Government at home decided to tackle the problem of the future of the Indian Empire, the Indian National Congress has spent so much of its time in abusing British rule, and the British Government has spent so much time in avoiding to give offence that the abutments upon which the bridge of India's future must rest have been lost sight of. These are military control on the one side and religious influence on the other. To build this bridge in the air, can be no more than a beautiful, or hideous, vision which will never span the gap. To build it on the muddy banks of politeness and abuse can only lead to its inevitable collapse.

Such in brief is India's military problem, a problem which would seem to defy solution other than that of the prolonged occupation of the country by the British Army, the object of which must continue to be to maintain law and order in the land and defend its frontiers. "To withdraw the British Government [the foundations of which are the British Army] from a country like India," wrote Sir John Seeley fifty years ago, "which has been dependent on it, and which we

have made incapable of depending on anything else would be the most inexcusable of all conceivable crimes and might cause the most stupendous of all conceivable calamities." Yet this is what the Indian Nationalists are urging us to do. They may talk of independence and we may suggest federation; yet these and Dominion status "are such stuff as dreams are made on," and are not worth the breath expended on their discussion until a national army is created; and failing this, either the present benevolent despotism must continue, or the whole land be handed back to the anarchy in which we found it. Anarchy gave us India, and from us can anarchy take India away.

So much for one abutment, I will now turn to the other.

CHAPTER X

THEOCRACY AND DEMOCRACY

To put new wine into old bottles is always a risky experiment, and nowhere more so than in the East. Yet this is what we are doing in India. We have poured the new wine of democracy with all its strange fermentations into the ancient bottles of Indian theocracy, and are now hoping for the best. We have never once paused to consider logically our actions consciously or unconsciously done. True, we are fearful of what we are doing, but fear ever begets failure. We are being nagged into suicide by a handful of agitators, in a land where ninety-eight per cent. of the people look upon their daily lives, as our ancestors did in the dimmest days of the Middle Ages, seeing in the whims of despots, in misrule, in plagues, famines and wars the finger of God. Were we to pause and consider our own past, before plotting the future of India, we should realize that democracy and theocracy are two world orders which refuse to amalgamate. They are as unmixable as oil and water, so that until theocracy has been modified out of all recognition, as it was in Europe between the days of John Huss and Robespierre, to pour the new wine into the old bottles, if it must be done, should be done with

extreme circumspection and with an eye on the bottle rather than the wine.

Until India is de-theocratized, democracy is no more than a blessed word, a will-o'-the-wisp which must lead us into a slough of despond. By this I do not mean that her peoples must become atheists and agnostics, or as callous about religion as the average European is; but that the idea of God must cease to impose itself upon every-day life with such force that the idea of man is crushed out of existence. To maintain faith in God and to develop faith in mankind seems to me to be a far nobler ideal than either the overwhelming theocracy of present-day India, or the all-absorbing materialism of Western civilization. Consequently, there is no question of India losing her faith. Quite otherwise, for, in my opinion, a readjustment of her religious views would cleanse Hinduism, which is founded on the most exalted conception of Deity, of the crude superstitions and unholy practices which have collected around it these three thousand years. Further still, in this great task of democratizing India we should remember the deficiencies in our own every-day lives, and that in her turn a purified India can give to us in exchange for the dignity of man, the dignity of God.

In its ultimate form the problem is a direct one; the West must regain faith in God and the East charity towards man, without which there can be no peace or contentment in this world. A nobler faith and a greater charity is the amalgam of nations, a problem

which I cannot examine here, but one which should not be overlooked in the following outline.

It has been said, and by an English writer, that "Many good brains in India have been bound like the feet of a mandarin's wife, so that they can only hobble ever after; and such cramping of the imagination may lose us the Empire." Personally I go further than this, for India to-day lies like a mummy wrapped in yards of sacerdotal customs, a mummy fast bound up by the past, but to-day infected with internal decomposition, which is much more likely to destroy its present form than revive its past greatness.

To quote now the words of an Indian, for I wish to be impartial; in 1928, Mr. J. M. Sen Gupta, Chairman of the Reception Committee of the National Congress said:

"Slavish worship of the past, communal dissensions, the caste, the purdah, polygamy, early marriage, and other cankers of the body politic are responsible for our failure. We live a life divided into compartments; our patriotism is communal; our unity amounts to mere juxtaposition. Steeped in the prejudices of a medieval age, with half the nation losing their vitality behind the purdah, and in its turn devitalizing the other half; disintegrated by warring castes and creeds which condemn a population more than that of the United Kingdom or Japan as untouchables, whose shadows even it is pollution to tread; can we ever expect that we shall be able to bear upon Britain the necessary pressure? In order to assert ourselves in the modern world, we must be modernised. . . The caste must go. . . It serves no useful purpose and exists only to emphasise meaningless, nay, harmful social distinctions—a fruitful source of hatred, jealousy and conflict—an enervating factor in national life, narrowing down the marriage circle and often resulting in the evils of near blood marriage. . .

"A frontal attack should be led on *the forces of reaction*. If it is found that Hindu culture means purdah, and Mohamedan

culture means the harem, both must go. If Hindu culture means caste system and marriage before puberty, and Mohamedan culture means polygamy, none of these should have a place in our social polity . . . the shackles alike of the Shariats and the Shastras should be unceremoniously cast off if they are found to stand in the way of the formation of a united nation."

Mr. R. K. Shanmugham Chetty, recently speaking at Erode, is even more outspoken:

"Every unjust law and objectionable custom," he said, "is linked up with religion, and the orthodox Hindu pleads the sanction of religion for the perpetuation of these evils. . . The caste system, the denial of right of entry into temples, the unjust laws of inheritance, practice of child marriage, in fact every evil that it is our intention to suppress or rectify is linked up with the Hindu religion. I shall proclaim from the house-tops that an evil is none the less an evil even if it has the sanction of religion; in fact an evil law or custom sanctioned by religion is the most dangerous thing and must be ruthlessly put down; but if the authority of any religion is trotted out in justification of an evil, then that so-called religion must go along with the evil. . . Personally I am free to confess that the God of my conception is in the life of even the humblest of individuals and that I must worship Him only through service and right conduct. And I know that this is the faith of a great many of the adherents of the Self-Respect movement."

Mr. Sen Gupta and Mr. Shanmugham Chetty are educated Indians, but in India 8 per cent. only of the male and female population of over five years old can read or write, and the majority of these is so cramped by religion that in literacy alone there is no hope of redemption. The following case of suttee, quoted from Mr. E. Thompson's book, "The Reconstruction of India," is illuminating. It occurred at Bahr, in Bihar, on November 22, 1927. The police, all Indians, were

overawed by the crowd. As the woman was scorched by the fire she sprang into the river, and under the shelter of a tiny tree she lingered for four days. No one was allowed to tend her burns, though exultant mobs brought to this scene of horror by motor buses, collected around her and worshipped her. Thus far the superstition of uneducated villagers may partially excuse the act; but the worst is to come. "Those accused of abetting her suicide were unanimously acquitted by the assessors, five educated Hindus, a schoolmaster, three college professors, and a landowner. When the judge, disagreeing, sentenced them to inadequate terms of imprisonment, the leading Bihar Hindu paper said his action 'sent a thrill of horror through the Province.' "

These four quotations are worth pondering. Are the feet of the mandarin's wife permanently crippled? It is impossible to say. Can Mr. Sen Gupta's and Mr. Shanmugham Chetty's objections be overcome? To this also no certain answer can be given. But one thing is sure, and this is: were we to leave India tomorrow, so engrained are her superstitions that, within a few weeks of our departure, hundreds of wretched women would for the love of God be yearly burnt alive. India is in fact latently in the same condition that Europe was in during the days of the witch and the sorcerer.

To turn now to the influence of religion in India on life generally. As long as men make a mystery of God so long will they remain priest-ridden; and in India

this mystery is so profound that none but the most highly educated can hope to grasp it; and the symbols used by the early priesthood to explain it to the multitude have become so gross and illogical as to beggar description. The belief that all misfortunes are sent by God was originally propounded to keep the masses docile. By it they were intellectually chloroformed, hence one of the reasons for their apathy, which in the past has only been broken when some holy man has announced himself to be an emanation of the Divinity.

A still more potent system of keeping the people quiet is caste (in Sanscrit: Varna, which means colour) a post-vedic conception introduced by the early Aryan invaders in order to keep their stock pure, and to prevent their religious ceremonies from being contaminated. The four main castes are those of Brahmins—priests, Kshatriyas—nobles, Vaishya—traders, and Shudras—labourers. Undoubtedly the caste system has maintained stability in India, but only at the sacrifice of intelligence; it is a purely restrictive social order, and this may be seen from the fact that a Brahmin is by his creed prohibited from teaching a man of servile caste “the laws of expiating sin.” This priestly caste is against all progress, for the simple reason that its males do not number more than from seven to eight million out of a total Hindu population of 216,000,000. The Brahmin knows that Western civilization spells doom to him and his trade, consequently he is bitterly opposed to reforms, but nevertheless he is the moving spirit within all revolutionary

substance; for he well knows that, once British rule is overthrown, the most advanced revolutionaries will at once be crushed out of existence by the reaction of the masses of the people.

To explain the mysteries of God to the common folk, from the earliest days the Brahmins have made use of sex symbology. It is true that much of the Hindu religions, like many others, is in origin phallic. In this there is nothing reprehensible, because the mystery of creation is near akin to the mystery of sex. But in Brahminism the use of sex symbols passes the limits of all common decency, and this may be verified by examining Hindu sculptures and idols. From the idea of the mystery of sex, woman is looked upon as the temple of love, and then in actual temples are the male worshippers accommodated by Devadasis, sacerdotal prostitutes. India is through and through saturated with sexuality, which has not only degraded the sublimity of her religion as expounded in such works as the Upanishads, but has lowered the status of her women to the lowest level. Woman is of no account. According to the "Code of Manu," for a man to be reincarnated as a woman is the most fearful of punishments; and though in this Code we read: "He who does not willingly cause pain of confinement and death to living beings, but desires the good of all, obtains endless bliss," this in no way has put a stop to female infanticide. This is proved by the fact that to-day there are 9,000,000 more men in the country than women. In one Hindu State—a State which has been

in existence for over two hundred years—Sir Michael O'Dwyer informs us that all daughters born to the Maharajah, except in the last generation (there have been eleven successions) were destroyed as soon as born. Yet to kill a cow, and in some localities a bug, is considered an unforgivable crime. Cow-killing is damnation to the Hindu, consequently the country is stocked with 151,000,000 cattle, large numbers being utterly worthless, and the majority most brutally treated. To show the height of criminal folly to which this principle of non-killing is carried, the following story is illuminating:

A certain Maharajah, over a hundred years ago, dedicated a few head of cattle to the gods. These established themselves near Baratpur, became wild and increased until they numbered 10,000. Their depredations were such, that to protect the peasantry outside the confines of the State the British authorities posted men to shoot them. This brought the then Maharajah to reason. To prevent the herd crossing the British boundary he erected along it a barbed wire fence ten feet high and forty miles long!

In government religion has always proved the complex factor in India, consequently the necessity for despotism in the past. Caste and caste preferment creep in at every turn. Nepotism is not a vice but a religious duty, and financial integrity is considered an arid virtue, if not a vice. The Hindu worships the cow, whilst the Mahomedan sacrifices this animal at the Bakr'Id festival. Cow-music insults one side, and

cow-killing the other. According to the teaching of the Prophet, there are no distinctions of caste, race or colour; according to Brahminism, such distinctions are the breath of God. Islam is willing to admit the lowest outcastes into its fold; Hinduism looks upon them as predestined to damnation. Islam regards all idolaters as sinful, Hinduism venerates image worship. In short, it would be difficult to find two religions more diverse, and, except under a despotism, they are daggers drawn.

A despotism is seldom an ideal form of government, yet how can India expect democratic rule as long as Hinduism itself remains despotic, and looks upon 60,000,000 fellow men as outcastes or untouchables. The Depressed Classes constitute a running sore in the Hindu social system. They are herded apart, their children cannot use the schools, they cannot enter a village post office or use a rest-house, certain streets are denied to them, and on the approach of a high caste Hindu they have to shout out who they are in order to give warning of the risk of pollution. In Madras a local authority "preferred to leave the roads unmended rather than employ untouchable labourers to repair them," and in Bengal it is not unknown "for postmen to refuse . . . to deliver letters to untouchables," so says the "Simon Report."

Once India, because of the anarchy which inflicted her during the eighteenth century, had passed under British rule, to create order and to establish tranquillity, there was no option but that of an autocratic govern-

ment to counteract the anarchy of several despotic theocracies which were totally unable to agree on the simplest political questions, because the God-idea inevitably intervened. From this it must not be supposed that the bulk of the peoples of India look upon anarchy as a desirable state—far from it, for the peasant has no one to look to but God, and a good God orders this world and a good peasant never questions his ordering, consequently anarchy to him is pure godlessness, and therefore a strong and just government is the instrument of God, it is all-powerful and all-wise, in fact superhuman. But should it fail, then the logical inference is that God has gone to sleep, and consequently man himself can take action. Thus did the despotism of religion shape the form of government, which for a hundred years, except for the brief interval of the Mutiny, gave to India a peace and prosperity she had never known before. To the peasant the Sirkar was God, or at least an Avatar of God, and the intelligentsia who did not accept this argument were too insignificant to be of any account.

As the theocracy of India reacted on the British government, compelling it to establish a despotism, so did the democratic spirit of this government, the reforms it introduced and the example it set react on the theocracy and cause a fermentation. This influence of West upon East was insidious yet unconscious, in one word it was as inevitable as had been the influence of theocracy upon our politics. We put a stop to suttee and other unholy practices, and thus struck at

the prerogatives and prestige of the Brahmins. We introduced our own language and system of education, and so opened the road to the study of European literature and political theory. Appealing thus to the minds of educated Indians, the inevitable result was the establishment of an Indian press, the newspapers of which are printed in English. Through these the spirit of patriotism, hitherto alien to India, was introduced, and editors soon discovered that patriotism was a paying investment, and the more violent the propaganda the greater were the sales. We established an ever-increasing bureaucracy drawn largely from the Brahmin caste, and almost entirely from the towns, the intelligentsia of which have never shown much sympathy for the peasants. We introduced law courts which gave birth to the pleader "caste"; factories and railways which made it impossible to observe caste rules with strictness, and steamships which brought large numbers of students to Europe and America, there to discover the vices of Western civilization. Thus, whilst the mass of the peasants grew more and more contented, a virile and ever-increasingly hostile politically-minded class was created, whose inner discontent was with the theocracy of its country, but whose outward grievance was directed against ourselves. This class, fed on European political philosophy, now wants to control the country, yet it cannot see that as long as its real discontent lasts this is impossible. Being placed between the horns of a dilemma, medievalism on the one side and modernism on the other, and

being impotent to tackle the inert mass of Brahminism, it throws all its energies into political agitation.

This agitation in its turn reacted on British control. At first almost unconsciously, for little notice was taken of it, consequently it was largely ignored, for all governments in the East, whether European or Oriental, are apt to become lethargic. Then, when it became too apparent to be overlooked, attempts were made to suppress it and in turn to palliate it; but as tolerance is a virtue unknown in the East the result was a loss of prestige, which at once led to the outbreak of disorders. This begot at times more toleration, and at others increased suppression, and between the vacillations of these two disorder grew in intensity.

Thus the difficulties which now face the Government of India are to a considerable extent of its own making; it has for over half a century been living in a dream. They are also due to the all but complete ignorance of the Home Government in Indian affairs, other than economic. The lack of touch with Indian psychology is complete, and successive changes in ministries have rendered vacillation more and more pronounced. In brief, India was not understood, the tag that "East and West can never meet" was found to be comforting, yet the political prayer still is "Peace in our time, O Lord." The outcome has been a general weakening of authority which has resulted in ever-increasing communal troubles. In September, 1924, an Indian writer in a Calcutta newspaper said:

"It is only the fear of a superior power that can ever stop the hatred of one community for the other. That fear has been removed in consequence of the efforts of the British Government to devolve responsibility upon others. There is nothing now to prevent us cutting one another's throats as we used to do before British supremacy established itself in India."

This clearly illustrates the difficulty of decentralization so long as theocracy governs political opinions.

Next there is the reaction upon the Indian States, where, generally speaking, astrology is a more potent factor in government than any form of Western statesmanship. There are over six hundred of these States, and these are seldom considered by the Indian agitator. In them communal troubles seldom occur, because their governments understand the people, and the agitator is not tolerated.

Lastly there is the reaction between these States and British India. The former are openly autocratic, the latter now autocratically democratic, that is to say its statesmanship is directed towards reforms which will suit the Imperial Government but not necessarily advance Indian aspirations. Agreement would now seem to be impossible, if only because a free press and foreign dominion are incompatible. Thus order has been reduced until to-day it is no longer dependent on the good-will of the people, but on the truncheons of the police and the bayonets of the soldiery.

As this state of affairs is antipathetic to public opinion in Great Britain, and also to the ideals of Western civilization, which are tending more and more towards internationalism, and of necessity must in-

clude self-determination, ever since the close of the World War one attempt after another has been made to solve the democratic problem in spite of theocracy; yet this problem defies all solution, except perhaps that of time.

Religion, as ever, is the outstanding difficulty, and there is no other difficulty which approaches it in intensity, except perhaps the military difficulty of creating a national army to enforce the will of an Indian Government. Except for a brief spell during the Khilafat Movement, political parties have grouped themselves round the various religions. Thus the Swarajists and the Nationalist party are entirely Hindu, the Central Moslem party and Independent party entirely Mahomedan. The mixing of religion and politics is inevitable, no man can avoid it, and Mr. Gandhi exulted in it, and as a holy man at once became the tool of the Brahmins, who nevertheless disagreed with many of his tenets, widow-marriage and the abolition of untouchability being anathema to them. Qualification to vote on a property basis is impossible, as women do not hold property in their own right, and neither do the junior members of undivided Hindu families. The only system, which in nature is an anti-democratic one, is to place the franchise upon a religious basis, for, as Mr. R. G. Pradhan says in his "India's Struggle for Swaraj," "The great question on which India is divided is the question of communal representation"; and as long as this condition endures Dominion status, that is responsible

self-government, can be nothing more than a dream. He also says:

"It is no use appealing to the principle of national self-determination, and asking the Government to act up to it, if India herself will speak with many discordant voices. If we cannot agree among ourselves, the right of final decisions must necessarily—no less morally than legally—belong to the British Parliament; and then to question that right is ridiculous."

This shows quite clearly the state of nationalism in India. There is no public opinion as understood in the West, but solely the opinions of various bands of agitators—Hindu, Mahomedan, Sikh, etc.—who possess no common idea on politics or social interest. In fact, it would be difficult to find a more anti-democratic country to experiment in.

Besides the communal difficulty there are many minor ones, each of which would wreck democracy in any Western country. For instance, over 90 per cent. of the people are not only illiterate, but submerged in the crudest superstitions. Hieroglyphics, such as a tiger, an elephant, or a sword, have to be printed on the ballot papers to enable the one-tenth of the adult male population which is enfranchized to distinguish the names of the members it intends to vote for, the bulk of which are town-bred pleaders who have nothing in common with the peasants. Should women be given the vote, the wife of a low caste Hindu could use it, but in most cases wives of high caste Hindus and Moslems could not, being debarred from recording their votes by social and religious customs.

The idea of a United States of India is an old one, anyhow as old as 1904, when Sir Henry Cotton, who presided over the National Congress held in Bombay that year, expressed the British radical view that "India should evolve into a federation of free and separate states." Such a federation was outlined by the Nehru Committee and considered by the All Parties Conference which met at Lucknow on August 28, 1928; but the constitution boiled down to a bargain between Hindus and Moslems for a division of seats and jobs, and provided for full Dominion government without any attempt to settle the religious or military problems. Until these are settled, no federation which does not admit of the principle of dyarchy, which in its ultimate form means the reservation of military power in British hands, is possible; consequently the National Congress has now set aside the Nehru Constitution and in its place demands complete independence. Such a demand is a mere cutting of the Gordian knot, which would immediately be followed by the disruption of India. Not only is there no national army, or even a reliable mercenary army other than the British, to keep the peace; but the Princes would refuse all allegiance to a national government which could not enforce its will; each would attempt to extend his own borders, and the warlike Sikhs would certainly create a State of their own. The result would be chaos and civil war.

Is there, then, a solution to the problem of Indian Independence other than that of war, which may in

the end consolidate the people, just as the wars of religion in Europe led eventually to the consolidation of modern European nations? There may be, but what it is is certainly not clear. My own views are that there are only two possible lines of direction which offer practical results. The first, the one I have already mentioned, namely, the reconstruction of the Presidencies and Provinces as States so that the whole of India may once again be ruled by princes. The second is to cease copying the European, and essentially British, system of franchise, and establish one which will fit India's predominant characteristic, namely a land of villages. In the old village system the headman was a man of authority, now he is little more than a cypher. R. Grant Brown in his book, "Burma as I saw it," says:

"Now the Burmese also [like the Swiss] have had, for thousands of years, an indigenous system of local government, the only representative institution they understand, and one which has stood like a rock through all their history; the system of village headman and village committees elected by the people.

"... If a representative Government is sought, as distinguished from a body of men elected for the purpose of overthrowing the Government, it could be obtained by making the headmen electors for the circle boards, who would elect the district councils, who would in turn elect the national council. This would be self-government in a far truer sense than the new and exotic system of direct election to a legislative council. Instead of a candidate being a complete stranger, selected by a distant caucus on the ground of his ability to persuade the villagers to join in overthrowing the Government, he would be a resident of the village, and would be chosen by the villagers themselves as a man who is likely to treat them well and to further the interests of the village. Such a system would not, as the present one does, tend to throw the Government of the country (so far as it is not British)

into the hands of a few rich men, lawyers and professional politicians, whose interests are often opposed to those of the mass of the people. It would enable the voices of the rural population to be heard; and the rural population is nine-tenths of the whole."

That such a system is applicable to India is vouched for by Mr. W. A. Gayer, who for thirty-three years served in the Indian Police. In *The Times* of December 11, 1930, he wrote:

"Throughout the time of British rule in India practical experience has shown that it has been unwise to reject the principle that the village must be the unit of all Indian administration. The exotic systems of franchise which are now recommended ignore this axiom. A system which would conform more closely to the dictates of experience would be to enfranchise, not a few individuals, but villages, or groups of villages, and towns, or wards in towns, according to size and importance. Each unity would be represented by a member elected by secret ballot. This system would not be entirely new, for in the villages of many parts of India, the 'headman' is so elected now, and, as in these small communities it is personality which counts, the choice is usually sound.

"Villagers grow up together from childhood, and therefore are tolerant of each other's caste and creed. Among them, unless fostered from outside, communal antagonism seldom arises, and would hardly interfere with sound judgment in a matter of policy. . .

"The Report (Vol. i. Report of the Indian Statutory Commission) estimates that some 226,000,000 of people live in India's 500,000 villages; the rest reside in towns. Consequently when each unit is represented by one man the unwieldy population of 247,000,000 would be reduced to an easily managed electorate of about half a million, each member of which would hold a mandate from his own constituency. All elected persons would meet at their own sub-division headquarters, and from among the members supporting the policy of the majority men would be chosen by secret ballot to represent the sub-division at

district headquarters. From districts elected delegates would go to Provincial Councils, and from these to the Central Council "

The only disadvantage which can be urged against this system is that it will most certainly not appeal to the Pleader and Bunia classes which now control Indian politics. Consequently the British Government will be afraid to adopt it. The franchise is the foundation of democracy, but even with this system theocracy will continue to rule. I do not think that India will suddenly go up in flames, but I do think that our present experiments in democracy, if they go through, are likely to have two results which will lead to one end. The first is, as British administrators decrease in numbers and are replaced by Indian, an administrative decay will set in which will alienate the peasant classes. The second is, that through agitation, boycott and tariffs, trade with India will grow less and less, until the people in Great Britain find that India is but an albatross around their neck. They may then cut the cord and have done with it. This, it seems to me, is the greatest danger which faces India to-day.

Here I think it will be well to summarize the various systems of government which have been scattered through this book, a confusion of possibilities which shows clearly how complex and confounded the Indian problem is.

We start with British autocracy, a benevolent despotism, a system of government based on military power, but without the administrative elasticity of the

old Mogul rule. It cannot stand, it must be replaced by a new order, but of what nature?

Parliamentarianism, as known in Great Britain and throughout the white British Empire, is obviously impossible in a country so divided by caste, sect and race as is India. Could it be foisted on the country it would end in creating a hundred political parties; already there must be nearly a score. Western democracy as demanded by the Indian National Congress is not democracy at all. It is oligarchy, but this in itself is no disability and, as I have already said, its one defect is that the Indian Princes will not accept it, and without their co-operation a united India is impossible.

As an alternative we can return to the Mogul system, a confederacy of self-governing States kept in order by a strong central military power. To re-establish this system would mean the transformation of Provinces into States, and this the National Congress is unlikely to listen to. There is also the return to the village system, as explained above; but this would not be agreed to by the States, certainly in its ultimate form, and would be opposed tooth and nail by Congress, for it would prevent the formation of an intellectual oligarchy. A combination of these two systems, the former for the States and the latter for the Provinces would appear to be the most logical solution, but this in itself would prohibit its adoption in India.

The possibility of a complete breakdown is another solution, one I have also noted. A breakdown follow-

ing the British evacuation, a period of anarchy such as swept Europe during the Renaissance and Reformation, and which led to the formation of a number of national States. Or a breakdown as occurred in Ireland in 1921, and which divided that small island in two.

This seems a likely solution, for since the reforms of ten years ago communalism has vastly increased in India, and the problem of finding a balance between nationalism and communalism appears to defy all solution.

Yet there is one more possibility, the possibility that the god Climate will succeed when every effort of man, especially Western man, has failed. The Indians are instinctively a peaceful people; British rule has given them a taste for order, and the doctrine of Ahimsa is in their bone. Climate has made of the Indian what he is, and there is no reason to doubt that Climate will make of the Indian what he is to be—the masses docile and God-fearing, the masters corrupt and sensual. Should federation, in its peculiar Oriental form, mean that the masters, the intelligentsia, the talkers and present-day agitators are to rise to the seats of the mighty, and are to be given a free hand to establish a corrupt bureaucracy and grow fat on the leanness of the peasant; and all this to be accomplished under the protection of a powerful British Army which will prevent the masses of the people rising against them, and will hold the frontier against the hungry barbarism of the North-West, then, I think, from the Oriental point

of view, federation is likely to prove literally a howling success.

Is there any justification, any precedent for such a degradation? Yes, Egypt! In a recent number of *The Times* we read:

"Wealth among Egyptians is concentrated in the hands of a few rich landowners who spend most of their time in the towns, while eight or nine-tenths of the population live in mud hovels in villages bordering the canals." Many of the Government consider that the constitution is less important than the economic question. The Wafd strove for complete independence rather than economic prosperity "so that it has so far shown itself to be a better fighting than a governing machine."

"The Wafd tended to place the thorny question of Anglo-Egyptian relations in the forefront, which led to political crises and distracted the Government's attention from economic questions."

The economic crises resulting led to resignation of Wafd Cabinets and the formation of "business" Cabinets, "such as those formed by Ashmed Pasha Ziwar in 1925, by Mohamed Pasha Mahmud in 1929, and by Ismail Pasha Sidky in 1930. It is argued that Cabinets governing without Parliament have done as much to consolidate Egyptian independence as have Wafdist Cabinets working with Parliament."

What has enabled this almost miraculous change over from riots and murders, the frenzy for independence and the waving of red flags to the outward con-

tentedness which smiles on the face of Egypt to-day? The answer is: the British Army of Occupation. This army is the guarantor of corruption. The felaheen is pillaged and swindled as he was before we came to the country; but he is inarticulate and what can he do against the bayonets?

India is not Egypt, India is very different from Egypt, yet both countries belong to the East, and from a Western point of view all Eastern nations have one thing in common—corruption. Whether India will follow in the footsteps of Egypt no man can say; yet there is a possibility, even a probability. Then will history for a time cease to repeat itself. Once the sword vanished in the rose, and when fully blown she cast her petals in anarchy and died. This has been the life story of every past Indian empire. Now the sword will prune the rose so that she will bring forth many buds, increasing her petals and becoming fruitless in the seed.

This is a strange world and strange things happen in it. Perhaps there is some virtue after all in never understanding a problem, of never being interested in a problem, of never formulating a policy. A nation which acts in such a way is surely more resilient, more plastic to outward changes. The valour of our ignorance has in the past carried us over many a seemingly unjumpable fence. The gods smile on the happy-go-lucky, because after all the gods are very human, and like ourselves they enjoy a laugh. To-day India is their jest, and it never does to take a joke too seriously.

CHAPTER XI

IN THE LAP OF THE MYTHS

“AUTHORITY”; this is the one word which to-day is missing from the world’s social vocabulary; and what does authority imply? It implies the control of the majority by the minority, because intelligence is a rare and stupidity a plentiful quality in humankind. The masses must be controlled by some myth, some ideal which enslaves their animal instincts and emotions, which keeps them docile and contented, which creates order, and which restricts their natural appetites. In brief, which sublimates the anthropoid within them, and which by establishing social stability leads to a peace in which intelligence can unravel the mysteries of the world and reveal the wonders of life. The masses must have a religion, that is a mythology, a Holy Grail. In India to-day a religious decay is apparent, and unless the present dying beliefs are replaced by a new faith, a new myth, all contentedness must vanish from the land. Minorities intellectually stand upon majorities, minorities are by nature mobile, destructive and constructive levers working from the fulcrum of stabilized majorities, and throughout world history it is religion, in one form or another, which has established mass stability. Religion may be

defined as the apotheosis of ignorance—a divine absurdity; in fact, Tertullian saw it thus, and this definition I give without an idea of being either cynical or profane.

In the West this breakdown of authority began in the early Renaissance. It was indigenous in the organism of the Church, in the speculations of her scholastic philosophers, in the arguments between realists and nominalists, and long before these in the Arian controversies themselves. It fissured the West, until theocracy crumbled into Protestantism, rationalism, agnosticism and atheism; and now it is fissuring the East, liberating the masses from superstitions which have kept them tranquil, and reducing all things spiritual to an ideology. Surely we stand to-day nearby where Rome stood these seventeen hundred years ago, at the brink of a dissolution which may be more appalling than her own.

“In the place of this earthly city, this vaunted mistress of the world, whose fall closes a long career of superstition and sin, there shall arise ‘the City of God.’ The purifying fire of the barbarian shall remove her heathenish defilements, and make her fit for the kingdom of Christ. Instead of a thousand years of that night of crime, to which in your despair you look back, there is before her the day of the millennium.”

Thus wrote St. Augustine; nevertheless, the five centuries following the sack of Rome cover a period of social degradation unrivalled in history. So bestial did mankind become, and so essential was it to re-establish order, that the Church had to sink from her exalted ideals of love and charity to the lowest depth

of spiritual terrorism in order to make firm her authority. The dogma of hell not only harmonised with the crimes of the age, but it walked daily with men.

To-day rationalism has largely replaced religion in the West; yet, so it seems to me, it is also going to fail. Under this system of authority, for spiritual terror is substituted physical fear, order being maintained no longer by sending the malefactor to hell but to the gallows. Its dogmas are not concerned with things spiritual but with things material. Gold is the passport to its heaven and a dishonoured cheque to its hell. And this dogma, as firmly established to-day as the dogma of salvation was in the early Christian Church, has brought rationalism, as the dogma of salvation brought the Church, into such intimate relationship with the masses that these masses have polluted it with their grossness. To-day art, music and literature are being strangled by gold, for the masses are so powerful that they can enforce their prostitution to their tastes, just as the medieval mobs were endowed with so high a spiritual power that they could demand the bloody sacrifices of heretics, witches and sorcerers, and the Church, even had she wished it, could scarcely have denied them these emotional orgies.

This is the form of authority we took with us to India, and there, cradled in the decadence of that country, we soon fell asleep and dreamt of our own self-sufficiency. Being rationalists or, if the reader prefers, Christians infused with rationalism, we utterly ignored religion, unless it intruded upon our morals

or shocked the susceptibilities of our wives and daughters. We never attempted to understand it, and we have never attempted to strengthen the various priesthoods over the various sects. When, under Alexander the Great, the Greeks entered Syria, Egypt, Persia and India, they not only respected the temples of the "barbarians" but sacrificed upon their altars. Alexander, probably the greatest man in history, understood full well the influence of religion upon life. In the East we have entirely ignored it, yet in the East religion is life. The result of this lack of interest in Indian spirituality was that all our energy was turned to the material improvement of the land. This improvement begat a contentedness out of which, as I have attempted to explain, emerged in gaseous form the spirit of fear, fear that India would lose her soul; and also a spirit of hope, hope that she would regain it and re-establish it in all its pristine splendour. We also feared to lose what we had gained and hoped to keep India as we knew her, a jewel securely locked up in the strong-box of law and order.

Thus were fear and hope scattered through the land, ploughing up a civilization and casting into its furrows the seeds of a new culture. Annihilation and creation walked side by side, resisting and pressing and engendering through resistance and pressure. The strange distillation which some day was to be a thing seen, felt and understood, was at birth and during childhood an invisible vapour without tangible form. Fear in itself is failure, but fear reversed is hope,

therefore hope in itself is the beginning of success. By denying hope to India we forced her awakening energy into the channel of fear. We did not do this intentionally, we did this in our sleep, in which we dreamed that law, order and material prosperity were the only gods who could bring peace and happiness to the land. Peace to us being the absence of physical conflict, and happiness—the enjoyment of physical things. Thus we piled up a tower of Babel, a soulless pyramid of force, a tower which was to reach to the very stars of matter, a tower which soon began to crack and sway out of the perpendicular, and which to-day threatens to crash to earth and obliterate us in its fall.

We might have watched this revolution in gestation and prepared ourselves to be a good midwife when it was born had we not fallen into the complacency of physical things. In fact, we became the void upon which the spirit of an awakened India began to glow. In place of rising to meet this dawn, wrapped as it was in leaden clouds tinged blood-red with enthusiasm, we kept our eyes fixed on the ground and fostered prosperity. That in this we succeeded is beyond doubt, but in succeeding what did we really do? We added enormously to the population, which never grew richer, anyhow rich enough to scorn starvation. Overpopulation, here as in China and in Europe, created a problem which appears to defy solution except by the natural processes of famine, plague and war, all of which we have strenuously fought or actually abolished. Thus we have dammed up a deluge.

Few of us Westerners would appear to realise that the Indian revolution is not an unique event, that it is not only part of a general Asiatic revolution, but of a world revolution. A revolution which sought a greater freedom; in the East liberation from the oppression of theocracy, in the West from the oppression of democracy—the political expression of rationalism. It was a revolt against existing civilization in one form or another; the conflict of minorities against majorities. It was the world-old rebellion of the intellectually free against the intellectually shackled.

I will now turn to a quotation: I take it from "The Round Table" (quarterly) of September, 1930, in which the Indian revolution is compared to others. It is as follows:

"The French revolutionaries of 1789 destroyed the *ancien régime*, but they were unable to create any stable government in its place, with the result that anarchy and the guillotine were followed first by the despotism of Napoleon, and then by the return of the Bourbons, and France did not become a democratic republic until 1870. The destruction of the Roman Empire was followed by centuries of chaos and barbarism. The Soviet Government was only established, and has only maintained itself in power, by the exercise of a violence against all who disagree with its teachings and a destruction of human liberty unparalleled in modern history. The pages of the vernacular press in China are choked day after day with lamentations about the famine, drought, floods, brigandage, and civil war which stalk through the land destroying the people, with no apparent hope of ending them in the near future. The comparison often drawn between India and the United States, the Dominions, or Ireland is valueless simply because in every case when the demand for Dominion status arose, the number of inhabitants did not exceed 10,000,000,

and in most cases they were more or less homogeneous in race and language, and had no external dangers to fear."

This is all very true, but disquisitions on history will not stop revolutions. The "Ancien Régime" could have canalized the French Revolution had it identified itself in part with the revolutionary ideals, not as they were in 1789, but in 1760. The Roman Empire could have done the same had it in part identified itself with the Christian ideals of the third and fourth centuries; and so could have Czarist Russia, even as late as 1905. In India we see the same loss of opportunity, and we may well see the same results. As regards the impracticability of establishing Dominion status in countries which exceed 10,000,000 inhabitants, I cannot fathom this argument unless it is a *sine qua non* that no political system except a democratic one can formulate such a status, when in part I agree. The more numerous a population the more absurd does democracy become, unless the franchise is restricted to a small minority. To-day such a condition does exist in India, and it should be welcomed, but instead it is used as an argument against the establishment in the country of the only form of democracy which is likely to prove workable. This form of popular rule is stigmatized as oligarchic, as if an oligarchy were necessarily something evil. In considering this question we are apt to forget that Parliamentary government in England, as long 'as only two powerful political parties existed, proved itself a success because it allowed of a limited oligarchy being formed, namely, the Cabinet,

an oligarchy which really rules the land, and which is often held in check by a full-hearted oligarchy—the House of Lords.

The Indian intelligentsia, from which the minority is almost entirely drawn, like every other political minority deprived of the use of arms, or not possessing military strength to revolt, has declared an economic and moral war on the Government, its object being to undermine its wealth and prestige. In the World War Germany was brought to her knees not so much by military pressure as by blockade and loss of world support, which grew less and less as her prestige was lowered by propaganda and her own lack of international psychology. Russia to-day, incapable of waging a military conflict and fearful of such as it might easily lead to a military dictatorship, is using identical weapons to undermine the wealth of so-called capitalist nations, and discredit their systems of government in the eyes of the proletariat which increases proportionately as wealth is lowered.

In India we see a similar war being waged; for passive resistance and non-co-operation are but names for the economic and moral attacks. Our trade is shrinking and our prestige is falling, for no government can continue to rule with honour if large numbers of the people refuse to obey its laws. The Indian agitators, being Asiatics, know well what loss of prestige means, consequently every move on our part, and especially every friendly move, is met by exaggerated abuse. In the harness of this form of warfare there

are, however, two weak links. Non-co-operation is in nature purely destructive—it can undermine, but it cannot build up; exaggeration always carries with it a reflex—the opponent may or may not be morally destroyed, but the opposer is never more than temporally exalted. Exaggeration is like over-much wine; it rapidly stimulates the drinker, but leaves him the following morning with a severe headache. It is only when non-co-operation and exaggeration are pandered to that governments collapse, but when they are met by a show of strength and justice, maintained and not from time to time diluted with draughts of humanitarian syrup, exaggeration sinks in altitude and non-co-operation becomes inarticulate.

Though I am no believer in physical force as a remedy for spiritual ills, yet the fact remains that man has an animal side to his nature, and that unless this side is controlled by spiritual terror—which rationalism does not permit of, and in any case is incapable of effecting—then unless anarchy is to replace authority and the beast in each man is to be uncaged, physical force must be applied. What do we now see in these latter days? A peace at any price policy. We see a Viceroy devote a considerable part of one of his farewell speeches to the reasons which induced him not to stay the execution of three red-handed murderers. (See *The Times*, March 28, 1931.) We see the jails opened at the bidding of Mr. Gandhi and violent miscreants released. The supporters of the Government are officially ordered to discontinue

active propaganda against Congress activities, and yet members of Congress are allowed to assail the Indian Army by a lying propaganda in the villages, so that when the sepoy's go on furlough their discipline may be destroyed. British officers in Indian regiments now discuss political questions with their Indian officers in order to counter subversive influences, a thing unheard of in former days; for the introduction of politics into military life is a sure forerunner of its disruption. Worse still, the civil mind is paralysed, paralysed by the Gandhi complex, that ungraspable gas engendered from mysticism and materialism, from Vedic gods and steam engines. It is fearful to act, fearful to introduce discord into the mythical "peace," and the result is that a thousand—for this is probably the nearest figure—Hindus and Moslems massacre each other at Cawnpore, and neither the police nor the soldiers do anything effective because the civil will is petrified.

What does this mean? If carried a step or two further, it means the end of authority, the end of law and order and the unchaining of the Beast. In India, a return to the conditions which followed the fall of the Roman Empire.

How can we solve this Indian problem if we do not so much as understand it? To me it seems that we utterly fail to see that it is a conflict within the three-fold nature of man as he is moulded in the West and in the East. What we require is a readjustment of values. This is not only an Indian problem but a world problem, an adjustment between our minds and

our higher and lower selves. On the one side of us stands the animal, on the other the god, and not until we realise that both are holy shall we learn to use our mental lever rightly. Man cannot live by dynamoes alone, neither can he live solely upon manna sent from heaven. Ideals are as necessary to the contentment of the spirit as bread is to the health of the body. All things in this world are holy, and sin lives a solitary lay figure in the imagination of man—the greatest of fate myths. By this I do not mean that this present world is the best of all possible worlds—no man can answer this question; but that the evil we see in it lives in ourselves and can only be transmuted into good through our triple nature.

The holiness of the animal within us, when it is mated to an unshackled mind, can give us material prosperity, and the holiness of the higher self within us, when similarly mated, can give us spiritual contentment. The one can conquer Nature for us, the other can storm the bastions of God. To us as human beings there is no fixed fulcrum, a god that is unchangeable or an animal which is for ever changing, but in place a living mystery which is as firm as rock yet as fluid as water—the reflection of the Absolute, the Unknowable, the Very God, in all and everything.

The Christian Church, and religions in general, obsessed by the idea of original sin, exorcised the animal and exalted the god; it named the animal in mankind Satan. The rationalists, and secularists generally, obsessed by the idea of ultimate ignorance,

ideologized the god and idealized the animal, it named the god over mankind Natural Law. In the theopathic systems of authority man was begotten in sin, and in the anthropolatric he departed this life in ignorance. In neither was the mystic, not historic, Christ revealed, the god who descended into the beast to render visible to man that both spirituality and animality are divine; a child-entrancing myth which lives on diaphanously and sweetly in the simple fairy tale of Beauty and the Beast.

It was the myth of Satan which wrecked Christianity, for the eventual abandonment of hell (the negative) shook heaven (the positive) to its uttermost foundations—religion was simply radiated away. Similarly to-day is it the myth of Natural Law which is stretching rationalism upon the rack; for the abandonment of causation is shaking the foundations of scientific philosophy. The one left us with an inscrutable God, a depaternalized father; the other seems likely to leave us in the lap of an equally inscrutable Chance, a somewhat unlovable mother.

Throughout the entire world religious authority is disintegrating and secular authority is losing power; more and more is mankind being thrown back on to his emotions, his fears, his hopes, his despairs. Everywhere is he faced by the crumbling walls of certitude, and beyond them an unfathomable ever-yawning abyss. His mind is restless and discontented, and like a land bird far out to sea it can find no solid object, beyond an occasional piece of spiritual or moral

wreckage, to alight upon. No wonder, then, that this present age is one of revolutions and intriguing short-cuts to Utopias and Eldorados, and no wonder that these lead man into Serbonian bogs and stables of Augian filth.

Once only in the history of this world, so far as my limited knowledge allows me to judge, did a religion arise which sanctified both the animal and the god in man. This was during the Classical Age, and though the Græco-Roman mythology is not one which is ever likely again to reincarnate in detail, its spirit is worth a moment's thought; for not only was this religion largely of Aryan origin, but it enhanced Christianity with many a beautifying touch.

The gods and the goddesses, but more particularly the gods—for this religion was in essence masculine—ruled a tiny fraction of the world for over 2,000 years. It was anthropomorphic and polytheistic, free from revelations and fixed dogmas; consequently it was pliant and adaptable, changing with circumstances and assimilating foreign religious ideas. It was a progressive religion, a living spirit, and consequently proof against inner revolutions. No man was called upon to believe any particular myth, and its only conception of evil was atheism.

This religion, scarcely recognising the cult of the dead, endowed life with an atmosphere of cheerfulness, wonder and beauty. "Secular advance, moral progress and the march of science," writes Professor Farnell, "could never be thwarted by religious tradi-

tion; on the contrary, speculative thought and artistic creation were considered as attributes of divinity. We may say that the religion of Hellas penetrated the whole life of the people, but rather as a servant than as a master."

Under the benign influence of this religion, which had a word of cheerfulness and beauty for each separate individual whatever might be his calling, arose a civilization which knew the greatest poets, artists, architects, historians, statesmen, warriors and philosophers that this world has seen. The miracle of Greece is still one of the supreme wonders of history, eternally young, fresh and alluring, and why? To me the answer is: Because its religion was essentially human, it came from man and from no supernatural source. It did not descend from heaven but rose up from earth. It did not demand repentance but joy. It did not contemplate the life hereafter but the life here and now. It was a lyric and not a dirge.

How different the religions of Hinduism since the simplicity of the Vedic mantras was lost in a tangle of magic and metaphysics. A soldier worshipping his sword, a moneylender his ledger, a cultivator his plough, and a government clerk his pens, pencils and paper "set upon an office box, festooned with red tape, for an altar." The exalted mysticism of the Upanishads, the inscrutable Brahmā, the bloodthirsty Kali, the rigid Code of Manu, the rituals and the sacrifices. It might be thought that here as in Classical mythology there is something for all men; but no, for every man's

life is girt by caste and Karma—self-acting retribution. Fate and not freedom is its controlling idea, consequently it is the antithesis of the Greek spirit.

I will turn now to the people moulded by this fatalistic tangle of beliefs, for in their country we see in microcosmic form the cataclysm which is creeping towards the entire civilized world. It is for this reason that the Indian revolution is so intensely interesting.

We see an immovable object met by an irresistible force—the world of an old myth struck by the world of a new. The object is Hinduism, the force—awakened Hindu intelligence seeking a new fulcrum, but blindly imagining that it can be found in Western institutions when it must be forged out of Hinduism itself.

In order to vitalize, hope must be rooted in fact. Hope may at times flutter through our imagination like a butterfly in a garden, yet unless it can settle upon a blossom, a living fact, its flutterings will be in vain; for the flower will remain sterile and hope will lack sustenance to live. Facts are India's true quest to-day, and not dreams. A spirit of nationalism, that is of self-realisation, has awoken in the land, and though a living chaotic force, it is as yet only a great hope; for until the power of authority is established in some form of nationhood this spirit cannot find a dwelling wherein to rest.

In place of looking within themselves to seek an answer to self-expression they look outwardly over the horizons of the world, seeking in the very forces which have dammed up and restricted them implements of

liberation. Thinking of the East in terms of the West, though they may overthrow British rule this will not prevent them double locking their prisons.

To-day in India the conflict is, I will repeat it again, one of myths and social complexes. This is why I consider that the life of such a man as Gandhi is worth studying. In it we see the reactions between East and West, the jumble of ideas and incessant contradictions. When myths change their forms irresistible forces are set in motion, forces which may sometimes be directed, but which can never be bottled up. When two fundamental world ideas are opposed a conflict is inevitable; but where we of the West make a crucial mistake is in believing that this conflict is between Eastern and Western civilization, when in fact it is a conflict between the ideas of a Westernized Asiatic minority and the traditions of the vast Asiatic majority which has remained untouched by the Western virus.

If it were possible for Asia to become Europeanized, all we should see is the extension of Europe to the Yellow Sea, and a proportionate extension of the diseases of her civilization. But this is most unlikely, for it is almost certain that within Asia a balance will be struck between fate and freedom, that neither will be annihilated but that both will be reborn.

The revolution in India is, in fact, the greatest compliment paid to Western civilization. It is the fulfilment of Macaulay's intuition, and is recognized as such by so spiritual a thinker as Rabindranath Tagore. Curious as it may seem, in a mysterious way

it may be the instrument of a destiny which eventually will lead to another renaissance in Europe. There are signs which cannot be mistaken that the Western freedom myth is reaching, if not has reached, its zenith; consequently, should the revolution in India lead, as is likely, to the evolution of a virile culture, one day in its turn this must impinge upon the West, as Moslem culture did during the Dark Ages. Looked upon from so distant a point of view, this revolution may hold within its tangled coils the elixir of a world blessing; for even if its energy is to-day misdirected, energy remains energy, and through wisdom may be caused to flow into creative channels. A flood may desolate a land, but if canalized it will fertilize it. In human affairs inertia is like a waterless desert, each thought is but a grain of standardized sand, similar in form and equally sterile. Any degree of human energy is better than inertia. Inertia is the void, and energy the spirit of God which vitalizes it.

It seems that the gods have willed that this should be so; for before destroying our authority over India's hundreds of millions, it would appear that they have turned us mad. As India is seeking her freedom through the implements of Western politics, implements which can only fashion anarchy—which is freedom run mad, a raging, uncontrollable torrent—we, though we tremble before its approaching spate, are handing to her the very tools which must undermine our authority and which cannot possibly establish her own. It is as if a servant, insanely discontented with

the house in which he lives, and obsessed by the dream of converting it into a palace, were to go to the master of the house and reveal to him his vision. And the master, insanely contented with the house, scoffing at the vision, were to turn to him and say: Here is a ton of dynamite, go forth and build.

This dynamite is democracy, the Demogorgon of the West, the emotional, unthinking animal in man, the weight of numbers, quantity without quality, vast human bulk endowed with a speck of human spirit. In democracy, as it is conceived to-day, we reach the age of the political saurians—a maximum of body and a minimum of brain.

When the franchise was restricted to a minority of the people it had some sense, but when, as now in England, it includes practically every adult—that is approximately half the population—it is literally endowed with nonsense. Majorities must by their very nature be out-of-date, because every original idea begins its life in a minority of one. Not only are majorities worshippers of out-of-date myths, but they restrict the rise of original thinkers, and so politically deprive a country of the services of its great men. Democracy may be defined as the religion of out-of-datedness, and its priests are increasingly recruited from the ranks of mediocrity. Be it remembered that Abraham Lincoln once said that "Honest statesmanship is the employment of individual meannesses for the public good." As honest statesmanship is not a predominant characteristic in modern politics, these

meannesses are frequently employed for the public harm, becoming weapons to instate or oust some political party.

Turning to the two problems, the problems of the East and of the West, what do we find at their centres? To the East the world order is God-appointed, it is a spiritual order, consequently anarchy is anathema to the Oriental. In the West anarchy lies embedded in its bone. Christianity in its first lap was an anarchical religion, the creed of the outcasts of the Roman Empire. Its aim was the destruction of the social order, and it looked forward to the destruction of the world as the ultimate salvation of the human race. Not until the Catholic Church established a spiritual despotism was authority reinstated, and with the disruption of this Church during the Reformation the shackles of anarchy were loosened. As primitive Christianity emerged a little flame of hope from the herded horrors of the stews and the servile compounds of ancient Rome, so democracy, like a candle burning blue in its socket, is sputtering out its life in similar dismal surroundings. The pariah class, writes the author of "The Lost Dominion," is a growing class. "No one ever rises out of it, and many are continually falling into it. As the elaboration of civilization becomes greater, so proportionately becomes greater the efficiency required in those who are to benefit by it. Those who fall below the ever-rising standard of efficiency—for such there is nothing but the pariah's doom. The -savage English criminal laws of the

eighteenth century, and the total ignorance of sanitation, prevented the increase of the pariah body. We are now more humane and know better how to preserve life, even of the wretched. Thus over all the West the people of the Abyss increase."

When we compare this quotation with the philosophy of Mr. Gandhi we are left in some doubt whether after all he may not be right. Is not our civilization essentially Satanic? Has not it unleashed forces which we can no longer control? When we abolished the medieval Satan, and brought heaven tumbling to earth, did not we create the modern Satan, and possessing no church bells to terrify him away are not we utterly in his grip? From the ruins of the medieval hell have not we built a hell upon earth, not a prison of fire but a palace of doubt? These are questions we must ask ourselves before we condemn either the Indian saint or the Hindu system. One thing seems, however, clear to me: in democracy the foundations of rationalism have sunk into madness. What is more mad than to open a newspaper and in one column read a gloomy article on ever-increasing unemployment, and in the next a joyous pæan upon the reduction of infantile mortality?

It may be said, however, and with some semblance of reason, that as we have already solved problems somewhat similar to the one now facing us in India we shall in time solve this problem also. I sincerely trust that this may be so. In Ireland the people demanded independence and accepted Dominion

status, which in a country like Canada means independence. But in Ireland the problem was quite different, for economically she was and is so closely bound to Great Britain that with her she must either float or sink. In South Africa the Dutch were quite capable of maintaining law and order in their country, and in Egypt, where the essential to stability of government was lacking, we only agreed to "Independence" so long as we maintained an army in that country. Eventually the same solution may be found to be the only possible one in India, but whether it will prove acceptable to her intelligentsia remains to be seen.

In all these cases the demand for self-government was met by the strongest opposition in England. The end of the Empire was predicted, yet when that end actually came at the Imperial Conference of 1926 the masses of the people never noticed it, and the few who did welcomed it with acclamation!

Our two main faults have been: first, that we have regarded ourselves as the hub of the world rather than as a sector of its circumference, and have consequently failed to assimilate the inner meaning of world movements. Secondly, after the war our statesmen and politicians, mostly old men whose ideas were rooted in before-war events, could not see that a return to them was impossible, because the war was a political jump forward of fifty years. Consequently in 1919 they applied 1913 statesmanship to "1969" problems, and when nothing but chaos resulted they blamed the opposite party. In India agitation and not forethought

compelled them to act. During the last ten years more Indians have been brought into the administration than were brought in between 1861 and 1914. This Indianization of the government is not, however, the main difficulty in spite of the inapplicability of democratic institutions to India. This difficulty is that the youth of the country want to escape from the "death-like torpor of Oriental culture." They want something quite different from what they ask for or from what we think they should have; consequently the Egyptian solution is unlikely to prove a workable one, for the Egyptians were under no such an urge.

Our colossal mistake is that we imagine that India must become democratically-minded before she can become responsible for her own government. India at heart wants something else—she does not want the political diseases of Western civilization. In a mysterious, inarticulate way her spirit, her higher self, senses quite clearly the differences between Europe and Asia. It does not doubt that, as Napoleon once said, "a Prussian is hatched from a cannon ball," nor does it doubt that a Bengali is hatched from a pigeon's egg. It has watched the ghastly failure of an elective Duma in Russia; it has seen Italy swelter out of parliamentary government into discipline engendered by tyranny. Yugo-Slavia, Poland, Hungary and Greece have cast off their democratic constitutions, and Germany may join them any day. Turkey and Persia are well ruled under despots. Reforms in Afghanistan brought Amanullah to Europe; in China they fo-

mented civil war, which up-to-date has killed off some 20,000,000 people, twice the European casualties in the World War. And in India herself what has taken place? Diluted doses of this poison have thrown masses of her people into convulsions. Why has this all happened? The reason for all this turmoil is that modern democracy is not really a system of government, that is of authority, but a pre-occupation in making and unmaking governments. Directly the contending political parties exceed two in number its product is compromise, divided authority and eventually anarchy.

Gandhi at one time saw this clearly enough; for, as I have shown, he is anti-democratic, and has no faith in the virtue of majorities, but the vision of a spiritually free nation and not merely a politically free one became blurred through his mixing politics and religion. To obtain a glimpse of the spirit which underlies and inhibits the present revolution in India, it is far more profitable to turn to Rabindranath Tagore. In his book "Nationalism" he thus answers the question "What is a nation?"

"It is the aspect of a whole people as an organised power. This organisation incessantly keeps up the insistence of the population on becoming strong and efficient. But this strenuous effort after strength and efficiency strains man's energy from his higher nature where he is self-sacrificing and creative. For thereby, man's power of sacrifice is diverted from his ultimate object, which is moral, to the maintenance of this organisation, which is mechanical. Yet in this he feels all the satisfaction of moral exaltation and therefore becomes supremely dangerous to humanity. He feels relieved of the urging of his conscience when

he can transfer his responsibility to this machine which is the creation of his intellect and not of his complete moral personality."

To Tagore modern democracy is but the political expression of the steam age. Law and order are the rhythm of its wheels, its output is standardized humanity, therefore it suppresses originality and genius, consequently its end is mediocrity and not greatness. I think he is right. Oligarchic democracies did produce great men, but proletarian democracy fails to do so, or they appear only through accident, and then by the pressure of stupidity they are generally forced into obscurity. Kohn in commenting on nationalism, which from the Western point of view is democracy, says in his "A History of Nationalism in the East":

"In India the accounts of the rise and fall of kingdoms, battles and political preponderance, are forgotten and despised. Her history tells a tale of social development and the realisation of religious ideals. She tried to solve the racial problem by means of the caste system, but that solution became rigid, and to-day it is crumbling, so that another must replace it. Tagore, like Gandhi, regards racial hostility and the untouchability of the outcastes as India's greatest problems. He, too, thinks that what she needs is creative activity, the fruit of her own spirit. But the nationalist movement in India simply adopted Europe's political nationalism, whereas in India the conditions requisite for its existence are lacking; India's own mission is on another plane; she is called upon to solve the racial problem, and that requires a consciousness of the unity of mankind, a sentiment of brotherly solidarity, such as India's great religious leaders have taught."

Here, I think, is presented to us the key to the entire problem. Modern democracy is a machine, the object of which is to produce equality of mankind—liberty,

equality, fraternity. To Tagore not only is this an impossible, but a destructive object. To him the future government of nations must aim at attaining a unity of mankind—liberty, unity, fraternity. Such a government is creative, for all men being raised to ecstasy, so that spiritually (not politically) they are one united power, are swept forward by a stupendous force—a universal prayer. Conversely democratic government is destructive, for all men are lowered to an equal status, levelled down and lost in the slime of mediocrity.

We can behold the glamour of this great truth in the history of our civilization. When the Papacy gathered European peoples into one spiritual unity there occurred an efflorescence of creative art, for every piece of work was a prayer. This enthusiasm begot the Gothic cathedral, the Tudor dwelling-house, the paintings of Raphael, the music of Palestrina; now it has died away into railway stations, concrete villas, daubs of crude colours and negroid cacophony.

On the nature of nationalism Tagore further says:

“Even though from childhood I have been taught that idolatry of the nation is almost better than reverence for God and humanity, I believe I have outgrown that teaching, and it is my conviction that my countrymen will truly gain their India by fighting against the education which teaches them that a country is greater than the ideals of humanity. The educated Indian at present is trying to absorb some lessons from history contrary to the lessons of our ancestors. The East, in fact, is attempting to take unto itself a history which is not the outcome of its own living. Japan, for example, thinks she is getting powerful through adopting Western methods, but, after she has exhausted her

inheritance, only the borrowed weapons of civilization will remain to her. She will not have developed herself from within. Europe has her past. Europe's strength therefore lies in her history. We, in India, must make up our minds that we cannot borrow other people's history, and that if we stifle our own, we are committing suicide. When you borrow things that do not belong to your life, they only serve to crush your life. And, therefore, I believe that it does India no good to compete with Western civilization in its own field. But we shall be more than compensated if, in spite of the insults heaped upon us, we follow our own destiny."

Curiously enough, so it seems to me, Lenin had a similar vision, but he beheld it through the frosted glass of the Marxian philosophy. His aim was to throw off the pseudo-morphosis of Western civilization and liberate the Russian soul. Only in part did he succeed, for much study of economic systems had made him mad, and stripping off the pseudo-morphosis established by Peter the Great he substituted that preached by Marx. In India Gandhi has followed in his footsteps. A man of the people, possessed of a remarkable spiritual force, vowed to poverty and accomplishing what appeared to be miracles without any material aid, he awoke the religious enthusiasm which lives in the heart of every Indian. Then into this spiritual awakening he poured the poison of politics and the virus of absolutism. The result was that this enthusiasm has been turned into the channel of materialism. The important point to note, however, is this: Russia will one day throw off the Marxian pseudo-morphosis; India will also one day throw off her present Western

pseudo-morphosis; Russia is at heart an Oriental nation, consequently when both are freed from their present political and economic diseases an eventual spiritual coalescence is a possibility; also is it possible that the whole of Asia may be attracted into one spiritual orbit.

There is no ideal solution to this problem, for vast as it is in the shape of an Indo-British problem, it is vaster still in that of a world problem. The world is sick with doubt and uncertainty. It can find no faith in a god who works by logarithms, it can find no hope in Absolute Chance, and no charity in machine-made civilization. Like a moth it has fluttered round many a lamp, and has been scorched by each one in turn. Is its fate to expire as an algebraical symbol or as a speck of engine grease? No, man cannot accept such a destiny. He cannot accept it because of his threefold nature. If the lever of his mind cannot find a fulcrum to work upon, and a fulcrum it must have, then it will create one by upheaving an epoch, and will dig up the nethermost foundation of what we call civilization in search for this cubic stone, this cornerstone of the temple of authority.

If India is Westernized, or if the present pseudo-morphosis of Western civilization lasts long enough to turn us out of the land, or to induce popular opinion in Great Britain to give up the game, then the present foundations of Western civilization will be undermined and, so it seems to me, new ones in the form of the much talked of United States of Europe will have to

be substituted in order to meet the conglobing forces of Asia, a federation begotten by the pressure of fear.

Hans Kohn in his "Note" to the English edition of his book, "A History of Nationalism in the East," prophetically says: "But above the clash of people, races, and epochs it is precisely the historic process now unfolding in the East that is tending more and more to unite mankind as a single whole. We must look beyond all the conflicts of to-day lest we fail to realize that evolution is moving in that direction." Again, in his concluding paragraph to his chapter on "Great Britain and the Orient," he writes:

"We are nearing the end of an epoch which has lasted for a hundred and fifty years, that of Europe's eastward aggression; during this time people had come to regard European domination in Asia as finally established, equally with her domination of Africa. During this period Asia has learned many things from Europe. Europe has imparted some of her vigour to Asia. She has awakened a new consciousness. The contact of two different worlds has opened a new chapter in the history of mankind. In a sense hitherto unknown, the whole earth's surface has become a stage for this single historical evolution. The very conflict of race has given an impetus to the unification of mankind. Pitted against the solidarity of the white race we find a corresponding solidarity, little more than a presentiment as yet, among the Oriental peoples. But their first meeting is on a common battlefield fertilized by the common ideas and conceptions that they have exchanged."

The loss of India to the Empire, however it may occur—by civil war, by voluntary evacuation or by Dominion status—is not, and I will repeat it again, only a British and Indian problem, but a world problem which is likely to lead to a stupendous inter-

continental conflict. Is it possible to avoid such a cataclysm? Yes, for in human affairs the will of man is omnipotent; but that it will be avoided is more than doubtful, for to the average human being it is torture to exert his will. Consequently, unless we can breed great men, men of courage, we cannot expect to solve this great problem. Russia has given birth to Lenin, Italy to Mussolini, Turkey to Mustapha Kemal, all men of authority; but we, the greatest empire the world has ever seen, after the greatest event the modern world has experienced since the French Revolution, have produced no single statesman or leader who can even by his most fervent partisans be considered as above mediocre. This intellectual drought, if prolonged, will inevitably wither up the Empire.

What must the human will do? It must first foresee what would result from such a conflict. As a vision, far from yet realized, of world interdependence, more especially economic in nature, emerged from out the World War of Nations, so do I think that the vision of world unity will evolve from out a World War of Continents. Wars, as I have already pointed out, are largely creative forces, normally they accomplish their end—the creation of a better form of peacefulness. Should economic interdependence be established, then for the world's salvation must a spiritual authority be added to it, without which the animal in man will once again devour man the human being. So it seems to me that if this greater World War is to be avoided

we must radically reform Western civilization whilst Asiatic civilization is engendering out of its chaos of cultures a new order.

Can the will of the West cut from out its body the cancer now inflicting it. I doubt it, therefore this body must once again be handed over to that great surgeon called War. Once again to establish the empire of Asoka or Samudragupta in India is altogether insufficient, unless simultaneously we reform ourselves and our own civilization. Better, far better, turn to the Russian ideal, and by examining Russia's recent history prepare ourselves to avoid the Russian realities.

The importance of Russia to-day is great, especially as a world cinema film, with its close-ups of horrors and starvation. Do not let us concentrate too much upon these, but in place judge the drama from the entire film as it is unwound. Officially, Russia has thrown over Christianity and has cast aside democracy, and to-day there is no country in the world in which the pariah is so utterly outcast and so readily exterminated—there the rule of the majority is anathema. In this country, or rather congeries of people, the spirit of man is crushed by a material fate seemingly overwhelming; yet the ideal lives on occultly—ethnographical groups of people set together in an economic unit, a unit in which culture is free to expand as it will unshackled from the serfdom of the modern capitalist system which has enchained labour by turning it into a commodity. In spite of the anti-God campaign, and be it remembered that atheism

as well as theism end in an ineffable zero and so are akin, the Russian at heart is fervently religious. It is fervour, hope ecstatical, which raises man towards his higher self and spiritualizes him and apotheosizes his life, bringing beauty and wonder and charity into his every thought and action, making of life a prayer and of this world a temple. "In the West, in periods of social reaction," writes Valeriu Marcu in his "Lenin," "the intellectuals turn to scepticism; in Russia they seek God." Perhaps they will find him through his extirpation, as the outcasts of the Roman world found a saviour in the crucified Christ. This world is a mystery and not a mathematical equation, a symbol of this mystery, as the wonder impinges on a particular form of the animal and takes shape within this form—a prince if we only knew it, a beast as we only see it.

The crude photograph of Lenin has replaced many an ikon in the cottages of Russia, and I am told by a friend that when he stood outside the mausoleum of that Mongolian monster he saw peasant women approach it, furtively gaze around and then hastily make the sign of the cross. Immediately behind the altar-shaped tomb and rising above it stands a square tower set in the outer walls of the Kremlin, a tower crowned with a spire, a symbol of the creative force pointing upwards from earth. To me this whole picture is, as it were, a magical pentacle, a gross actuality in which dwells a sublime possibility—the awakening of the monster into the prince.

To me it seems beyond doubt that for long now

mankind has been lost in the Valley of the Shadow of Death. A world without hope, a world which though it may yet endure a hundred million years is destined to be radiated into Nothingness. To the God-illuminated adept this Nothingness may be a Plenitude, but to the masses of mankind it can be nothing more than what it appears to be—a hopeless end. The Russian experiment may well be a mystery play acted on the world's stage as an object lesson pointing out to us that the multitude cannot live upon occultism, whether applied to religion or economics. Christian spirituality pitched its idealism so high that the animal disappeared, Russian materialism is exalting its idealism to a point where the spirit vanishes. The masses do not want a first-class world in either direction; they want a human world in which angels play with tiger cubs, and not where lions lie down with lambs. They want variety in uniformity, a garden of many flowers good to look upon and of fruits good to eat; a garden well ordered, tended and weeded by a Gardener who is not of themselves. They want joy and mystery, freedom and authority, and not rigid fate.

Be all these things as they may be, to-day chaos glooms around us, a chaos which is lapping through Asia and poisoning the bowels of the West. It is a death agony and a birth pang. Once the spirit of God brooded over the Void and the world took shape in human form. Then the soul of man searched after its Maker, and man fashioned myths in order to create cosmos out of the void of his own ignorance. Some-

times it is Fate, sometimes it is Freedom which lightens his path, will-o'-the-wisps which lead him onwards to unseen goals which ever elude his grasp. In one age the god is without him, Very God or Law; in another within him, a still small voice or a roaring Cerberus. Yesterday it was Fear, to-day Greed, to-morrow Chance. An eternal evolution, involution and revolution. Let the chimes of Fate mingle with the bugle blast of Freedom and a new myth is born. To-day, in the lap of the myths lies not only the destiny of India, but the destiny of the World.

the house in which he lives, and obsessed by the dream of converting it into a palace, were to go to the master of the house and reveal to him his vision. And the master, insanely contented with the house, scoffing at the vision, were to turn to him and say: Here is a ton of dynamite, go forth and build.

This dynamite is democracy, the Demogorgon of the West, the emotional, unthinking animal in man, the weight of numbers, quantity without quality, vast human bulk endowed with a speck of human spirit. In democracy, as it is conceived to-day, we reach the age of the political saurians—a maximum of body and a minimum of brain.

When the franchise was restricted to a minority of the people it had some sense, but when, as now in England, it includes practically every adult—that is approximately half the population—it is literally endowed with nonsense. Majorities must by their very nature be out-of-date, because every original idea begins its life in a minority of one. Not only are majorities worshippers of out-of-date myths, but they restrict the rise of original thinkers, and so politically deprive a country of the services of its great men. Democracy may be defined as the religion of out-of-datedness, and its priests are increasingly recruited from the ranks of mediocrity. Be it remembered that Abraham Lincoln once said that "Honest statesmanship is the employment of individual meannesses for the public good." As honest statesmanship is not a predominant characteristic in modern politics, these

meannesses are frequently employed for the public harm, becoming weapons to instate or oust some political party.

Turning to the two problems, the problems of the East and of the West, what do we find at their centres? To the East the world order is God-appointed, it is a spiritual order, consequently anarchy is anathema to the Oriental. In the West anarchy lies embedded in its bone. Christianity in its first lap was an anarchical religion, the creed of the outcasts of the Roman Empire. Its aim was the destruction of the social order, and it looked forward to the destruction of the world as the ultimate salvation of the human race. Not until the Catholic Church established a spiritual despotism was authority reinstated, and with the disruption of this Church during the Reformation the shackles of anarchy were loosened. As primitive Christianity emerged a little flame of hope from the herded horrors of the stews and the servile compounds of ancient Rome, so democracy, like a candle burning blue in its socket, is sputtering out its life in similar dismal surroundings. The pariah class, writes the author of "The Lost Dominion," is a growing class. "No one ever rises out of it, and many are continually falling into it. As the elaboration of civilization becomes greater, so proportionately becomes greater the efficiency required in those who are to benefit by it. Those who fall below the ever-rising standard of efficiency—for such there is nothing but the pariah's doom. The savage English criminal laws of the

eighteenth century, and the total ignorance of sanitation, prevented the increase of the pariah body. We are now more humane and know better how to preserve life, even of the wretched. Thus over all the West the people of the Abyss increase."

When we compare this quotation with the philosophy of Mr. Gandhi we are left in some doubt whether after all he may not be right. Is not our civilization essentially Satanic? Has not it unleashed forces which we can no longer control? When we abolished the medieval Satan, and brought heaven tumbling to earth, did not we create the modern Satan, and possessing no church bells to terrify him away are not we utterly in his grip? From the ruins of the medieval hell have not we built a hell upon earth, not a prison of fire but a palace of doubt? These are questions we must ask ourselves before we condemn either the Indian saint or the Hindu system. One thing seems, however, clear to me: in democracy the foundations of rationalism have sunk into madness. What is more mad than to open a newspaper and in one column read a gloomy article on ever-increasing unemployment, and in the next a joyous pæan upon the reduction of infantile mortality?

It may be said, however, and with some semblance of reason, that as we have already solved problems somewhat similar to the one now facing us in India we shall in time solve this problem also. I sincerely trust that this may be so. In Ireland the people demanded independence and accepted Dominion

status, which in a country like Canada means independence. But in Ireland the problem was quite different, for economically she was and is so closely bound to Great Britain that with her she must either float or sink. In South Africa the Dutch were quite capable of maintaining law and order in their country, and in Egypt, where the essential to stability of government was lacking, we only agreed to "Independence" so long as we maintained an army in that country. Eventually the same solution may be found to be the only possible one in India, but whether it will prove acceptable to her intelligentsia remains to be seen.

In all these cases the demand for self-government was met by the strongest opposition in England. The end of the Empire was predicted, yet when that end actually came at the Imperial Conference of 1926 the masses of the people never noticed it, and the few who did welcomed it with acclamation!

Our two main faults have been: first, that we have regarded ourselves as the hub of the world rather than as a sector of its circumference, and have consequently failed to assimilate the inner meaning of world movements. Secondly, after the war our statesmen and politicians, mostly old men whose ideas were rooted in before-war events, could not see that a return to them was impossible, because the war was a political jump forward of fifty years. Consequently in 1919 they applied 1913 statesmanship to "1969" problems, and when nothing but chaos resulted they blamed the opposite party. In India agitation and not forethought

compelled them to act. During the last ten years more Indians have been brought into the administration than were brought in between 1861 and 1914. This Indianization of the government is not, however, the main difficulty in spite of the inapplicability of democratic institutions to India. This difficulty is that the youth of the country want to escape from the "death-like torpor of Oriental culture." They want something quite different from what they ask for or from what we think they should have; consequently the Egyptian solution is unlikely to prove a workable one, for the Egyptians were under no such an urge.

Our colossal mistake is that we imagine that India must become democratically-minded before she can become responsible for her own government. India at heart wants something else—she does not want the political diseases of Western civilization. In a mysterious, inarticulate way her spirit, her higher self, senses quite clearly the differences between Europe and Asia. It does not doubt that, as Napoleon once said, "a Prussian is hatched from a cannon ball," nor does it doubt that a Bengali is hatched from a pigeon's egg. It has watched the ghastly failure of an elective Duma in Russia; it has seen Italy swelter out of parliamentary government into discipline engendered by tyranny. Yugo-Slavia, Poland, Hungary and Greece have cast off their democratic constitutions, and Germany may join them any day. Turkey and Persia are well ruled under despots. Reforms in Afghanistan brought Amanullah to Europe; in China they fo-

mented civil war, which up-to-date has killed off some 20,000,000 people, twice the European casualties in the World War. And in India herself what has taken place? Diluted doses of this poison have thrown masses of her people into convulsions. Why has this all happened? The reason for all this turmoil is that modern democracy is not really a system of government, that is of authority, but a pre-occupation in making and unmaking governments. Directly the contending political parties exceed two in number its product is compromise, divided authority and eventually anarchy.

Gandhi at one time saw this clearly enough; for, as I have shown, he is anti-democratic, and has no faith in the virtue of majorities, but the vision of a spiritually free nation and not merely a politically free one became blurred through his mixing politics and religion. To obtain a glimpse of the spirit which underlies and inhibits the present revolution in India, it is far more profitable to turn to Rabindranath Tagore. In his book "Nationalism" he thus answers the question "What is a nation?"

"It is the aspect of a whole people as an organised power. This organisation incessantly keeps up the insistence of the population on becoming strong and efficient. But this strenuous effort after strength and efficiency strains man's energy from his higher nature where he is self-sacrificing and creative. For thereby, man's power of sacrifice is diverted from his ultimate object, which is moral, to the maintenance of this organisation, which is mechanical. Yet in this he feels all the satisfaction of moral exaltation and therefore becomes supremely dangerous to humanity. He feels relieved of the urging of his conscience when

he can transfer his responsibility to this machine which is the creation of his intellect and not of his complete moral personality."

To Tagore modern democracy is but the political expression of the steam age. Law and order are the rhythm of its wheels, its output is standardized humanity, therefore it suppresses originality and genius, consequently its end is mediocrity and not greatness. I think he is right. Oligarchic democracies did produce great men, but proletarian democracy fails to do so, or they appear only through accident, and then by the pressure of stupidity they are generally forced into obscurity. Kohn in commenting on nationalism, which from the Western point of view is democracy, says in his "A History of Nationalism in the East":

"In India the accounts of the rise and fall of kingdoms, battles and political preponderance, are forgotten and despised. Her history tells a tale of social development and the realisation of religious ideals. She tried to solve the racial problem by means of the caste system, but that solution became rigid, and to-day it is crumbling, so that another must replace it. Tagore, like Gandhi, regards racial hostility and the untouchability of the outcastes as India's greatest problems. He, too, thinks that what she needs is creative activity, the fruit of her own spirit. But the nationalist movement in India simply adopted Europe's political nationalism, whereas in India the conditions requisite for its existence are lacking; India's own mission is on another plane; she is called upon to solve the racial problem, and that requires a consciousness of the unity of mankind, a sentiment of brotherly solidarity, such as India's great religious leaders have taught."

Here, I think, is presented to us the key to the entire problem. Modern democracy is a machine, the object of which is to produce equality of mankind—liberty,

equality, fraternity. To Tagore not only is this an impossible, but a destructive object. To him the future government of nations must aim at attaining a unity of mankind—liberty, unity, fraternity. Such a government is creative, for all men being raised to ecstasy, so that spiritually (not politically) they are one united power, are swept forward by a stupendous force—a universal prayer. Conversely democratic government is destructive, for all men are lowered to an equal status, levelled down and lost in the slime of mediocrity.

We can behold the glamour of this great truth in the history of our civilization. When the Papacy gathered European peoples into one spiritual unity there occurred an efflorescence of creative art, for every piece of work was a prayer. This enthusiasm begot the Gothic cathedral, the Tudor dwelling-house, the paintings of Raphael, the music of Palestrina; now it has died away into railway stations, concrete villas, daubs of crude colours and negroid cacophony.

On the nature of nationalism Tagore further says:

“Even though from childhood I have been taught that idolatry of the nation is almost better than reverence for God and humanity, I believe I have outgrown that teaching, and it is my conviction that my countrymen will truly gain their India by fighting against the education which teaches them that a country is greater than the ideals of humanity. The educated Indian at present is trying to absorb some lessons from history contrary to the lessons of our ancestors. The East, in fact, is attempting to take unto itself a history which is not the outcome of its own living. Japan, for example, thinks she is getting powerful through adopting Western methods, but, after she has exhausted her

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